

RELIGION IN LIFE

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Christian Solidarity and War

JESSE S. DANCEY

I

WE who are linked by a common interest in RELIGION IN LIFE are almost entirely members of churches, but with numerous denominational affiliations. Yet, however much we differ, we are united in our sincere desire for closer spiritual fellowship. We wish really to be one. How can we tighten these mystic cords of Christian brotherhood?

If unity demands uniformity in affiliation, belief and manner of worship, there is little hope for it. This sort of unity has been long sought without result and today it seems further away than ever. Christian unity is no longer merely the problem of getting the denominations together, for denominations have been losing their specific character. Sharp cleavages often prevent those worshiping under the same roof from arriving at common ground, while many earnest Christians, struggling to make headway in the face of the general confusion and the critical spirit of the age, are unable to accept any particular system of belief without mental reservations.

If unity with identity is not possible, may we hope for the comradeship which springs from deep devotion to a great common purpose, served in that spirit of liberty which allows each denomination and each individual to conceive that purpose and to serve it in his own way? Whether this be a higher or a lower conception of unity, even it is a great way off. As Christians we do not yet have any great common purpose which is definite enough to have practical meaning, and this may be because we are still too sectarian and parochial to grasp life in terms of its great essentials.

Since the churches have so largely left doctrinal controversy behind, we are apt to think we have outgrown sectarianism, but inspection will show this unwelcome presence shadowing us still. In a theological age sectarianism demanded subordination to a creed, but in this practical generation it insists upon deference to some pet method. The abolitionists claimed that their attitude toward slavery alone was Christian. The fight against the liquor traffic produced that type of prohibitionist who was certain that he only was an enemy of alcohol and who despised others. Today there are Christian zealots refusing to give the hand of fellowship to any who

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do not chant the hymn of hate against capitalism and all its works. And finally there are the ultrapacifists with their demand of a pledge of nonparticipation in any future war as the supreme test of fidelity to the program of Jesus. The pernicious anemia of sectarianism still afflicts us.

Now let us understand each other. I am not passing judgment upon the merits of any of these current proposals, but only attempting to show what happens when it is insisted that any of them be accepted with finality. This demand that a method be accorded a special or exclusive Christian character merely closes discussion, prevents an adequate treatment of the problem and shatters the unity of the Christian community face to face with that issue. It overlooks the fact that the kingdom of God is not a matter of form but of spirit.

Here emerges the all-important consideration: is it possible for the Christian community to attack a great evil in society without breaking into quarreling cliques which sacrifice the hope of victory to their contentiousness? Will it ever be possible for the Church of God, with unbroken ranks, to move like a mighty army? Time is lacking for a general examination of this problem. I shall consider it in relation to only one definite issue, that of the attitude of the Church toward war.

And so we have arrived at a most solemn moment. For this question reaches beyond that of slavery or liquor or capitalism into the area where Church and State must meet in a death struggle unless some formula can be agreed upon which leaves both these institutions in full possession of their independence and dignity.

Rightly or wrongly, the power to command the support of its citizens in waging war has been regarded from time immemorial as the supreme function of the sovereignty of the State and as indispensable to its self-preservation. The Church has not previously questioned this right, at least in modern times. If she is to question it now, the Church exposes her own unity to an unprecedented strain, for church members are also citizens. What are they to do should the loyalties involved in this dual relationship become irreconcilable? Already this question has arisen and with it appears the specter of grave divisions within the Christian fellowship.

The dangers to the Church, divided on this issue, become appalling when we realize that it must confront a united State, for while administrations change within the State, it is the function of an existing administration to present a unified program, and to back that program, if need be, with all

the physical force at its command. The possibility of such a situation is poignantly suggested by what is even now taking place in certain countries in the relations of Church and State. Does the fidelity of the Church to her mission require her to face the State with a challenge so categorical, or is there the possibility here of some ghastly mistake? This sets the question which we must attempt to answer.

II

While every government is prepared to insist upon its sovereign right to make war, no government faces the possible exercise of this right complacently. Here governments reflect the sentiment of their publics. Even the restricted and disinherited nations, which fear they may be forced to appeal to war in a hazardous attempt to secure justice, recognize the deadly scourge of war and the uncertainties attendant upon the use of that instrument. Among citizens we may assume that everywhere the active church membership is the element most definitely set against war. Yet, on the whole, the opposition of Christians to war is still in the stage of sentiment, having crystallized into no definite policy.

However, on the extreme left of the anti-war movement in the churches, a clearly defined program has developed. This is the pacifist program. It urges the employment of every possible means to prevent war, but if even then war must come, it is the distinctive mark of pacifism to disassociate itself to the utmost from the war-waging activity. So today individuals are signing pledges and groups are solemnly committing themselves to withhold their support from any future war, whatever its character. This movement is drawing to itself some of our finest spirits and there is something so heroic in its attitude that criticism halts in its presence. Nevertheless it demands the most careful scrutiny.

The war resisters, to a very great extent, derive their inspiration from religion, and from the Christian religion in particular. Their most significant support appears to come from Christian ministers. The cornerstone of this antiwar philosophy seems to be an ethical monism. By this is meant that it holds the laws of ethics to apply equally under all conditions. It would seem to argue that if Christianity is a religion of love applicable to individuals, then it applies in the same way to groups of individuals, and nations, since the nation is only an enormous human group.

At first sight this principle of the equal application of a moral rule

seems to have the force of an axiom. There is ground for questioning, however, whether Jesus himself subscribed to it. Assuming the absoluteness of the rule of God, Jesus' enemies thought to embarrass him by forcing from him the admission that the Roman State formed no exception. But here Jesus ruled that men should render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things which are God's. At the same time Jesus arranged for the payment of his own taxes, some considerable part of which went, no doubt, to maintain the Roman military establishment.

The idea that the individual and the State are subject to the same laws has its great precedent not in Jesus, but in Plato. Plato discusses the matter at length in the fourth book of *The Republic*. Being an aristocrat, Plato was trying to produce a defense for the existing social order in Athens. It was made up of the wealthy and cultured class at the top, to which Plato himself belonged, with a vast slave population at the bottom, kept in order by the military. Plato urges the naturalness of this arrangement, because, he insists, it corresponds to the triple nature of the human individual, who is made up of intellect for guidance, will for control, and physical energies and passions, to be guided and controlled. So in the State the common mass is to be directed and disciplined by the wisdom and power represented in the two classes above them. Christianity historically took over this idea to secure a warrant for the universal imposition of Christianity, conceived as a fixed ethical pattern. It results in an ethical imperialism, which takes no account of the actual complexities of life.

Upon the slightest consideration the differences between the individual and the national group are so obvious that one wonders how they could ever have been denied. First, the individual has mobility. In his effort at self-realization he may pass freely from nation to nation. On the contrary, the nation lacks mobility, but must realize itself within a definite geographical area, if at all. It is not absolutely essential that any given individual produce offspring, but the reproduction of its population is the first necessity of the nation. The individual may do with his life as he will. He may choose to lower his standard of living; he may die for a principle. But a nation may not do as it will with its population; it must support its standard of living, and it becomes wholly recreant if it does not defend its people to the utmost.

In relation to violence the individual and the nation do not exist under comparable conditions. The individual, no matter in what country

he finds himself, is under the protection of laws enforced by the physical power of the State. But there is no positive system of law for the protection of states, each being thrown back upon its ability to protect itself. Therefore, when the State kills it may be on an altogether different moral plane than when an individual kills. War need not necessarily be "mass murder." Under existing conditions nations may be driven to war to defend their boundaries or to secure the means by which a restricted population may live. This is not to justify war, for here war ceases to be a question of right or wrong and becomes the possible form which may be taken by the instinctive urge of the masses of a nation to achieve a tolerable position in relation to other more secure and prosperous peoples.

We find then that the nation is not, as Plato said, merely the individual written large. The two are different in nature, with two laws, one law for the individual, another law for the nation, and one cannot follow the law of the other without courting disastrous results. The pacifist formula does not take account of this basic fact. It is not in contact with its environment and so offers us no solution for our problem.

III

In the old tale of the "Idylls of the King" Tennyson relates how one after another, each lured by his own private vision of the Holy Grail, the knights of King Arthur deserted the common task of driving out the heathen, slaying the wild beast, and felling the forest to let in the sun. At last when only empty chairs stood about the Round Table, the king, the symbol of the State, arose to address the ghosts of those who had left him desolate.

"O my knights," he cried,
"Was I too dark a prophet when I said
To those who went upon the Holy Quest
That most of them would follow wandering fires,
Lost in the quagmire?—lost to me and gone,
And leave me gazing at a barren board. . . .

"And some among you held that if the King
Had seen the sight he would have sworn the vow.
Not easily, seeing that the King must guard
That which he rules, and is but as the hind
To whom a space of land is given to plow,
Who may not wander from the allotted field
Before his work be done."

So we find the individual with a certain freedom in the choice and service of ideals, but the State has its obligation fixed for it by the interests of its population, living in relation to a certain determined geographical area.

What is to be the procedure of the Church under these conditions? Must it limit the application of the law of love to individuals in their private relations, while leaving the State free to pursue its own policy of force, if not sanctifying whatever course the government may choose to follow either in domestic or foreign relations? This has been the deliberate program of the Church in some countries. Elsewhere, without intention, it has come to just about that.

Although this program is still highly approved in some quarters, if ever satisfactory, it is no longer so, even from the standpoint of the national interest. The percussions of modern warfare have become so terrible that they threaten destruction to weak and strong nations alike. But from this vicious sequence of force no single nation can escape, since in international, as in business competition, the level of relationships is determined not by the best but by the most ruthless competitor. It was this which drove the nations of Europe to act in concert for the prevention of war. So arose the historic European balance of power, beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and continuing with varying success until August 1, 1914. Since then the League of Nations has been set up to support peace, but its weakness is that it became inevitably a means of guaranteeing the advantages gained by the present great Powers, and turned a deaf ear to the needs of the cramped and restricted nations. It attempts to impose a static control upon a dynamic world, and this is as impossible as it is for a forest to turn back the winds which blow over it. If nations cannot themselves do away with war, neither can individual opposition, no matter how numerous the dissenting individuals, for individuals are powerless to offer a peace system as an alternative for the present international chaos.

But one institution has the capacity to generate the atmosphere and to provide the conditions essential to a world structure of peace, and that institution is the Christian Church. It alone may grow into what it is not yet, namely, an effective peace society. Like the nation, the Church is limited for self-realization to a definite geographical area. But while with the nations this is an exclusive unit of territory, with the Church it is an

inclusive area, embracing the whole world. Not until it has gathered to itself the last desolate isle, will the Church have attained its natural boundaries. Furthermore, as the nation is responsible for the population within its territorial limits, so the Church is responsible for the population of the earth to the very last man. Nor is its responsibility primarily for the physical needs of men, like that of the nation, but for the sum total of the needs of all personalities in the world, physical, intellectual, social, spiritual, both actual and potential.

Now it is apparent that the Church cannot satisfy these needs through the present war system, or even while it exists. This system creates what is actually a continuing state of war, waged through tariffs, currency manipulation and other means, always inhibiting the emergence of the best in men and forcing them back to sub-human levels. The higher system of just, sympathetic and eager co-operation essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Church is not possible because everywhere the strong nations oppress the weaker nations, while within the nations the more powerful and wealthy classes crush the feeble and the more scrupulous. This places the Church, the world over, where she is compelled to champion the weak against the strong. In other words she must insist upon respect for the Christian law of love, regardless of class, race, sex, or human conditions of any sort.

The recognition of a difference in the nature of individuals from the nature of the State, does not remove the State from the pressure of the law of love to which the individual is subject. It only demands its application in a manner suited to the difference between the individual and the nation. So we find the Church at last standing over against the nation, challenging it in the name of the underprivileged and disinherited, whether these be nations, races, classes, or individuals.

To make good this bold and uncompromising challenge the Church requires powerful support. The nation may compel the support of her citizens. The Church can compel no one but must rely upon the voluntary force gathered from the citizens of all nations, who are willing to enlist at any cost under the banner of the Church to oppose that which is lower in the nations and in human nature, for the sake of the higher possibilities of life with which the Church has identified herself.

What must be the strategy of the Church in this critical situation?

IV

When Tolstoi was an army officer, he once observed a fellow-officer striking a common soldier who had fallen out of the ranks during the march. "Are you not ashamed to abuse a fellow-human being like that?" he chided; "Have you never read the Gospels?" "And you," retorted the other, "have you never read the book of military rules?" There they stand in contrast—what men of the world could call, ineffective sentimentality and brutal efficiency. So the Church, representative of the Gospel, and the State, source of military rules, confront each other. What is to be done in this dilemma? Is there any solution which does not involve either revolution or compromise and hypocrisy?

It will be helpful, first of all, to contrast the temperaments of these two institutions. The spirit of the State is masculine. It is concerned with material things, over which it attempts to establish control by impersonal rules, and through the device of abstract systems; it is expert in the use of force to secure obedience to its regulations and policies, both within and without the nation. On the other hand the spirit of the Church may be called feminine. It is concerned primarily with persons, its aim is not the development of institutions but the present and eternal welfare of human beings. It recognizes the inconsistency of its reliance upon force and money, and feels that its real strength is in its ability to awaken love, to labor untiringly, to wait patiently, to endure without complaint, to suffer without bitterness. Here we discover the sexual tension which runs through all forms of life, finding its poles of opposition in human society. Our problem here is how these two elements, each of which demands the other, are to find happy and productive adjustment in political society.

Four ways of adjustment suggest themselves. First there is the old standard way by which masculine force conquers feminine weakness and compels it to serve without admitting it to equality. This has been the way particularly of savagery and the Orient. Where woman has been degraded and debased, civilization has enjoyed but a stunted growth. Since the beginning of the Renaissance, the masculine State has subordinated the feminine Church in much this manner. The Church has been limited to relatively harmless spiritual exercises, dealing with the mystic life of men, but the State has insisted upon having its say in business, war and politics, for all of which it has demanded approval in terms of ecclesiastical sanction.

But as the subordination of woman is coming now everywhere to an end, it is not likely that the Church will much longer endure humiliation by the powers of this world.

One of the most distinctive marks of emerging womanhood is its tendency to pose as morally superior to the masculine. In this way it compensates for its inferiority in physical power and in practical experience. The feminine appears as the champion of abstract ethical notions which it naively demands that the world accept without reference to actual conditions. This has been and remains, to too great an extent, the attitude of many who preach the so-called social Gospel. Utopian standards are set up for the regulation of men's habits, for the management of business and the conduct of international affairs, resulting in much hypocritical pride and stubbornness upon the part of the representatives of Christianity and in vast irritation and resistance in those who are subjects of this lecturing. Since the Great War, the United States has played this feminine rôle in international relations. She herself, with her national destiny in terms of territory fully rounded out, with less reason for war than any other nation, has assumed the rôle of lecturer on peace to an evil world, but always refusing to assume any definite responsibility for the enforcement of the peace to which she professes such devotion. It is to be hoped, so far as the Church is still inclined to take this attitude toward the world of affairs, that with coming maturity, she will speedily outgrow it.

A third relation between the masculine and the feminine is that which obtains when they allow their natural difference in temperament to drive them into a state of hopeless misunderstanding, out of which can come only shameless bickering and irreconcilable incompatibility. When this occurs in the home the spiritual foundations disappear, whether or not the case ever gets to the divorce court. In our present state of shocking change, with all its accompanying worries, there appears no small danger that the frayed nerves of both Church and State may drive them into just this relationship. When they thus begin hurling direct challenges at each other, all the combustible material lying round may be set on fire, and we may see things happen such as have been occurring in Russia and Germany.

Certainly there must be a more excellent way. This shines before us in singular beauty in the best examples of married life. Here the masculine and the feminine take each other for better or for worse, no thought of parting short of death being entertained for a moment. This confession

of individual insufficiency and faith in the attainment of organic completeness through mutual fellowship is full of inspiration. With this fundamental attitude goes the confidence that every problem may be adjusted to the genuine satisfaction of both parties. Under this pattern the Church is ready to recognize a real partnership with the State, while the State, conscious of its need of a genuine helpmate, exhibits no taste for a totalitarian grass-widowhood or bachelorhood, in which it may indulge its querulous masculine will to its complete undoing. What are the essential features of such a marriage between the Church and the State?

V

Any true marriage requires an accord between two still separate personalities and is not a mere merging of both into one. This implies mutual respect and also recognition of the fact that at certain points, no matter how free and cordial the discussion, one must become the leader and assume the responsibility of the decision, while the other must loyally accept the rôle of follower. Now, since the realm of the State is that of practical activity, with it must rest the obligation of developing methods for the control of the common life and for making decisions in matters of public policy. Although such decisions may be arrived at only after the most sincere effort to strike an accord, it may be that they will not always be agreeable to the Church. Still it becomes the duty of the Church to accept these decisions as at any rate temporarily binding and to encourage citizens to support them, if not because they are right by virtue of their own character, at least because they are the decisions of the State.

But if this becomes for the Church merely a passive rôle, she has fallen far short of her obligation under this dual arrangement. While the State must devise and act, it must also give full recognition to the responsibility which rests upon the Church to evaluate morally all State policies and activities. This requires that upon all subjects and at all times the Church must exercise the right of examining the program of the State and of encouraging the citizens in their free discussion of it. This also demands that the developing minds of the citizens be not subject to repression, whatever their attitude toward the commonly accepted standards, but that these minds be constructively disciplined and led.

Under these conditions the State might decide upon war. But if her relations with the Church have developed along the lines suggested here,

the State would reach this decision only after paying the largest possible deference to the mind of the Church in the matter. But it might be that the popular mind had become inflamed and had forced the hand of the State. Under this situation, even, it would still be the duty of the Church to support the State and to urge obedience to its policies because they were its policies, but without accepting responsibility for those policies. In this way the Church might come in for a large share of persecution, but it would be her duty to endure this cheerfully as a part of the burden to be borne out of loyalty to truth and love.

Furthermore, if painful issues required the attention of the State, perhaps involving surgical treatment, it would be the duty of the Church to keep the condition aseptic. It must keep down infection by opposing propaganda, by separating race and class prejudices from the real issue, always trying to focus the public mind upon the real point involved. This would require the possession by the Church of mental poise and of accurate sources of information, but it would be her duty to equip herself with these.

There is nothing dramatic in such a relation as this between the Church and the State and it may seem tame, indeed, to those who love the heroic deed and expect that the problems of humanity are to be adjusted once for all at some definite rendezvous with destiny. But there will be no opportunity to fight the whole thing out at any particular barricade. Our view of the matter is that the Kingdom of God will not come with observation, but that institutions must be molded gradually through their almost imperceptible influence upon each other when their relationships are right, just as a rich family life is not to be achieved by a spectacular campaign but develops under the impact of the vicissitudes of daily experience through the decades and even through the generations.

It is interesting to note that the position taken here as to the relation of Church and State when great issues arise, seems to be that which would have been approved by Abraham Lincoln. In a speech in Congress during the course of the Mexican War, which he thought unjustified, Lincoln declared: "If to say 'the war was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by the President' be opposing the war, then the Whigs (Lincoln's party) have very generally opposed it. But if when the war had begun and had become the cause of the country, the giving of our money and our blood, in common with yours, was support of the war, then it is not true that we have opposed the war."

Some ten years later when discussing a famous decision of the United States Supreme Court in reply to a speech by Stephen A. Douglas, Lincoln said: "He (Douglas) denounces all who question the correctness of that decision, as offering violent resistance to it. But who resists it? We think the Dred Scott decision erroneous. We offer no resistance to it. We believe as much as Judge Douglas (perhaps more) in obedience and respect for the judicial department of government. We think its decisions on constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control not only the particular cases decided, but the general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by amendments to the Constitution as provided in that instrument itself." Of Lincoln, Bertrand Russell writes (*Freedom versus Democracy*, p. 289): "His position was always that a private citizen should not set himself in opposition, except argumentatively, to a democratically elected government. He was one of the few thoroughly consistent believers in democracy that have ever lived. He believed not only, like Jefferson, in government by the *people* but in *government* by the people; he never lost sight of the need of authority and submission to the law."

VI

We began our discussion of the war problem from the standpoint of concern for its effect upon the unity of the Christian brotherhood. We have found a way of exerting a steady pressure against war without challenging the authority of the State within its area of irrevocable responsibility. But we need to know more about how this program may contribute positively to the growth of that Christian fellowship within which the nations may find the conditions of international peace.

Our argument, briefly, has been this. We have found the individual and the nation different in nature. The individual may sacrifice himself for principle, but the nation may not sacrifice its people. Its principle is to stand by its people and defend them, even if it lead to war. Hence the nation cannot practice the law of love in the same direct way that the individual can. But the law of force upon which the nation is thrown back at our present stage of civilization, cuts like a two-edged sword, so that those who take the sword must also perish by it. Yet nations cannot deliver themselves from this situation, since it is the most ruthless competitor who sets the pace at which the rest must march, and there is always some nation meditating military measures. Individuals cannot rescue the nations from

this war complex for they are powerless to provide an alternative system where the nations can find refuge. This brings the Church forward as the only effective peace society possible, for the Church, like the nation, can secure her self-realization only within certain geographical limits, but these limits for the Church are the whole world. Furthermore, the Church, like the nation, is responsible for all the persons within her national territory, but unlike the nations, she is responsible not only for the material well-being of her people, but for the present and eternal well-being of all men in every aspect of their lives. The Church can discharge her duty to men in this way, then, only where all nations co-operate in a mutual system of goodwill and understanding.

This Christian method involves the unreserved recognition of the dignity of the nation. It inspires reverence for the State in its exercise of devoted guardianship through the ages over the people of a certain area, having no object in view except their welfare. The State is an earthly creation with many of the marks of its origin upon it, but there it stands, appealing to our support in its great human task, and deserving it. But the State exists in a world of anarchy, where service to it may bring it and us at any time into violent conflict with our brother men in other nations.

We shrink from this, but the way out is not imperiously to decline to fight, but to build up the Church as a great world fellowship, supporting the effort to create a system of universal co-operation within which all nations may take refuge from the storm of international strife. Yet the Church can become such a fellowship only as in the experience of its members it actually becomes such a fellowship. But today our churches are narrow and parochial, thinking of themselves as independent and self-sufficing units. We pick out a favored city neighborhood or a single rural community as a territory within which a Church may, we think, realize itself. We do not see that no single Church, however small, can ever realize itself in anything short of the whole world. We fail to understand that the sense of its identity with the universal Christian community is the irreducible minimum required to constitute a Church as such. The greatest need therefore of every church member, every local congregation and every denomination is to cultivate a compelling consciousness of unity in the one universal and catholic Church of Christ, which must be present in its wholeness in every part, as each of its parts finds life only in the whole. In this way alone can we build up an adequate defense against war or lay the foun-

dations by which economic justice can be secured for all men. This seemingly indirect attack upon war and oppression is the only effective attack.

But this approach involves more than a development of a sense of unity as fellow church-members. It also brings us to realize that the Church and the State are not really opposing each other, but that they are engaged within society at the same task. We see in the State and in the Church husband and wife working together within the family group. If this be true, then those of us who recognize the obligations of citizenship into which we have been born and who also accept the privileges and duties of Church membership to which we are freely called, have the State as our Father and the Church as our Mother. As good children we will not side with one against the other. We will seek our way into that family fellowship which provides freedom in service under the dual authority of father and mother, and joy in the community of brothers and sisters in this united household. We will find inspiration in reaching out to make the whole world a spiritual fellowship through the Church, that it may become also an economic and political fellowship through the instrumentality of transformed States.

Recent Contributions to a Theory of Christian Certainty

EDGAR P. DICKIE

GEORGE GALLOWAY writes (*Faith and Reason in Religion*, p. 10): "We may hold that it is fit and right that we should have some justification for what we believe, but it does not follow that the only justification which is admissible is one which can be cast in the form of a logical demonstration. . . . In fact if, in practice, we were always to be guided and controlled by a purely logical criterion, we should seldom act at all. But we constantly act, and notably where the future is concerned, without being able to assign reasons for action which are logically cogent."

From a different standpoint, William James declares that "He who says, 'Better go without belief for ever than believe a lie!' merely shows his own preponderant private horror of becoming a dupe. . . . It is like a general informing his soldiers that it is better to keep out of battle for ever than to risk a single wound. . . . Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things. In a world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than this excessive nervousness on their behalf." (*The Will to Believe*, section VII.)

Dr. John Oman, from still another angle, indicates the fundamental weakness of rationalism. "So long as we did not believe anything not forced on us by mere logical argument, or did not do anything except what was imposed on us by rationalized imperatives, it seemed not to matter how much we missed of truth and righteousness, in complete disregard to the saddest of all failures in life, which is just what we miss of its fullness. Thus man was made a much poorer measure of the universe than he has it in him to be; and it was forgotten that, while his own knowing is the only measure man has, it is used to profit only when he realizes how very far the universe is beyond his measuring, and how with his best knowing and groping, he is, as Newton said, only a child gathering pebbles on the shore of the great ocean of truth." (*The Natural and the Supernatural*, p. 102.)

Or hear one more voice, directed to the humanists of our own day—"It is part of the tragedy of human life—or, if we have the heart to take it so, it is part of life's high adventure—that in all the supreme decisions we have to make, we are obliged to act upon insufficient evidence." The decisions may concern marriage, choosing a vocation, supporting or refusing to support one's country in time of crisis, or, most inclusive of all, choosing a religion or philosophy of life. "To wait too long for further information is to run great risk of making precisely the worst possible decision—which is, the decision not to decide. Moreover, many of these decisions have to be made in early life, when ignorance and inexperience add their weight to the inherent difficulties of the problem." (Dr. W. M. Horton: *Theism and the Modern Mood*, Chapter IV.)

Life is rather like playing a violin solo in public and learning the instrument as one goes on. We may not begin life equipped with the experience which only life can give. Nevertheless, when we speak of Christian certitude, we are bound to recognize, first of all, that the thing is, quite clearly, *there*. When the poet Henley was under the care of Lord Lister, he wrote of his "large, placid brow, the soft lines of tranquil thought, the benign face, the faculties of patience and unyielding will, and his wise, rare smile, so sweet with certainties." It might be said that the certainties of religious people are subjective only. But that is to make the mistake of Feuerbach; to suppose that the evidence of the outsider is conclusive, while that of the experience itself may be disregarded. It is not easy to see why Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz and Kant; why again Phidias and Michael Angelo, Raphael and Rembrandt, Bach and Beethoven, Homer and Shakespeare are to be regarded as revealers of various kinds of truth and reality, if Amos and Isaiah, Augustine and Aquinas, Francis of Assisi and Joan of Arc are to be treated as pure illusionists in precisely what constitutes their specific greatness. (Cf. von Hügel, *Essays and Address*, I, p. 38.) The certainties of religious people are not *deceptive* satisfactions.

Nor are they *premature* satisfactions. They arise, indeed, at precisely those points where there might appear to be reason for uncertainty. They come, not through turning away from difficulties and perplexities, but from facing them; not from timid contentment with a few comforting rays of light, but from the courageous, steady look into the darkness. When we turn to consider the supreme example, we discover One who knew and suffered the consequences of evil as none other has ever done; who knew

also the extent, the profundity, and the seriousness of human sin as no one else could know them; and yet, in Christ, we find One whose sureness of God did not waver. When he spoke about God, he was speaking on his own subject. The best of men have failed to fulfil the spiritual conditions for right knowledge of God. They discern these realities only dimly and fitfully. But in him the conditions were fulfilled. And, when he speaks of God, it is to say that man, this tiny creature, may cry, and he is heard by the God who built the atom and flung out the stars.

The organ of spiritual knowledge is spiritual. Brunner has expressed it in this way: "The thing that matters supremely is not whether man is 'aware of' or has a 'feeling' for 'something divine,' but whether he knows God as the One who challenges him to decision." (*The Mediator*, English Translation, p. 13.) And Karl Heim has the same in mind when he speaks of the "inward attitude" which is "entirely different from that involved in the technical recasting of Nature. In this case I am not playing the part of a cool spectator. My personality is at stake. It is all engaged in the transaction. This is the willing, believing, praying attitude." (*The New Divine Order*, English Translation, p. 43.) These are all, indeed, interpretations of the words, "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine." The organ of this knowledge is spiritual. It will record the truth only if it is kept pure and sensitive. If we differ from the poets about poetry, we may be sure that it is *we* who are wrong. If we disagree with the good people about religion, it is probable that *we* have missed the truth: they are seeing things which our eyes are not clear enough to behold.

This certitude, then, is *there*, a fact to be acknowledged, a certitude of its own appropriate type. But it is quite a different exercise when we come to speculate about the nature of it. To examine the experience changes the experience. Nevertheless, there are certain things which theology can do, and ought to do.

1. It can remove difficulties which are unreal or nonvital.

(i) Many are profoundly troubled when they discover that others cannot see what they see. They have a natural desire, for the sake of these others, to produce evidence or argument which will appeal to them. We must recognize that this is a profitless task. Herrmann declares that it is impossible to prove to the unbeliever the things which the Christian knows. The affirmations of spiritual experience, like those of all the higher

regions of thought, aesthetic, ethical, and the others, are not capable of logical demonstration. (Cf. A. Martin, *Finality of Jesus for Faith*, p. 216.) Faith knows nothing of external guarantees. To demand them is to fail to understand its very nature as a free heroic act. The truths of mathematics, of the natural sciences, and of history, are convincing because they must be accepted indifferently by men who are spiritually opposed to one another. Unity is possible, in the realm of mathematical and physical truth, between those who are hostile in outlook to one another. It is not so in the realm of the spirit. There can be no criterion of the truth of the knowledge of God outside God himself. (Cf. Berdyaev: *Freedom and the Spirit*, pp. 105-110.) If it can be said that "Science is the great cleanser of human thinking; it makes impossible any religion but the highest" (*Reality*, p. 272) it might be added that theology has as its aim the purification of belief; it ensures that there shall be no rest in premature satisfaction; that truth shall be acknowledged only when it rests on the highest type of evidence. Faith can offer its evidence only to those who have lived in its sunlight and eaten of its bread.

(ii) Theology may remove a difficulty in the minds of those who have not had the experience of religious certitude. It reminds them, not only that there may be evidence which they have not taken into account, but also that their disregard of this evidence may falsify their interpretation of those facts which they seem, by their very detachment, best fitted to explain. Science has marvellously revealed and explained the substructure of the world, the protons and electrons and waves which underlie the constitution of matter as we know it. But science cannot explain the meaning and purpose of the world. It is not the whirling electrons that explain the rose, but the rose that explains the flying electrons. Suppose a tribe of men who had eyes so penetrating that they were able to discern the electrons which constitute a flower. They would be aware of a world inexplicable and terrifying. But suppose that some scientist in the tribe discovered a way of reducing their visual powers so that the flower became visible in its beauty and freshness, they would discover a wonderful explanation of the inexplicable dance of atoms. (*Science Rediscovered God*, R. C. Macfie, pp. 252ff.) Convictions about the world, acquired in another sphere than the spiritual, may need for their explanation precisely that experience which has been left out of the reckoning.

2. Of Metaphysics, F. H. Bradley writes in his notebook, "Meta-

physics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct." (*Appearance and Reality*, p. xiv.) In the second place, therefore, the task of theology is to construct a theory of religious knowledge. It must set itself to bring out more clearly the nature of the religious experience; to distinguish between experiences which are transient and those which are ultimate; between those which have relative value and those which are absolute; between those which are individual and eccentric and those which are general and fundamental. Nevertheless, it must always be borne in mind that the *theory* cannot have certitude. That belongs to an experience, not to a theory of it. Spiritual experience is reality—perhaps the only reality—it is not simply a state of man's soul or a religious feeling. Heresies are not false doctrines but distorted spiritual experience. Convictions do not always remain vivid and self-authenticating; instead of the soul in touch with God, we may have only memories, impressions, and results of that communion. It follows, therefore, that great importance must be attached also to the experience of the *community*.

Certain philosophies begin with a self-authenticating experience. From the postulate of thought, for example, Hegel proceeds to show by dialectic how the Universal Thought unfolds itself in the cosmos. But the best example is Descartes. Truth is that which is *clear* and *distinct*; clear, in that it is self-evident; distinct, in that it depends on nothing else. Nothing in the outward world can provide such evidence, since it might be only imagination or fancy; and since, moreover, it can be known only indirectly through our senses. Then Descartes found that which, he thought, it was impossible to doubt—his own existence as a thinking being. *Cogito, ergo sum.*

It is fairly easy to see that *cogito ergo sum* says at once too much and too little—too much, because the act of thinking does not prove the continued existence of the ego which thinks; can say nothing indubitable of its past or of its future; personal identity is not proved: and too little, because it ignores the other aspect of the case; thinking, perceiving, doubting are impossible, certainly, unless there is something that thinks, perceives, doubts; but they are equally impossible if there is not something that is thought, perceived, doubted. This latter point is emphasized again by Husserl in passages on the *intentionality* of consciousness. (Consciousness is always consciousness of something. A *cogitatio* implies a *cogitatum*.) The phe-

nomenological method discovers the *a priori*, not, with Kant, in the mind, but in the thing itself. The necessity of the *a priori* is not a necessity of thought, but of being. (Cf. Cullberg, *Das Du und die Wirklichkeit*, p. 91.)

It appears that *cogito ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am) is no truer nor more fundamental than *cogito ergo sunt* (I think, therefore things are). And this brings us to examine another conceivable postulate—*cogito ergo es* (I think, therefore thou art). Heidegger plainly declares (*Sein und Zeit*, pp. 113ff.) that the ego can as little be given without other egos as without the external world. But, many years before, F. H. Bradley had written a brief, but pregnant, paragraph, which foreshadowed much of contemporary philosophy of the "I" and the "Thou." It occurs in his chapter on "Solipsism" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 255). "If I am asked to justify my belief that other selves, beside my own, are in the world, the answer must be this, I arrive at other souls by means of other bodies, and the argument starts from my own body. My own body is one of the groups which are formed in my experience. And it is connected, immediately and specially, with pleasure and pain, and again with sensations and volitions, as no other group can be. But, since there are other groups like my body, these must also be qualified by similar attendants. With my feelings and my volitions these groups cannot correspond. For they are usually irrelevant and indifferent, and often even hostile; and they enter into collision with one another and with my body. Therefore these foreign bodies have, each of them, a foreign self of its own."

This relation is, clearly, of very great importance to the theologian. The relation I-Thou may prove to be an analogy of the relation I-God. *Persons* are different from *things*. There is a Thou-world and there is an It-world. Without the It, man cannot live: yet, if he has nothing but the It, he is not man. The It world is ruled by causality: man's real world is the world of personal relations. An expression of this attitude is the word "Love" or the word "Spirit." These are not in the ego alone, but between the "I" and the "Thou." Whereas the external world is ruled by causality, this world is ruled by freedom. The tragedy is that we cannot encounter a "Thou" without seeking to turn it into an "It," objectifying it, destroying its freedom. This tragedy is sealed unless there is an eternal Thou which can never become an It, can never be objectified. Our attitude to God has been described as the feeling of dependence. Against Schleiermacher and Otto, Buber shows that, while the feeling of dependence may

be connected with it, it is not its essence. The one analogy is the relation of an "I" to a "Thou." What is the nature of this relation when it concerns man on the one side and God on the other?

Barth, in his attack on idealism and subjectivism, opposes to the idealist's unity of God and man the doctrine of distance between them, qualitative difference. Christian faith is the recognition of this distance, leaving God as God and man as man. The qualitative difference between Time and Eternity provides a thesis and antithesis of which there is no synthesis—not even in faith. In effect, Barth's solution is the negation of the human side. Man is nothing: God is all. The difficulty inherent in the Barthian theology on this point is that you cannot destroy one side without destroying the whole relation. Between the All-Real and the not-real there cannot even be distance! Barth overlooks the *religious* aspect of distance, which is concerned, not with two metaphysical qualities, but with personalities. The real form of Christian belief is this: Faith is communion with God: distance is the result of the estrangement of sin. (It is significant that the term "communion with God" hardly appears in Barth's writings.) With Barth, sin is rather metaphysically than ethically conceived. For him, the sentence "All men are sinners before God" is really parallel with the sentence "God is all: man is nothing."

In his search for objectivity in religious knowledge, Barth was thus driven to study this attitude which is characteristic of personal relations. In *Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes*, he accepts the position that God is always subject, never object, and he faces the problem, How can God become object of our knowledge? His answer is that the real object of religious knowledge is not God himself but our being known by God. (It is difficult, however, to see how we can be conscious of being known by God without at the same time having some knowledge of God.) Barth then takes up the valuable suggestion that God's Word is not simply spoken, but "addressed" (not only *Rede* but *An-Rede*). God, in revelation, is not a neutral force, but a Person. We inquire concerning the possibility of revelation, and we find that the Divine "I" must become a "Thou," in order to be known by men. God becomes incarnate in order to have fellowship with men.

The impression conveyed by much of this dialectic is that there are two Gods: first the *deus absconditus*, God in himself (there is a perilous affinity here with Kant's "thing-in-itself"), and, second, the God who reveals

himself. The God of faith is different from the God of metaphysics, not simply, as we might say with justification, inadequately apprehended by metaphysics (because the personal relation is left out of account) but actually different. This is an inevitable result. If we do not begin with the personality of God, we cannot arrive at it.

It is at this point that Karl Heim takes up the question of religious certitude. Religion and philosophy cannot be put in water-tight compartments. Heim has found himself in the same cul-de-sac as the Barthians, and in the same danger of postulating *two* ultimates, one that which is sought by the metaphysician, the other the object of faith. But, unlike the Barthians, he saw that the position was untenable. Religion and philosophy, he finds, must be two sides of the same thing. Is it possible, then, to establish religious certainty on a theory of knowledge? In *Glaube und Denken* he attacks the problem of ontology which has been considered by Heidegger, Grisebach, Buber, Gogarten and others. Philosophical systems have broken down, because they concentrated their attention solely on the nature of consciousness. We must invert the phrase of Descartes, so that we have, not *cogito ergo sum*, but *sum, ergo cogito*. We need to examine, not the nature of thought, but the nature of the ego which thinks.

There are two ways in which the ego may approach reality. 1. The way of experience, which is immediate, and cannot be defined. 2. The way of what is called "scientific knowledge." It is to be remembered that the second way, quite as much as the first, assumes an ultimate which cannot be proved. It must presuppose, for example, that two things which we take to be different, are actually different. We desire to find the unknown *X* which is the object of these two different types of knowledge. To probe into the ultimate is to analyze the form and significance of the function of differentiation. At first this is a simple matter. The book is different from the table on which it lies. (Spatial determination decides this.) This note C is different from that played a moment ago. (Temporal determination decides this.) But how are we to differentiate Space from Time? Here we have differentiation of the second grade—differentiation between spheres of differentiation. These spheres of differentiation Heim calls *Dimensions*. The presence of a Dimension is indicated by an Either-Or; the entrance of another Dimension by escape from the apparently decisive Either-Or. The entrance of another Dimension he calls a "dimensional cleavage." A

content belonging to n Dimensions suddenly stands in $n + 1$ Dimensions. This involves a paradox. What is now seen to be possible can be expressed, for those who have no knowledge of this new Dimension, only in a paradox. Dimensions belong together, inseparably. They condition one another (polarity). Yet a person may be "blind" to a Dimension.

Heidegger saw that we cannot be conscious of our self without being at the same time conscious of the world, from which, as background, the self is differentiated. *Cogito ergo sum* runs out into *cogito ergo sunt*. The ego and the world can be thought of apart only in abstraction. Between them is a relation of polarity. It is a distinctive feature of Heim's philosophy that he identifies with this relation I-the World a relation which at first appears altogether different, the relation Present-Past. These, says Heim, are the same from different aspects. "I" stands always for that which is present and not yet determined: the World (It) is that which is past, decided, brought under the reign of causality; the precipitate of the fluid present.

It may be that the relation I-Thou and the relation I-God are altogether different from the relation I-It. To think only of the I-It type may be to lose the chance of probing to the ultimate. But this is the only relation which scientific knowledge takes into account. Cartesian thought missed the fact that the ego is related in a peculiar way to the Thou. It dealt only with the I-It relation. The discovery of the I-Thou relation is a revolution in Western thought. Here we have a new Dimension. That which is true within it can be expressed only in paradox to those who have no knowledge of it. To them its truths will appear as impossibilities.

The paradox appears at once when we realize that here, in the Thou, we have a second perspective center of *the same world*, claiming to be a center from which truth is seen in its absolute nature. A seen point turns into a seeing point. Here is a contradiction of the fundamental rule of the I-It world, that there can be only one absolute standpoint. This is a sign that a new dimension has entered. This dimensional cleavage comes from the tension between doing and suffering, action and passion. (I am aware of the other according as his will coincides or interferes with mine.) The Thou claims to be the perspective middle-point. If its claim is allowed, then we can no longer hold to our objective picture of the world. The "world" becomes now the unity of world-aspects of possibly innumerable subjects, each of which may confront me as a Thou. But the "world" of

scientific knowledge is an *It*, that which is past, amenable to measurement and calculation.

We see, therefore, that in metaphysics Heim is neither idealist nor realist. With Heidegger, he refuses to make the ego an absolute. It is not the ego itself which is elevated above space, time, and individuality, but the ego which is "here and now." Hence it is impossible to fall into the mistake of idealism, of identifying the ego with God. Second, the realist's thing-in-itself disappears. Every "thing" depends on some perspective center.

From this study of intra-mundane relations of transcendence, Heim turns to consider the ultimate Dimension.

Is it possible to express the transcendence of the omnipresent God in terms of an intramundane relationship? He finds that neither the *I-Thou* relation nor the *I-It* relation is adequate. This is made clear when we consider the two fundamental problems by which we are confronted as human beings who know and will. There is the question propounded by our *knowing* faculty—the question of origins. We may postulate a First Cause, but this is only arbitrarily chosen. We make a halt in our regress, and say, *Here let us assume a beginning.* Alternatively, we find the origin of all in the infinite totality of the causal system. A similar result is obtained when we consider the problem presented by our *wills*, the problem of the ultimate sanction of our actions. Here also it is possible to halt at some arbitrarily selected member of the series (for example, the will of a dictator, a code of laws, some corporate good to be achieved) or to fall back on the infinite interrelationship of the entire world-process. But the characteristic feature of the divine transcendence is that God belongs to a realm which lies beyond the contrast of these two possibilities; beyond the contrast of idolatry and pantheism.

"To meditate on the nature of God is to be confronted with an ultimate Either-Or: Either our categories of thought and perception possess validity for the comprehension of reality, and then we interpret the nature of God after the fashion of idolatry, by giving absolute value to some reality which is only relative, or pantheistically by an apotheosis of the infinite universe: Or, God is the *ens realissimum*, and therefore our intramundane forms of experience have the effect of concealing the ultimate nature of the 'I,' the 'Thou,' and the world. God, who is the source of all existence, cannot be apprehended in these forms.

"If God is a reality and cannot be disposed of in the manner of idolatry

or pantheism, then it is impossible for us, by our observation and by our thought, to arrive at any valid conclusion concerning his nature and his will. We are thrown back on divine revelation." (*Glaube und Denken*, 3rd edition; concluding paragraphs X-XIII.)

From Heim's discussion of intramundane forms of transcendence two things, I believe, have been gained. 1. We have seen that there may be different types of certitude. That which appears as paradox may be the truth: truth *must* appear as paradox to those who are as yet blind to the dimension in which it lies. Man of himself is incapable of apprehending the ultimate. It must come to him as revelation. 2. The study of the important relation *I-Thou* has given a new prominence in contemporary thought to the transcendence of Space and Time involved in personal relationships. This is of great importance when we come to consider the authority of Christ over the knowing and the willing faculties of men in all ages. Jesus, the Lord, is the contemporary of all his followers. Those who knew him as Incarnate Son of God have, over others, an advantage which is only relative, not absolute.

Another important contribution is made from another side, in the symbolism of Nicolas Berdyaev. Berdyaev had the distinction of suffering under both Tsarist and Bolshevik rule in Russia. In 1899, at the age of twenty-five, he was exiled from Kiev to the north of Russia. Associated with a group of Marxists, he helped to prepare the way for the Revolution. When that came about, he was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy in the University of Moscow; but, after twice undergoing imprisonment, he was expelled from Russia in 1922.

His philosophy of religion shows many undesigned parallels with the dimensional philosophy of Heim. He speaks, for example, of the "discontinuity of our thought about God." When thought tries to penetrate into the final mysteries, it involves a drastic revolution in our consciousness, which brings with it a spiritual illumination transforming the very nature of reason itself. Reason thus illuminated is reason of a different type, belonging neither to this world nor to this age. (*Freedom and the Spirit*, pp. 73-74.) This discontinuity in our thought about God "consists precisely in the abandonment of concepts in favor of symbols and myths." In the discontinuity of thought we see the equivalent of Heim's Dimension of the divine: in the reference to symbol and myth (both terms are used with a specific meaning, which Berdyaev carefully defines) we have a

parallel to Heim's "paradox." Discontinuity involves a "leap of faith," but this is not a venture, a hazard. Faith leaps because it sees the truth. It does not abandon reason: it carries reason with it; but reason is transformed and illumined. (Op. cit., 79.) Berdyaev is striving after an expression of symbolism which will transcend idealism and realism, rationalism and mysticism.

Rationalism, we know, is involved in certain insurmountable difficulties. Reason, for example, cannot prove the authority of reason; for every stage of the proof depends on the acceptance of that authority which is to be proved! From this there have followed two fatal consequences in the history of rationalism. 1. It reduced nature to a mechanical scheme of matter and motion, and it regarded religion as no more than a body of doctrines about God, providence, and immortality. 2. It failed to realize that each kind of reality has its own appropriate evidence, on which must depend the method of investigation; and thus, having determined the method in advance, rationalism limited its inquiry to that which could be made amenable to the method. (Cf. Oman: *Natural and Supernatural*, p. 103.)

On the other hand, mysticism, as we must now conceive it, is not to be confined to that revolt against reason represented by William James, who would reduce religion to the working of nonrational feelings and subconscious impulses; nor to Bergson's glorification of suprarational intuition. Nor is it to be narrowed down to Otto's awareness of a *mysterium tremendum*, or awe in the presence of the numinous. We should require to take into account the character of this feeling-experience. On this its religious quality depends, for not every form of awe is religious. (Cf. Galloway: *Faith and Reason*, pp. 24-29.) Our genuine mysticism must be one which takes account also of reason. If, with Berdyaev, we speak of it as symbolism, then we must be sure that we have only the *highest* symbols. Friedrich Heiler has emphasized the weakness of much Christian mysticism. It is a *formless* ecstasy. The soul seeks to lose itself in the death of Christ on the Cross. But the words and the deeds of Christ are only points of support for the soul in its journey back to the ineffable. Mystics can take part in the Mass without hearing any word or seeing anything on the altar. The passion of Christ is not a redemptive fact but only a symbol of that sacrifice which the mystic must every day offer afresh. (Heiler: *Der Katholizismus*, p. 527.) If this is possible, then it does not matter which intellectual ele-

ment has acted as the point of departure. Such mysticism has abandoned its religious character and has become aesthetic experience, pleasurable, it may be, and useful, but quite definitely not religious. (Cf. Heim: *Spirit and Truth*, English edition, Lutterworth Press, Chapter VI.)

The mystic must meet the difficulties of scientist, philosopher, historian, even textual critic; and must at least show that the difficulties are nonvital or unreal.

Moreover, the Philosopher must take into account the evidence of mystical experience. While checking the experience and restraining it from eccentricities and subjective fancies, the rationalist should be prepared to recognize that the solution of his difficulties, the key to his problems, may lie in this experience. Reason changes its type. It is prepared to deal with new evidence, hitherto unknown to it or unrecognized by it; and, because of its illumination, reason now sees this evidence more clearly and estimates it with more justice. "Revelation," says Berdyaev (op. cit., p. 96) "is a catastrophic transformation of consciousness, a radical modification of its structure, almost, one might say, a creation of new organs of being with functions in another world." "In the basic and original life and in the spiritual will an orientation toward a new world is possible which will create new organs of consciousness." (*Ibid.*, p. 98.)

Remembering that the organ of religious knowledge is a spiritual organ—a mind obedient, illumined, consecrated—we see that two results follow. The first is negative: The transcendence of God has not been rightly conceived. The wrong conception has arisen through the isolation of one side of the relation. Both philosophy and theology must refuse to take either God or man as their starting-point. "The transcendent is only part of the immanent, an incident in the course of spiritual development, a separation of spirit from spirit." "In the process of this antithetical division of the spirit revelation appears to possess a transcendent and objective character, but actually in its inner nature revelation is entirely immanent in the spirit within which it occurs." (Berdyaev: op. cit., p. 96.)

In this connection it is essential also to take cognizance of that barrier which is presented to Divine self-revelation by human unworthiness. We recall the consequences of sin, in darkening the spirit, distorting its vision, and falsifying its values; and we remember that it is not only of the individual transgressions that we take account, but of the mass of human guilt, including, perhaps, *Ursünde*, the Fall as pre-history in the spiritual world.

It would be impossible to overstate the consequences of estrangement from God. If we are compelled to say, *Finitum non capax infiniti*, we must bear in mind that the disability is not metaphysical, but ethical. Christian certitude begins, therefore, with the experience of redemption through Christ.

Second, we have a positive consequence. The Christian Absolute is not thought out but revealed. It is not accurately spoken of in terms of Aristotle's "Unmoved," Plato's *ἀντίμενος οὐ*, the philosopher's Absolute and Unconditioned, the absolute ego, absolute Spirit, absolute Reason. These represent man's efforts to jump off his own shadow. We have confused two things: (i) our active attempt to make absolute something of our own conceiving; (ii) that passivity in which we find an ultimate in which we can anchor the soul. This ultimate is beyond our grasp, unless something happens which breaks through the polarity of our thinking. (Cf. Karl Heim: *Jesus der Herr*, pp. 33, 34.)

In this connection special importance attaches to the Barthian theology with its warning that only an impasse can be found in the paths of scientific knowledge of the world; in the study of man's own mental life; in Kant's ethical idealism; in Schleiermacher's doctrine of "the feeling of absolute dependence upon God"; or even in "historic facts as to the life of Jesus" (cf., Dr. R. Birch Hoyle: *Teaching of Karl Barth*, p. 31), and its insistence that revelation is "straight down from above." Dialectical theology does not, indeed (see the disclaimer in Brunner's *The Mediator*, E. T., p. 31, note), reject the idea of revelation in nature and in the spirit of man, but it *does* say that the Christian revelation is not simply the highest point, but that it is *the* revelation.

Faith is not an achievement but a response. Some say (cf. Dewey: *The Quest for Certainty*) that certitude is unattainable; there can be nothing more than probability. But this statement can then be no more than probable! When we say, "Certitude is unattainable," *ex hypothesi* we cannot be certain of the truth of our statement! This is said here, not to score a point in metaphysical debate, but to indicate that there is no solution to be had on epistemological lines. The certitude of which we speak is something quite different from that discussed by the metaphysicians. It is different in that ours is an inquiry concerning religion: a particular *character* is necessary for the possession of certitude. Our investigation is only as deep as our love: our grasp of the truth is measurable by our obedience.

Repent—and Be Thankful

A Note on Max Scheler's Analysis

E. PARL WELCH

“REPENTANCE” and “regeneration”—two words that once played significant rôles in the vocabulary of intelligent Christians—have come in recent years to hold places of minor importance. The reason for the decline of their former popularity is quite obscure. Perhaps it is another one of the many unfortunate aspects of the universally hopeless outlook following the Great War; more probably it is due to the hesitancy Christian leaders seem to exhibit to speak of such personal facts and experiences as “sin” and “salvation” while emphasizing a social gospel. Regardless of the reason, however, the fact remains that the emphasis upon repentance has been noticeably relaxed both in the pulpit and in religious literature. Max Scheler,¹ one of the most brilliant of Germany’s modern philosophers, perceived the unhappy consequences of this for both the individual and group, and as a result bethought himself of the necessity of a scientific analysis and evaluation of the nature and place of repentance in personal and social religious life.

“As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he.” This dictum applies both to man and society. Thinking affects action. It may be hasty and poor or deliberate and good, but we do act according to the manner in which we think, have thought, or perhaps have been made to think by some individual, institution, or group. Scheler, upon examining the influences determining the thinking of the western world, concluded that positivism and pantheism had come to be two of the most pernicious forces in philosophy and religion. Analysis discloses that there is really not much choice between the positivistic glorification of man and the pantheistic exaggeration of God. In the one instance, Deity is obscured and thoughts of it are considered worthless; in the other, humanity is absorbed to the point of divine extinction. In both it is senseless to speak of a relationship for the very reason that the term presupposes at least two entities. Positivism does not allow for God; pantheism has no place for man. Such being the case, both

¹ Deceased 1926. Cf. his essay, “Reue und Wiedergeburt,” in *Ewigem im Menschen*, Leipzig, 1921.

philosophies must be rejected by the practical religionist as not only without value, but decidedly dangerous.

Scheler deplored the infiltration of these two philosophies in our religion, and naturally contended that the first step to be taken is to divest the world of every possible trace of them. That in itself, however, would not be enough. A constructive program must be proposed which would include not only a change in thinking and a new evaluation of man's accomplishments and cosmic significance, but a realization of the need of a religious revival. By "religious revival" Scheler meant not only a new awakening in the hearts of men to their need of turning to the Divine, but—more important—a new interest on the part of intellectual leaders in each important field in the study of religion from every aspect in order to discover its true nature, status, and value. As long as the leaders of thought disdain religion, just so long can it be expected that the layman will scorn it. On the other hand, if it is found that man cannot realize his highest destiny as long as he limits himself to biological pursuits, it behooves him to open his eyes to new realms—or perhaps it should be said, to realms now lost sight of.

God and the realm of values invite us to satisfy a desperate hunger for things divine. However,

"This crying need of the world can become significant only when it sets in motion and activity the positive religious source-streams in man, when it brings our reason to new activity in the direction of the idea of God, and opens our spiritual eyes to the values of grace and positive revelation which are already in the world, but to which the great mass of men have been blinded."²

What is the first step required to supply this need? The answer is repentance, for only on such a basis can men expect to begin anew their struggle to realize their highest destiny as potential children of the Divine.

What did Scheler mean by repentance? He flatly rejected any theory which would make of repentance nothing but a mere symptom of "dis-equilibrium" in the soul. There is much more involved than mere dis-harmony and disillusionment, and it is concerned with more than events of the "past." If repentance were nothing more than mourning over that which has happened and cannot be changed, it would be wise not to give it a second's thought. Analysis shows that regret plays but a minor rôle in genuine religious repentance.

Neither is fear of punishment the essence of repentance, for there is

² *Ewiges*, p. 300.

much more included than remembering a punishment once administered and now expected to recur. If fear played the major rôle, to repent would mean nothing more than mere cowardice, underlying which could be traced the desire to escape the "*verrinerlichte Polizei von gestern.*" It would also have to be argued that the guilty person first saw a definite compensation and utility before he repented. Repentance, on these grounds, would then be motivated by hope of escape and reward. It would cease to be something in and for itself. As such it would be only a temporary and uncertain expediency.

Is repentance, perhaps, a morbid depression caused by excessive indulgence—such as eating, drinking, and sexuality? Scheler obviously had to reject this "hangover" or "morning after" theory (*Katertheorie*), whose only argument is "*Omne animal post coitum triste,*" or, to put it in another way, "*Junge Huren, alte Betschwestern.*"³

Scheler classified all these theories as purely negative because (1) they make of repentance a purposeless and useless act (what is done is done, and nothing can be done about it!); (2) they inculcate in the individual a hopelessly deterministic outlook and thereby breed an insidious pessimism; and, finally (3), they are actually based on a false philosophy of the self and its relation to its environment. In short, they fail utterly to discern the positive value of repentance. To be sure, it does have its negative side, but that cannot be the whole story, because

"seen from the purely moral standpoint, repentance is a form of self-healing of the soul, the only way, indeed, for the rewinning of its lost powers. Religiously, it is in addition the natural act, made possible by God, in which the lost soul is led back to him";⁴

and only when the soul responds to God is it regenerated and given new life.

A study of the true nature of personality shows not only the possibility of, but the necessity for, repentance. The failure really to discover the true nature of personality is the reason for so much misunderstanding about the function and value of repentance. The above false theories have as a basis the idea that the life of the soul can be so divided into "temporal" and "functional" compartments that neither has any effect on the other. Scheler rejected such conceptions and held, on the contrary, that

"the past, present, and future are present to us in experience as indivisible, temporal

³ *Loc. cit.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

elements of life, and as such constitute the structure and idea of the whole of our life and person. In every part of these elements there are the three inseparable strains of the past, present, and future, which are given in immediate memory, perception, and immediate anticipation."⁵

It is by virtue of this wonderful fact that the meaning and value of our whole life can be present in every given temporal point. But yet another power is there, for in our very nature it is given to us to unbind the effectiveness of the past. It is a curious fact that only he who refuses to survey the past is determined by it, for the very reason that he regards it as "finished." The past is past, its work is done, and nothing can change it. But according to Scheler the past is never past until it is definitely made so by a new life; until that time it unknowingly determines the present and the future.

At this point appears Scheler's argument for the significant rôle of memory. The fact of memory indicates the power of the personality to free itself from those influences otherwise destined to undermine it. It means freedom from determinism. By means of it past existence and events can be recalled, reviewed, surveyed, and appraised—and their influence broken, the causal chain torn asunder. "The known history makes us free from the power of the experienced history."⁶ Once the events of an individual's history are seen and understood in the light of their interrelations, it is possible to know (1) how to avoid situations which might give rise to identical effects, and consequently, (2) how to seek for, and bring about, conditions required for the enrichment of the person. Knowledge of the past can mean control of the future. This is applicable to groups as well as individuals.

Scheler thus saw a definite connection between repentance, memory, and freedom. "*To repent means first to regard a given part of the past and impress it with a new meaning and new value.*"⁷ This would be impossible to him who refused to recall the past and appraise it. Furthermore, he would fail to see that everything "is redeemable in so far as it is a unity of effect, meaning, and value."⁸ The memory of which Scheler spoke was more than mere recollection; he meant "*re-experiencing*" the past. The person is able once again to project himself into a given time, and associate

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁸ *Loc. cit.*

the events of the experience with its surroundings, influences, etc. By this means it becomes possible to evaluate a given situation and to meditate upon alternative ways in which he could have acted. He sees himself as he "could have been," and does not mourn that he "had to be."

Scheler was certain that without repentance personal and moral freedom would be impossible. Submission to determinism is the lot of the impenitent soul, for his attitude is one of resignation to fate—his god is the Past. For how could a man be expected to feel guilty of a deed if he assumed from the beginning that it "had to be"? And how could he expect to escape the consequences of his deeds by ignoring the setting in which they were committed? On the contrary, freedom constitutes the positive aspect of repentance, for it "kills the life-nerve of guilt. . . . It tears out the motive and deed by the roots, and institutes with this the free, spontaneous beginning, the pure beginning of a new life . . . all repentance brings with it moral rejuvenation."⁹ With the consciousness of freedom alone can a person either change his environment or seek a new one. Either choice means the beginning of a new life.

Repentance in its highest form is thus a matter of the whole personality. When a deed is done—be it good or bad—it is not a question of some "part" of the individual doing it while the rest of him lends approbation or disapproves. The *whole* person is good or bad at any given moment of his life. Genuine repentance does not say, "What have I done!" but "What sort of a man was I to have done this!" The penitent soul does not argue that he could have willed otherwise or done something else; he knows that he could have been another person. Exercising of memory and consciousness of freedom alone make this possible.

Repentance does not, then, mean mere regret and sorrow. It brings with it not only a despondency over our present essence—despondency soon vanishes in the face of genuine repentance because the heart throbs with new hope—but it enlightens us as to what we could have been, what we are now, and into what we can make ourselves. First in repentance comes this new insight into our real being, and in this insight is posited our new freedom. New sources of power are tapped with which we feel ourselves regenerated; new strength is given to attain those things to which the eyes have once again been opened. Both the person and his environment assume a new aspect. The soul is freed from guilt, and feels the power of a newly

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

acquired freedom to change the present and control the future. "Repentance is not the Utopia, but the revolutionary power of the moral world."¹⁰ To be sure, negative destruction has been included—but it forms the basis of reconstruction, new birth. The soul rejoices in the feeling of a new beginning, and revels in the thought of being blessed with a new heart.

In the last analysis, repentance meant for Scheler turning to the Divine in order to receive new strength, new courage. Or better still, repentance is a *response* to the Divine, a heeding to God's call. It was believed by Scheler that were there no other grounds, the existence of a personal God could be proved by repentance alone. It begins with an accusation—from whom? Another Person. Following this is the consciousness of guilt—before another Person. Then comes the feeling of being forgiven by the accuser, after which there surges in the soul a mighty stream of new life. And all of this, believed Scheler, occurs in accordance with certain spiritual laws as invariable and inevitable as any "natural" laws. Is there any cogent reason to believe Scheler was wrong when he held that without a spiritual law-giver there could be no laws in conformity with which the person must govern his spiritual growth and life?

"It is terrible that we must win life through the difficult way of repentance. It is wonderful that there is a way to win life."¹¹ With these words Scheler rejoiced that provision had been made for us to return to the Divine. To mourn that there conceivably could have been other ways would be considered absurd by him. We are to be thankful that repentance provides the way to life, for without God the soul is dead. Only God can revive it; only by repentance can man see himself as he is and open his heart in response to the constant call of the Divine. In the very act of this response man realizes his highest destiny. He becomes a son of God.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

Salvation

WILHELM PAUCK

THE problem of salvation arises for man in connection with his experience of freedom. Man alone among all beings is *free*.

His humanity rests upon the fact of his liberty. This is the fundamental reason for the concentration of the philosophical and moral thought of all ages upon the problem of freedom. Man is a *human* being, a person, because he alone among all creatures is endowed with the possibility of having himself, possessing himself, controlling himself, deciding for himself. Man is autonomous. He can carry this possibility to a negative extreme by committing suicide, that is, by deciding that he shall no longer be. (No animal has ever been known intentionally to have taken its own life!) But by ending his existence, he does not solve the problem of his being; he merely dodges the struggle for its solution.

"To be or not to be," is not the deepest nature of the human question. One must say that only he is aware of his humanity who asks himself whether he is what he ought to be, whether he "has," knows, possesses himself in such a way that in the concrete, natural, factual, biological, sociological, psychological endowments of his existence he actualizes the demands of the order of values. This is the true nature of man's autonomy.

Now it is his fundamental experience that he is not what he ought to be. His whole life is beset by physical and spiritual limitations. It is characterized by the omnipresent fact of suffering which may arise from many roots. It can be slight physical pain caused by an acute mishap. Or it may be a deep spiritual depression accompanying the experience of "*Weltangst*," which Schelling called the "melancholy" extending throughout creation. Man's freedom is not only held in check by the irresistible dictates of fate, it is also caught in the limitations of being itself. The realization of his finiteness and mortality overcomes him again and again, filling him with the abysmal fright of the meaninglessness of his being. He must also discover that he cannot exercise his autonomy within the conflict between the real and the ideal and within the contrast between subjective and objective spheres.

Thus man despairs in himself; he feels frustrated in his endeavor to be

what he ought to be. He has a sense of futility with respect to the problem of his being. He desires to be extricated from his dilemma, to be freed (= absolved, redeemed, saved) from himself who is incapable of having himself in the fullest, absolute way. The problem of salvation is therefore the following: How can man be freed from the predicament of his freedom? How can he be liberated from the insecurity of his autonomy?

In considering the ways and means of salvation, he tries first to find consolation in the realization that he is not alone, but that he is part of an ongoing process of life, that he is a member of a family, a historical social group, the race, the animal kingdom, the universe. He imagines that he as an individual may appear insignificant or even disappear in the vast process of life. He tries to live in obedience to the laws of the small or large groups to which he belongs. But once it has arisen, the quest for salvation cannot be silenced. Man cannot render the emergence of the problem of liberty undone by attempting a return to the continuous historical process whence he apparently came. For the question: What is true being? persists in a personal way, facing man in his solitariness. Also as part of the world of things, of persons, of the cosmos, he is confronted by the human concern, how he can have himself. It may have become more extensive by his awareness of belonging to a larger whole, but it has lost nothing of its direct, inescapable, personal intensity.

It is more important for man to consider that he has his being not from and by himself, but that he is "in dependence" upon a "yonder of himself," that he is conditioned. This awareness of being founded in an "outside" of himself is not identical with his experience of being part of the world of space and time. It is neither the realization of a heritage which has come down upon him in the nexus of cause and effect, endowing him with definite patterns of behavior, nor the realization of the necessity that he must live in obedience to the laws of pure, practical and aesthetic "reason." It is not the insight that he is made conscious of himself as an autonomous being by his encounter with other autonomous beings. The whole world of facts and values and persons in which man participates (and this participation bestows a fulness upon his being!) is not what as the "yonder of himself" conditions him. All this represents merely the degrees, limitations and possibilities of his autonomy. Together with the universe he finds himself conditioned by a *carrying* transcendent "reality" to which he gives the name "God."

This all conditioning underground of being is the *ens realissimum*, the absolute meaning, eternally conditioning all facts and values and persons as well as all possibilities of the togetherness of the real and the ideal, containing within itself the infinity of all these possibilities. In the words of Tillich, God is *Grund und Abgrund jeder Sinnwirklichkeit*. He is the eternal, infinite giver of life and its meaning, transcending all being, and eternally and infinitely immanent in all that is in time and space.

In so far as in "him" all existence and meaning (= togetherness of the real and the ideal) is constituted, he is the *creator* and *preserver*, the "Lord of all being throned afar," "who liveth in a light no man can approach unto" and is yet "nearer to us than breathing." In believing in "Him," the creator, we trustingly know that what is and will be *can* become what it ought to be, that reality can become ideal reality. As creator, "He" is also the "*Judge*" in whose presence the world conflict between reality and ideality is apparent. But as the creator-judge, "He" is at the same time the *saviour*, who alone can bridge the conflict. In believing in "Him" as the saviour, we know that what is or will be *will* become what it ought to be, that reality will become ideal reality.

We may now conclude that when man considers himself and his freedom in the light of God, he recognizes himself as the "child of God," created in the "image of God," because his freedom (autonomy) is the divine possibility by which his being can become meaningful being. The predicament of his freedom now appears to be due to his inability to realize the infinite possibilities of this freedom within his finite existence. If he wishes to maintain himself, as he must, he is compelled to do so within the limits of his finite existence. His infinite freedom is constantly held prisoner by the necessity of maintaining his finite self. We call this maintenance of the finite self *power*. His whole situation is therefore characterized by the co-ordination of power and freedom. He uses his freedom to have himself (that is, autonomously to create meaning) by confining it to the limits of his power. The meaning which man actualizes in this, his life, is never the absolute meaning of God, but meaning relative to himself. This is his sin and his guilt. Not *that* he has himself constitutes his sin, but *how* he has himself, namely that he *insists* on being *autonomous*, *self-sufficient*, *selfish*.

In the light of God he is made aware of this sin. In the light of God, he also realizes that this sin can be removed only if his self-having

would be endowed with the absolute possibility of meaning-creation which is God's. In all forms of ecstasy we encounter the attempt of extinguishing the self, in order to experience unlimitedness and possibly the transcendent fulness of God. But self-extinction within a continuous ecstatic existence is a practical impossibility. Nor can the transcendent meaningfulness of God (= ideal reality, perfection, *love*) ever be brought into the possession of man. The encounter between man and God can take place only in the form of a *crisis*, namely the crisis of repentance (Metanoia) in which the power of self is *separated* from the power of God.

Hence salvation can never be a "status" to which man can attain. It is always an eschatological possibility by which his being is qualified. As long as he is a finite being, absolute divine love cannot be a human possibility for him. But in so far as he knows (recognizes, acknowledges) the absolute-ness of divine love and in so far as the experience of knowing it implies judgment over his finite human love and *promise* of salvation to infinite divine love, a new dynamic motivation is introduced into his existence. The intentionality of his being (autonomy) is transformed. He no longer interprets his destiny as "having himself," but as "having himself in God." "Having oneself" always includes a relation to the God-conditioned universe (a relation to the *ego*, the "thou" and the "we" (the group), the "it" (the world of things)), but it is a relation established for the sake of enjoying the freedom of being which is determined by the power of self. "Having oneself in God" includes also a relation to the God conditioned universe, but it is now determined by the power of the God-related self for the sake of enjoying (and participating in) the love-creating activities of the universe. Redemption represents a change of man's attitude toward the universe and its meaningfulness. Augustine has expressed the two stages of man's transformation in the famous sentence: *Boni ad hoc utuntur mundo ut fruantur Deo; mali autem contra, ut fruantur mundo, uti volunt Deo.* (*Good men use the world in order to enjoy God; bad men, however, use God in order to enjoy the world.*)

Redemption is the transformation of *amor sui* to *amor Dei*. But it is dynamic and not static, achieved only in the sense of being achieved. For as long as man is a finite and not an infinite self his *amor sui* is never directly but only dialectically replaced by the *amor Dei*. The redeeming Creator-God is immanent in man's being only as the transcendent one.

The Training of the Pastor

WARREN WHEELER PICKETT

THE Reverend John A—— is sitting at his desk struggling, a little desperately perhaps, to decide with which portion of the truth he will edify his congregation on the following Sunday morning. Just as the first, faint glimmerings of an idea seem about to break upon the Stygian darkness, he hears the door-bell ring, and presently his wife appears in the study to announce that Mrs. S—— is below, apparently in great trouble. Can she see the minister? A little sadly he turns from the beckoning light and plunges into the consideration of one of those pastoral problems which form so important a part of his task.

This time it is a young couple, who are making rough weather of their matrimonial voyage. As he learns about their troubles, he may find that the source of their difficulty is quite simple and obvious. It lies in some form of selfishness on the part of one or both, or in a lack of wisdom in budgeting the family income, or in undue interference from parents, or in some other of the familiar dangers which beset married life. If such is the case, Mr. A—— is probably quite competent to deal with the problem. The professional training which he has received, his native common-sense, and his own dearly bought experience with life, provide him with all the equipment which he needs to calm the storm and send the puzzled young woman away to make a success of her marriage.

But not infrequently marital unhappiness is due to causes which are far more obscure. It may be the result of mistaken attitudes toward sex, to some surviving infantilism in the personality of the husband, to a mother fixation on the part of the wife, or to any one or more of a dozen other psychological abnormalities, hidden far below the level of consciousness. For such dilemmas the natural wisdom of even a good and able man is quite insufficient. Here is a case of mental disease and until mental therapy has located the focus of infection and eliminated its poison from the system there can be no permanent cure.

Nor is it merely the unhappily married who bring to the pastor enigmas which he is not prepared to solve. Here is a so-called problem-child, a lad

who is the nightmare of the neighbors, the vexation of his teachers, and the despair of his parents. At first glance he may seem to be guilty of nothing worse than the mischievous pranks which are an inevitable expression of effervescent youth, and which need no treatment save sympathetic understanding and friendly patience. But a closer study of his conduct reveals something far more serious than mere mischief. He is definitely anti-social in his thoughts and deeds, and has already come perilously near to misdemeanors which will entangle him with the law. In such a situation mere sympathy and patience, no matter how well-intentioned, may easily do more harm than good. For his offences are not due to a superfluity of energy, but to an inferiority complex which, uncorrected, may eventually produce a gangster and a convict. What that boy needs is a complete readjustment of his whole attitude toward himself, his home, his school, and his community. But to achieve that result one must possess some knowledge of mental pathology and psychotherapy as well as a loving spirit and a desire to help.

Or again, here is a pitiable victim of habitual intoxication. It is not necessary to point out to him the error of his ways, nor to warn him of the inevitable consequences of his folly. Conscience, experience and observation have already taught him those lessons and he would gladly make any sacrifice to be free from that devastating curse. But he is in the grip of a power which is mightier than he, and what he needs is not moral lectures, but a way of escape. Nor can that deliverance be effected merely by urging him to "swear off" and to seek the help of fervent prayer. Both passionate resolution and spiritual dynamic will undoubtedly be needed, if he is to break his fetters, but in many cases both together will be quite impotent until some experienced analyst has discovered the inner conflict from which the nepenthe of liquor brings him transitory release.

These are but a few samples of the many problems which defy the skill of the average minister. Nor does he fail here because he lacks experience, intelligence or consecration, but because he has not been adequately prepared for his task. The treatment of such difficulties demands a specialized body of knowledge which he has never studied, and the employment of a technique which he has never learned. For we now know that the underlying cause of many forms of perplexity, unhappiness, immorality and irreligion is to be found neither in the desperate wickedness of the human heart, nor in the natural ignorance and bewilderment of the

normal mind, but in definite psychological maladjustments. Nor is there any hope that such unfortunate tendencies can be removed by instruction, correction, and reproof until the underlying malady has been diagnosed and treated. Consequently, theological training, common-sense, and experience no longer equip the pastor to be a true physician of souls. To them he must add some knowledge of psychopathology and psychotherapy.

Nor is it merely the wayward who are in need of such understanding help. Many of the most respectable would also profit by the counsel of a minister who also understood thoroughly the vagaries of the human mind. The little girl, who prayed that God would make all the bad people good and all the good people nice, would have had less desire to offer the second half of her petition, if some of the unattractive saints had passed through the hands of a competent psychologist. Probably there are very few human beings who are entirely free from all the complexes and inhibitions, all the conflicts and the phobias which produce unhappiness, waste one's energies and mar the beauty of one's character. It should be one of the primary functions of the Christian Church to help them to cast off those chains and stand forth in the glorious liberty of the children of God.

But the average minister finds himself woefully unprepared to render that much-needed service. Often he is so entirely ignorant of the factors involved that he does not recognize these mental maladjustments when they walk into his study. He simply exhorts the offender to straighten up and behave himself and commands to him the help to be found in worship, Scripture reading and prayer. When these means prove unavailing, he is shocked by the wicked perversity of human nature or secretly troubled by the seeming impotence of the grace of God. Or, if he has read enough psychology to understand some of the strange mysteries of the unconscious, he knows that he is faced with a demand too great for his powers and is humiliated by his helplessness. Rare indeed is the pastor who is equipped with sufficient knowledge and experience to deal effectively with the phantoms of a mind diseased. Until the clergy become competent to help their parishioners meet these vexing problems of the personality, the Church will be failing to discharge one of its most fundamental obligations.

It is upon the theological seminaries that the responsibility for removing this deficiency must rest. For an adequate understanding of these mental difficulties cannot be learned even by years of experience in a parish. Nor ought any man to read a few popular books on psychology and then begin

to tinker gaily with the minds and souls of his flock. If he does proceed in that care-free fashion, he will only be one more psychiatric quack, no matter how laudable may be his desires and his intentions. The treatment of mental maladies demands both an amount of study which most over-busy preachers will be unable to undertake, and a type of clinical training which only the favored few will have an opportunity to secure. The average clergyman must acquire the foundations of this skill while he is still a student, preparing for his life work, if he is ever to have it at all.

Nor does the need for such training place an impossible demand upon the seminary. With the wealth of material now available in this field there is no reason why the training of the pastor should longer be limited to an incidental course or two in "The Care of the Parish." Instead the candidate for the ministry should be so instructed in the rudiments of applied psychology that he will be able to recognize the true nature of the problems which will confront him, and equipped to render constructive assistance to the simpler type of mental disorder. Possibly more souls would be saved for time and for eternity if the theologue were taught less Greek exegesis, which he will never use, and given some understanding of the hidden nightmares which he will find troubling his people.

Naturally it is not to be anticipated that all the ministers of the future will be specialists in psychiatry, any more than all mothers are expected to be physicians and surgeons. When Johnny begins to exhibit symptoms which may mean appendicitis or infantile paralysis, or even measles or chicken-pox, the wise parent sends for the doctor and faithfully follows his directions. But before the baby has grown very old mother learns how to deal with common colds and passing spasms of indigestion. She understands also which maladies she can safely treat herself and which demand the skill of an expert. Furthermore, when the doctor comes she can co-operate with him by an intelligent obedience to his orders and by providing the care and nursing which are as important elements in the cure as is the prescription of the physician.

In like fashion, the psychologically trained pastor of the future will still refer all the more serious cases of mental disorder to the psychiatric specialist. But if his seminary has prepared him adequately, he will be capable of appreciating the significance of the symptoms which come under his notice. He will recognize the common colds and passing indigestions of the mind and will know the simple treatment which they require. He

will also be competent to detect the presence of those graver diseases which demand the skill and knowledge of the specialist. To that expert he will also be fitted to render genuine and valuable co-operation. His pastoral visits will not merely provide that spiritual undergirding and direction which the average psychiatrist now seems to consider entirely outside his province, but will also bring just the type of understanding sympathy which the patient and his family need, and by wise counsel will reinforce and strengthen the regime ordered by the mental physician. The modern divinity school should consider it an essential part of its function to prepare its students to meet the mental ills of their parishioners at least as intelligently as the wise mother deals with the physical ailments of her children.

But such a grounding in practical psychology would not merely fit the clergyman to be a better pastor. It would also increase his power in every department of his work. His preaching would be strengthened by a deeper insight into the most vexing problems which torment his people and by a more comprehensive knowledge of the methods by which he could secure those responses of contrition and desire for amendment which are essential for all moral and spiritual growth. The whole educational program of his church would be improved by his better understanding of the process of learning and the use of materials. Even his duties as administrator and executive would be discharged more successfully because of his command of those arts by which his fellowmen could be won to willing co-operation. For the same reason he would also be far more effective in the task of winning converts to Christ by the method of personal evangelism. He could uncover the hidden reasons which hold so many people back from discipleship. He would know how such barriers could be removed, the type of appeal which would make religion winsome, and the means by which a genuine commitment could be secured. The hours which had been devoted in the seminary to the study of human nature would produce far more effective leadership for every aspect of the church's life.

Still further, his knowledge of psychology should also enable the minister to retain for the church many of its members who are now wandering away to Christian Science and the other irregular religious movements. In every community there is a certain number of people who have no organic disease but who fancy themselves in ill-health because they are afflicted with pathological nervous, mental or spiritual conditions. There are even more who are depressed and unhappy for no reason which is appar-

ent to the superficial observer, or of which they themselves are consciously aware. Here also the source of the difficulty lies below the surface and has its root in some maladjustment of the personality. Many such turn to some one or other of the cults for the help which they have not secured in the regular churches. But although their problem may seem to have been solved, it is often at a frightful cost. Sometimes their sense of security has been achieved, not by facing the reality of their condition, but by adopting a sentimental escape mechanism which removes them still further from genuine spiritual health. Invariably their new faith demands the acceptance of strange doctrines which are demonstrably untrue, and sometimes actively detrimental to the individual and his associates. Quite usually these exotic creeds also lack many elements which are essential to a full-rounded Christian life.

But so long as the Church has no liberating message for this large group of men and women it need not be surprised if they turn to the false prophets. What they need, and what they should have, is a type of preaching and pastoral service which would recognize whatever of truth and strength these cults may possess, but which will apply those remedial measures more sanely and intelligently, and will keep its whole message in the great central stream of the Christian faith. Such a ministry the psychologically trained clergyman could provide. The cults would lose their reason for existence, and the message of the Church would be immeasurably strengthened by this more inclusive teaching and practice.

But the seminaries ought not to think merely in terms of educating the average minister who will be the only full-time salaried worker in his parish. They should also plan to develop for the larger churches a new profession of religious specialists who would expect to find their life-work, not in the pulpit, but in the pastoral office. There are many men and women with a genuine call to the ministry, who quite lack the gifts and temperament necessary for effective preaching, but who do possess the instincts of the true shepherd of souls. Under present conditions some of these people attempt to preach, with results which are satisfactory neither to themselves nor to their congregations. Others turn aside to social, philanthropic or secular employment, and their talents are thereby in large measure lost to the Church. Such individuals ought to find in the seminary an opportunity to develop their particular talents and look forward to a life-time of usefulness in the calling for which they are best fitted.

Students who are preparing for this type of work would follow a course of study identical in many respects with that now given. They would need to know philosophy, theology and church history in order to deal effectively with the intellectual difficulties of their parishioners. They should also be versed in religious education and church administration in order to be able to carry their fair share of the general parish program. But the time which the fledgling preacher must devote to homiletics and the more erudite branches of biblical criticism could be spent by the embryo pastor in a more intensive study of applied psychology, and in gaining practical experience in mental clinics. With such an equipment he would deserve, and would receive, the confidence of those to whom he ministered and could solve many problems now beyond the range of the average preacher. If it became the practice for the stronger churches to engage such pastoral experts it would mark a return to a recognition that there are diversities of gifts which may be employed by the same Spirit, and would inaugurate a wise division of the ministerial labors which would enrich the service of the church to its constituency and the community.

But there is a still broader field into which this type of training ought ultimately to lead. As has already been indicated, the more serious types of mental disorder will always need the services of the psychiatric specialist, no matter how expert the pastor may become. Up to the present time it has been assumed that the best physician of the mind would be he who had first been a physician of the body, and in consequence the great majority of psychiatrists have been recruited from the ranks of the medical profession. Many of them are accomplishing marvelous results, but in all too many cases they are almost wholly ignorant of the spiritual aspects of personality and neglect the contribution which prayer and consecration can make to the re-ordering of a mind diseased. Many of these gentlemen are either atheistic or agnostic in their own personal viewpoint and consequently reject religion as entirely futile, if not actually harmful. Even when the psychiatrist is himself a Christian, he has only a layman's acquaintance with spiritual resources and disciplines and therefore cannot employ them effectively in his treatment. As a result far too much modern psychiatry operates on a materialistic, mechanistic basis and thus fails to obtain either the most enduring or the most comprehensive results.

Now if it be true that religion is simply a delusion which a more intelligent tomorrow will discard, the physician of the mind can readily dispense

with it. But if, as Christians believe, it is the fundamental reality of life, then spiritual truth must play as large a part in the correction of mental maladjustments as does psychological knowledge. For if religion be true, then no man can have the proper attitude toward himself, toward his fellowmen or toward the universe until he is in right relations with his God. Nor can all the problems with which psychotherapy is concerned be met purely on the mental level. Many of them have their ultimate root in moral rebellion or spiritual conflict. When such devils infest the mind they can be cast out only by faith and prayer. Consequently, if there be any truth in religion at all, its insights and its techniques must be incorporated in all psychiatric procedure.

This raises the interesting possibility that increasing experience may indicate that the ministry is a far better preparation for the psychiatrist than is the profession of medicine. Naturally, before the specialist begins to treat any case he must know whether the symptoms described are really due to mental or spiritual maladjustments or whether they have their root in some physical malady. But a thorough examination of a competent diagnostician would readily yield that information. When the facts with regard to the patient's bodily condition are at hand, the psychiatrist who was also a minister of God would have the advantage over one who was only a doctor of medicine. The clergyman's theological training, his religious faith, his spiritual knowledge and experience, and his Christian purposes would all be in his favor, and should produce results far more adequate and enduring than even those which are now achieved.

Naturally, it is not for a moment to be supposed that the new psychology can be made a substitute for vital religion. As Professor Walter Horton writes in his *Realistic Theology*, "An objective source of power, beyond the needy person and beyond the 'case worker' or pastor who is trying to help him, is as necessary and important as it ever was. There is no such thing as salvation by pure technique. There is only salvation by the power of the Spirit, proceeding from God through Christ and the Church. (But) psychological technique can render inestimable service in diagnosing the difficulties of the needy individual and cleansing away artificial obstructions that wall him off from the life of the Spirit." Christian folk have the right to expect that their churches will render them this inestimable service. The churches have the right to expect that the theological seminaries will provide ministers equipped for this task.

Liberalism, Scholarship, and Politics

ARTHUR LIEBERT

Translated by Edgar Sheffield Brightman¹

ANY serious study of history reveals the false judgments which are passed by every age on the previous one. These judgments arise from many sources: ignorance of what really happened, ill-considered assertions that display temperament rather than ideas, inability to understand the past from its own standpoint rather than from that of the present, the naïve demand of the young generation for recognition, and many other humanly understandable tendencies.

It may be that successful historical research requires a certain narrowness, a limitation or inadequacy in one's sense of justice, together with an exaggeration of one's own point of view. Here is one of the most important paradoxes of human experience. It is possible to know so much about historical life in all its wealth of detail that we are unable to be of real service to that life, or even to ourselves. Thus we become accustomed to being very reticent in passing value judgments, in expressing preferences, and in conduct. The spontaneity of our energy is weakened and we view the struggles of history with composure, utterly unprepared to take sides.

This explains in part why every present confronts its past with so crude misunderstandings and mistaken judgments. Perhaps it will also guard us from the suspicion of being unsympathetic accusers of our own generation, when we charge it with narrow-mindedness and unfairness toward the period of development which lies just behind us. With this in mind, we shall present a few ideas in behalf of liberalism, which has of late been condemned excessively and uncritically.

First of all, we should perceive that liberalism is a most complicated structure. Just now our interest is not in political or economic liberalism, but in something much deeper, that peculiar attitude of the moral spirit which was an essential presupposition for the origin and the power of all our modern culture. After some premonitions in the Middle Ages, this attitude of mind burst forth and developed in the centuries of the Renais-

¹ Liebert puts his finger with clarity and restraint on the absolutely central point where religion and the intellectual conscience cannot yield.—E. S. B.

sance, early humanism, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment. With severe struggles, both inner and outer, the men of those times made themselves "free" from the dogmatism of tradition and from the tradition of dogmatism, both of which had made the Middle Ages what they were and had imposed restrictions on the thought and investigation of that period. The guidance for the work of modern science and philosophy has not come from a church, be it ever so holy, or from a dogma, be it ever so divine. The energy of modern thought has turned, with infinite heroism, from the old theocentric and theonomic attitude to the sources of personal responsibility, and to independent thinking which feels bound only by its own laws. This was an incomparable spiritual reversal, a truly Copernican revolution. Men abandoned the tendency to appeal to external authorities and powers; they took their stand on their own conscience and followed the criteria of objective logic. We cannot justly condemn the creators of modern science and philosophy, as some have done, for a blameworthy arrogance or childish disobedience. No. They were humble and obedient in a very noble sense. They learned to obey the voice of their own reason and to exercise the highest privilege of a free mind—that of criticism.

Everyone knows what magnificent achievements have been wrought by this "liberal" spirit. Without it we simply should not possess a modern science or a modern philosophy. To condemn liberalism root and branch and to charge it with all possible defects is not only to display a lack of knowledge of the nature and achievements of liberalism, but also to make a pretentious attempt to scorn the foundations of modern culture. It requires no special gift of prophecy to foretell the issue of such an attempt.

The cultural importance of liberalism and its indispensability are revealed by all objective historical investigation which is not obscured by prejudices or precommitments. Liberalism may also be shown, on rational grounds, to be necessary. The historical argument shows how things have been; it does not show how they must be. But we may assert that liberalism is the essential foundation of all truly objective scholarship. He who is not intellectually free, or who does not possess at least the will for inner independence and the capacity to suppress dogmatism, may indeed accomplish something in a hundred other realms of culture, but he is not fit for scholarship.

We are, it is true, influenced by countless forces in our historical and natural environment, by the climate, and the like. But it is the duty of

the true scholar to allow these forces, precisely because they are so strong, as little influence as possible on the course of his investigations; otherwise he would abandon freedom of view, independence of method, and the autonomy of reason, in favor of primitive naturalism and a prescientific attitude. The thinking of primitive man manifests just such dependence on natural conditions. But the very concept of science and philosophy sets up the demand for liberation from all such restrictions. One who does not understand or admit this demand betrays his likeness to the primitive. He shows that he is a victim of dogmatism, which may have a place somewhere, but is forever inconsistent with the spirit of scholarship.

This spirit of scholarship can yield to no alien totalitarian claim. When such an attempt is made, it can only lead to the most severe conflicts. Even if perchance a scholar here and there may yield to the claim of such an alien social totality, because not every scholar is personally a strong character or necessarily understands the true meaning of scholarship, nevertheless such personal weakness is insignificant. In the long run the proud and free spirit of scholarship is the victor.

It is true that the spirit of scholarship stands in relation to a totality, but only to the one which it creates out of itself and bears within itself. Its sole foundation and law are the logic of truth and the truth of logic. With all the problems and difficulties in the search for truth, it would be disloyalty to the spirit of scholarship if logic and truth were consciously and forcibly subordinated to the service of methods and aims which are foreign to all science and philosophy.

One who thinks in exclusively political terms may regard these demands for freedom and liberalism as uncongenial, abnormal, dangerous, and illegitimate. But the politician and the politically minded have no more voice and vote in this matter than has the man of religion. Why not? Because politicians, whether of the Right, the Center, or the Left, are nothing but dogmatists, and are bound by their dogmas. They lack the primary and decisive presupposition for the comprehension of the very nature of science and philosophy, namely, an understanding of the independent responsibility and autonomy of scholarship. Hence they can pass only false judgments about these fields. Their whole spiritual make-up has no place for that liberalism which is the creative and fruitful foundation for the mighty achievements of modern science and philosophy.

Has the Concept of Humanity a Scientific Basis?

J. PARTON MILUM

IT cannot be doubted that the concept of humanity which has been the guiding star of Christian civilization, despite its frequent betrayals and denials, has received a setback in our time, if not, as some think, a final eclipse. It is widely assumed by publicists and propagandists that the view of the universe toward which science is tending allows no room for the pursuance of those ideals hitherto enshrined in Christian ethics and generally expressed in such terms as personality and humanity. It is no longer a question whether this or that dogma of the Christian faith is still tenable, but whether as guiding motives in the social, national, and international activities of the human race, those ideals which Christianity brought into being, and which have acted as a conscience through the centuries, rebuking kings and empires and peoples, holding out a world ideal for the human race, have been undermined and relegated to illusion. Evolution is now part of our mentality. But this general consent conceals the fact that the method and driving force by which evolution has been brought to pass is still in the arena of debate among the specialists, or indeed is entirely hidden from us. Thus the fact that we are all evolutionists nowadays constitutes a very real danger. For it means that the nonspecialist part of each nation, that is, the vast majority of us, now allow to pass without challenge suggestions and policies that can be put forward under the general password of biological evolution. The control of the whole planet for the welfare of human life was the clearly discerned objective of the humanitarian ideal. But we should be deceiving ourselves if we assumed that this is the ideal that is motivating the statesmen and politicians of today. The driving force behind present-day world politics is control by this or that group, this or that nationality, and "there is no daysman betwixt us."

The control of the food supply and the control of population are the twin themes about which world politics revolve, and their consideration lies at the root of the present-day intense revival of nationalism. Three tacit propositions haunt the policies of western nations:

- (1) That nationalism maintained by force of arms is in line with the process of evolution by which the strongest nations survive.
- (2) That increase in quantity of population is a *sine qua non* for progress, because it is a condition of (1).
- (3) That improvement in quality of population can be brought about by a controlled and directed birthrate.

Let us endeavor to see how far these propositions can justly claim to be based upon verified processes of biological evolution.

I. MILITANT NATIONALISM

The most picturesque justification of militant nationalism from an evolutionary point of view is that of Sir Arthur Keith in his "Defence of Prejudice." (*The Place of Prejudice in Modern Civilization*. Williams & Norgate. 1931.) "Prejudice, personal, local, national, and racial, Nature has planted deeply in the heart of the prehistoric world for the production of higher and better races of mankind." "Primitive peoples always lived in isolated groups, but the isolation was not the result of sea, river or mountain barrier. The isolation was maintained by what I may call the tribal spirit." Sir Arthur tells us that he derives his conviction of the formative effect of prejudice from Professor Starling's discovery of "hormones" in 1904. These potent secretions of the ductless glands are found to be the determining or regulatory cause of many of the bodily characteristics; they also affect and are affected by man's emotional life. "I never suspected until then that to secure her evolutionary ends, she (Nature) had enslaved man's mental nature." The way in which racial variety is supposed to have arisen is not perfectly clear from this essay. Hormones are known to have a regulatory effect upon the body; and hormones are also known to be poured into the blood stream during the emotional experiences of fear, pain, and rage. Are we then to regard prejudice as the cause of the physical differences? Or are the physical differences the cause of the prejudice in the first instance? Are we to regard racial differences as being due to the accumulated influence of the hormones poured into the blood through the sustained emotional tension of tribal jealousy? Or are we merely to regard tribal prejudice as isolating one tribe from another for such a prolonged period that physical divergences arise? In the latter case we should note, there is no *vera causa* for evolution. Be it one way, or the other, or both combined, "this ancient dual machinery has been thrown out of gear. Man's

civilization has crossed Nature's evolutionary plans; her old tribal organization has been broken up and replaced by a conglomeration of massed communities, nations, states, vast empires. But inside the massed populations of today beats the old tribal evolutionary heart." Yes! Sir Arthur is in entire agreement with League of Nations advocates when they assert that our modern political unrest is due to the conflict of the ancient tribal spirit with the cosmopolitan and international way of thinking which had begun to replace it. But Sir Arthur says that the hope of the future lies in maintaining the tribal spirit and prejudices alive. According to him, these amalgams of which modern nations consist would be better undone, and the evolutionary progress of mankind should be secured by the maintenance of racial differences culminating from time to time in struggle and survival. Sir Arthur holds that isolation by prejudice, rather than by geographical barriers, is the most potent factor in producing physical differences in mankind. But is this true? Two of the most evident departures from the normal human form, cretinism and mongolism, have now been traced to changes in the internal secretions. Such changes, isolated by geographical boundaries, may have sufficed to establish the subraces of man. But if so, the inference is that these differences are latent in a common humanity and not the product of an internecine conflict.

Let us take the widest racial differences that have appeared in the human species—such as the Negro, the Mongolian, the Nordic, the Esquimau. To what selective factor have these differences been the response? The claim that "prejudice" and struggle, rather than the geographical factor, have been the efficient cause will be regarded by many experts as disregarding the evidence. A black, looking at a white or a mongrel, feels prejudice, but on the face of it the racial differences are the causes of the prejudice, and not *vice versa*. That such prejudice should prevent intermarriage between the major varieties, probably all will agree is to the good of the race. That prejudice may prevent a coming together for council and mutual understanding, and so may lead to war, must be admitted. That such war would be eugenic is utterly doubtful. "Survival value" might go along with such a quality as greater resistance to poison gas. Experiment has shown that the Negro possesses this to a greater degree than other races. This might then give the future to the Negro. If this turned out to be progressive evolution, it would be despite of, and not because of, the quality that conferred survival!

It is established that the greater varieties within the human race were already defined in the most primitive times, and it seems most reasonable to believe that they are modifications suiting these subraces to their habitats. Sir Arthur's own standard work *The Antiquity of Man* is one of the best witnesses to the extraordinary stability of the human race. "There is not a single fact known to me which makes the existence of a human form in the Miocene period an impossibility." (P. 734.) Variety there has been from the earliest time even as today, but that these forms may be arranged in an evolutionary sequence can scarcely be claimed. The half dozen or so of skull fragments which might conceivably represent the prehuman stock which gave rise at length to man form the strongest evidence that man constitutes a "permanent type."¹ While this position is not conceded as yet by Sir Arthur and other anthropologists who do not relax their efforts to show a series of progressive human forms, the evidence collected in this very attempt points to the conclusion that man physically was finished when he began to be truly human. To speak of human evolution is to invite confusion. Human evolution in strictness is the prehuman process; human progress is the social, mental, moral and spiritual superstructure. Fifty years ago the humanitarian ideal went down before evolutionism because its champions had no option but to fight a losing battle against evolution. Today, by a better understanding of the limits of evolution, the concept of humanity may find its revindication.

II. THE POPULATION PROBLEM

The exuberant humanitarian hopes that blossomed in the close of the Eighteenth Century were nipped by the freezing doctrine of Malthus. Scarcely was philosophic pessimism checked by the sober evolutionism of Spencer, than Darwinism, taking its origin from the hint of Malthus, saw the human race committed to the path of struggle and survival. The latter part of the Nineteenth Century was marked by the spread of artificial limitation of families, the advocacy of which had become an integral part of the radical propaganda for social betterment. The impression gained on all sides that size of population is a circumstance within a nation's

¹The dogma that man is still an evolving species conflicts with the evidence of his antiquity, and this conflict of dogma with fact, Sir Arthur frequently reveals to us. "The racial body is unstable; it must change with the passage of time. It is the application of this law which makes me more and more skeptical of the geological evidence which assigns a high antiquity to modern types such as Galley Hill man, etc." (*Modern Discoveries Relating to the Antiquity of Man*, 1931, P. 30.)

control. The long view may show that in this we have been utterly mistaken. But for a long time the gloomy alternative was offered—multiply and be poor, or cease multiplying and perish. A changed attitude to the population question is now general among economists. The emphasis on food is out of date. "We no longer look forward to a future in which an increasing population will be forced by the operation of the law of diminishing returns to devote a larger and ever larger proportion of its whole labor force to the production of food." (Professor Cannan.)

There are two grounds for this change of attitude. (1) The statistical proof that the end of the swarming period under the new methods of production is in sight. (2) The immensely increased power for food production under scientific control.

The Malthus doctrine, that population tends to outrun food supply, checked mainly by wars and epidemics, emerged at a transitional time, in which Great Britain was passing out of one method of production to another. It was not pressure of population that produced the change in method of production, but the change to factory production called forth the increased population. Britain was first in this great change; the nations of the world have one by one followed suit. As they have done so each nation in turn has manifested a parallel increase in numbers—a sudden leap forward, which then slows down according to a curve by which the date of its completion and return to stationary condition can be calculated approximately in each case. In place of the crude view of social development driven on by constant pressure of increasing population, some such conception as that of an "optimum number" to which the population tends (as stated by Professor Cannan) more accurately fits the facts. "For any people at any time in a given area there will be a certain density of population, which will be the most desirable from the point of view of return per head of the population." On this view, size of population in a nation is not determined by any mechanical law of increase, but is a manifestation of the organic life of a nation. Now the new factor in industrial nations is mass production. Commodities can be produced in quantity and number almost without limit. Machines are brought to a standstill simply when and because their products can no longer be profitably distributed. It was this mass production by machinery that struck the first blow at the ancient conception of self-dependent nationality. In the nation in which it first appeared, Britain, there developed those great conceptions of internationalism

—the nations sharing their science, their markets, their prosperity—which once again revived human hopes of a common life, wider than that of empire, but free. As other nations entered into the new methods they also entered into the international organic life. To share in the world's life by international exchange, and yet to maintain sovereign independence, now became the problem of each nation. To whom should any people look for the furtherance of its own prosperity, the assurance of its security, the guarantee of its food supply, but to its own leaders, rulers, or monarchs? Woven together out of geographical, racial, historic elements, speaking a common tongue, and possibly having the same religion, that which we call a "nation" certainly has a natural basis, but this natural basis is no longer absolute when all the nations have recourse to a common supply for their staple foods, the wheat and rice lands of the world. Reserving the right to change or modify their governments, according to their general enlightenment, none the less, through their accredited heads, the nations confer with, or withstand, one another in a world economically one. Every nation may be held to have its own genius, its own contribution to make to the common life of mankind, and this is recognized and paid for by international exchange of commodities, especially by food supply. At the present time the nations are acting on the belief that only by armed force in the last expedient will they be able to maintain their access to the necessities of life. The ghost of Malthus still incites to war. The nationalists want their own nation to increase in comparison with others, and the only justification each can give to itself is that it is marked out for world leadership.

All this ignores the fact that it is now possible to calculate the population limits to which all nations are tending. The growth of nations is no amorphous ever-pressing process, it is an organic phenomenon; nor is its organic nature limited to each nation, but as a result of economic unity, the size and scope of nations may be regarded as exemplifying the mutual adjustment of parts and organs in the embryo of a united humanity.

The reduction of rate of growth of population which first showed itself in England at about 1880 has extended not only to other European countries, but even to Japan. At the present moment Japan looms large in world politics. But in Japan already "The fecundity has been falling for two decades, and has entered upon a fairly sharp decline." The only sane way of dealing with Japan is to see her problem. This has been

sympathetically analyzed by W. R. Crocker in his book *The Japanese Population Problem*.

The adoption of industrialism has involved an increase which will not reach stability for another generation, when an additional fifteen to twenty million will have to be fed and clothed. Japan cannot grow the rice needed. Thus Japan of the future can only live as England is now living, by buying food from abroad. Japan's problem is to discover what goods its people can manufacture which foreign markets will buy. So far from giving up the problem as beyond us, and falling back upon the bestial method of war, the method of mutual understanding of our common problems, by world agreements, guided by the concept of humanity, is the way indicated, but requiring knowledge and above all faith in the human ideal.

III. CONCERNING EUGENICS

The third proposition which challenges the concept of humanity is that which affects to regard the human species as still in the making, part of it still comparatively at the animal level, part of it further removed. The study of human heredity, and the collection of statistics connected therewith must prove to be of incalculable value, and cannot in any wise be suspected as antihumanitarian. And eugenics, as comprising these studies, ought not to be sweepingly condemned. None the less in the name of eugenics the humanitarian standpoint is being very strongly attacked. The eugenists have divided their proposals into positive and negative eugenics. Negative eugenics, which seeks to devise means of avoiding the propagation of the unfit, compels our serious attention. But the proposition "that it is perfectly practicable to launch at once, here and now, with quite moderate and simple means, a scheme of positive eugenics, which will progressively affect the human race in such a way as to improve its intrinsic qualities" (Dr. F. C. S. Schiller), goes beyond the warrant of scientific knowledge.

The scientific ground upon which this claim is generally based today is the "gene" theory of heredity, of which the leading exponent is Professor T. H. Morgan, and arises from the discoveries of the Abbe Mendel. Professor Lancelot Hogben has imagined a future historian of science recording that in studying the writings of the eugenists he came to the conclusion that they were discussing the habits of fruitflies rather than of human beings, but had not thought it necessary to mention the fact. (*The Nature of Living Matter*. L. Hogben. Kegan Paul.) If geneticists' methods

were practicable in dealing with the human race, what conceivable effects might be possible? It might be possible to sort out some of the varied stocks which have become welded in the course of history. It is a curious fact that the national groups which are most "advanced" are indeed the most mixed in their stocks. For an actually pure "race," if any still exists, we have to go to the primitives, such as the Esquimaux. If it were possible to isolate in a few generations one of these stocks, such as the Nordic, it might be their "undoing" in more senses than one. If two charming young people with blue eyes, whose four parents were also blue-eyed, wed, their children will be blue-eyed, we are told on sufficiently good evidence. They might call themselves Nordics and take a strong pride in their race, which they would nourish perhaps by reading the Sagas, cultivating Wagner and what not. But how far they would be Nordics because of their hereditary constitution, none could tell. As there may be an advantage in joining this or that club or society, so there may be an advantage in joining the Nordic club, of which the qualifications are fair hair and blue eyes. But to claim that the advantages of the club are due to hereditary and innate qualities is going beyond the scientific standpoint. Statistics indeed have been collected to show that the tall fair race succumbs to phthisis in modern city conditions far more readily than the short dark "Mediterranean" type. Such a sorting out therefore might prove fatal for the Nordic ideal. The human heritage differs from biological heredity in that the distinctively human character is the social milieu, the culture or civilization into which the individual is born and does not bring with him. Civilization does not appear to be an affair of race or heredity at all, but has many times been passed over from one racial stock to another. None the less the individual human being, to enter upon his heritage fully, must bring with him the sound basis of physical and mental health. The first question to be settled is whether it is possible to distinguish in an industrial community environmental ill-health from hereditary ill-health. The study of family records through many generations may eventually teach us some valuable lessons for guidance in marriage. Some families are shown to have been more prone to certain diseases than others. But even so other considerations will weigh. One does not suppose that proneness to gout, which is said to be shown statistically to affect most of the Aryan stock, will decide them against continuance. Men may be able to alter their environment so as to avoid the conditions in which certain diseases will arise.

The safest guide to science for the layman who wishes to know what is the bearing of the "ascertained results" is to be found in the limitations acknowledged by some of the leading geneticists. Professor Crew, director of the Animal Breeding Research Department, University of Edinburgh, says: "Personality is not predetermined in the fertilized egg although its limits are clearly defined. . . . The social inheritance in many a man can and does override his organic inheritance." And then he asks, "But who shall sit in judgment and separate fit from unfit? . . . The biologist alone is not competent to draw up these standards."

The one proposal of negative eugenics that might conceivably be practicable is that hereditary feeble-mindedness might be eliminated by marriage restrictions. But when we learn that there are 300,000 feeble-minded persons within the population of Great Britain, we next want to know how many of these are born so, for without doubt the mental stress and bodily privations of our time must account for a very large proportion. Records of certain families have shown that an alarmingly large proportion of individuals have been feeble-minded; so that there are cases of hereditary feeble-mindedness. A Christian civilization which acknowledges the principle of personality as its guide will abhor the multiplication of such families. It is surely in accord with this principle to seek means of preventing the continuation of such stocks. By what means the cessation of definitely feeble-minded stocks may be brought about is not our present theme, but the recognition of the misery entailed by their perpetuation will go a long way toward achieving the object by the assent of those concerned. And who are those concerned? Firstly are those who, though not feeble-minded themselves, come of a stock in which there is a large percentage of hereditary feeble-mindedness. That such will refrain from parentage is not too much to expect. Secondly, there are the definitely feeble-minded, and that they should be under control is already widely admitted. The main difficulty lies in dealing with a third class, the more or less so. So supremely valuable to civilization is the principle of liberty that we may well pause before denying the right of marriage to any. But on the same principle the injury done both to other individuals and to the race by the propagation of unsound stocks should be prevented at all costs.

Passing to positive eugenics. It is constantly affirmed that there is now in operation a selective birth rate. It is alleged that the more rapid multiplication of laborers, miners, and manual workers generally, in com-

parison with mental workers and the "gentle" class, has brought about a deterioration in the quality of the race. It is suggested that by family endowments and other privileges the more mentally active classes could be induced to have larger families and so an opposite process be induced. But what are the qualities we want in our population, and who are "we" that want them? "We" must be utterly impartial, desiring nothing but the good of the race. We shall desire the race to be composed of healthy bodies and healthy minds. But then we are confronted by competent minds, even reaching to genius, which have made their contribution in spite of indifferent physique. Or again in a single family circle we may find the alert mind and the dunce, and indeed one fairly large family may present us with such a variety as to represent in little the variation of quality found in the nation at large. True, certain characteristic family likenesses are generally to be found, and certain aptitudes "run" in certain families. But when we read such a pioneer work of the eugenics movement as Galton's *Hereditary Genius* we cannot help asking how far family tradition and training—and not heredity in the biological sense—is answerable, for instance, in the Darwin family for its interest in science. Under the present English educational system the "scholarship" boys who enter the grammar schools more than hold their own with the sons of more privileged people. If it is said that the desirable objective is not mere book-learning but the qualities of loyalty and command such as the public schools take pride in, it is surely very doubtful whether ability to "play the game" is their prerogative.

No subject of scientific research is more beset with personal prejudice than this. The family records and statistics collected by eugenists and others must be recognized as affording valuable material for guidance. But it is easy to see that this knowledge can be used to create a new tyranny, to be made a weapon of class war, and to maintain the ascendancy of a privileged few, whose present ascendancy may have nothing to do with "eugenic superiority." Above all, a disproportional belief in hereditary determinism hides the fact that in an industrial civilization the factor of environmental conditions so greatly enters that whatever true effects of hereditary differences there may be are largely obscured.

The whole theory of a differential birth rate, whereby the inferior stocks are alleged to be replacing superior families, seems to be refuted by the following observation. The British middle classes have been and

are being recruited continually from the large families of the laboring classes. So soon as an individual reaches a position in which a higher level of culture is possible, his family tends to be smaller. From out of the successful tradesman's family the intellectual arises, and his family tends again to be smaller, and often to "nil." Thus it seems that what is happening and has happened is that the race grows ever from its obscure root—the large family of the lower orders—coming each generation to flower in individuals of higher powers of intellect who leave few or no descendants. So far from this meaning racial decay, it may be the natural order of racial economy—whilst the healthy root remains there will be ever an ample supply of shoots whose contribution to the life of the whole is in intellectual leaders and not in quantity of population. The crude Malthusian idea of a population ever pressing upon the means of subsistence has had to give place to an organic conception of society. The sudden expansion of nations in their passage to an industrial way of living is seen to have been a temporary phenomenon and not the rule of history. Industrial countries are all within sight of the end of this process of numerical increase, and will reach the population stability compatible with the organized life of each national unit. And it does not appear that this state of things will be determined in the long run by voluntary individual practice, but by forces beyond the present wit of man, which are characteristic of all organic growth. The proposition of positive eugenics, to take matters into our own hands and set about altering the hereditary constitution of the human race, of certain groups within it, was a very natural result of the acceptance of the doctrine of evolution. But the evolutionary outlook has itself advanced in two significant ways. Firstly, the "species question" is not where Darwin left it. His confident view that the difference of species and variety is one of degree, said the late Professor Bateson, "I think will not bear the test of further research." And again, "The transformation of masses of population by imperceptible steps guided by selection is, as most of us now see, so inapplicable to the facts, whether of variation or of specificity, that we can only marvel both at the want of penetration displayed by the advocates of such a proposition and at the forensic skill by which it was made to appear acceptable even for a time." Secondly, the eugenist's main proposition is rebutted by a fact that only later evolutionary studies have made plain, namely, the immense stability of the human race. Evolutionary processes are now seen to have had their limited objectives, resulting in

many types which have remained permanent until they have passed from the planet. As Professor Broom has strikingly shown, the successive forms and groups of living things could only have arisen once in the ages. "Once only, perhaps in the Cambrian times, did an invertebrate give rise to a vertebrate." "Never again can a new order of mammals arise." That man's physical frame is classified as that of a primate, a mammal, and a vertebrate gives no clue to his uniqueness. On the other hand, it does not detract from it. What we do know is that, with an antiquity which Darwin never suspected, before the Ice Age ended, men dwelt in groups, used speech and fire and tools, depicted the mammoth on the walls of caves, and buried their dead with rites. Man's evolution was prior to that, and should be clearly distinguished from human progress, which is the accumulation of valuable experiences through the generations. Making full acknowledgment of the evolution of man's frame, it is becoming more and more probable that man's physical evolution was finished when man himself began to be. Thus the physical evolution of man has as little, and as much, connection with his future social and mental development as his embryology. Thus we return to the concept of humanity. This concept, it will be said, is non-scientific, because it involves a value-judgment. Let it be admitted, the same thing must also be admitted of the concept "eugenics." But whereas the concept Humanity enshrines a moral valuation in the sacredness of personality and the essential unity of the human race, the valuations of eugenics are the arbitrary standards of this or that individual or group. It is strange to remember that the ancient doctrine of the "Adam" who "fell" and the "Adam" who rose from the dead enshrined the values, for want of which the world has lost its way. Because our fathers regarded it primarily as a theological concept, taken on authority, they had to surrender it. When we come to see in it the profoundest conception of human nature it will be restored. Science will not be abdicating but will find its crown in vindicating the uniqueness and essential unity of the human race. Not in the alteration of the human form but in the mutual adjustment of the various families of mankind, in paving the way for the co-operation of nations, by which alone the solution of their internal problems can be envisaged, and in the awakening of man's dormant spiritual capacities, along this line, indicated by the Christian ideal, does headway seem possible.

The Riddle's Key

Oswald W. S. McCall

THE times are out of joint and we have many saviors offering to set them right.

There are gospels out of Russia and gospels out of Germany, Fascism here and Socialism there, and Communism yonder. "We are changing the world!" sanguine Russian youth chants in thunder, confidently assuming that of course the change is to be for the better and seeing only hope and redemption in this hour. Nevertheless it is in this same hour that we are still reading Oswald Spengler's heavy forebodings in his *Decline of the West*.

Amid these many voices one might not presume to speak unless it were to beg a little hearkening to one voice which has not been devoid of respect in its day, but which is now in some danger of being lost in the din. One may at least venture to call attention to it. The voice is old enough. It is no upstart. It has withstood examination. Good minds have considered it and thought it very hopeful. The great Lincoln confessed that there had been moments when he had gone to his knees because he didn't know where else to go, and in our present perplexities there may still be some wisdom in even the wisest of men, and the highest placed, condescending to weigh the point of view of any likely contributor to their relief, even if the contributor has happened to be thought as unattractive for practical affairs as a root out of a dry ground. The ground is dry enough, to be sure. This root may yet be found to be the only thing capable of growing in it, the only root from which anything abiding can spring.

Jesus of Nazareth's gospel, in such a time as this, though it be only a straw thrown to the grasp, and the very desperation of hope, may well be allowed a place and a claim with the others. As familiar as sunlight—certainly no virtue to such as seek salvation in novelty—its partisans will probably protest that it is still also as life-giving, and will say: "Alas for the world if on any day the sun should fail to rise!"

In this article I propose to state what I conceive to be the social principle by which all social gospels and saviors should be tested, the essential principle, too, as it happens, of Christianity. I propose to set that prin-

ciple forth and then to examine with it somewhat the three conspicuous social systems of our time, Communism, Fascism, and Capitalism. A great principle has much virtue in it for, like Ithuriel's spear, it has a way of constraining into its proper character, divulged through all masks and shams, whatever it touches.

I

Howbeit, at the outset I am checked by two preliminaries.

First, it would appear to be necessary to say once more that Christianity is not a system of doctrine, and that its "gospel" is not an elaboration into forms and specifications.

Christianity is a principle, which is a very important thing indeed. It takes form as the principle of a tree does in trunk and leaves, but the form is not the principle, and the principle may assume wide variety of form. The whole derivation of the word "principle," as it comes to us by way of the French from the Latin, and also as it is found in Spanish and Italian, puts significance into this fact of Christianity's being not a religious or social system, but a principle. For a principle is "a beginning," an "original cause," an "operative cause." It is a general truth, a comprehensive law from which others are derived, or on which others are founded, an elementary proposition or postulate. It is a rule, a ground, and motive of conduct. With such connotations in the word, and with a principle having as one of its characteristics that it is universal, adaptable, and persistent through ages, whatever fashions may deck its body or whatever changing accents may characterize its tongue, it is not hard to see that one of the great virtues of Christianity is that it is a principle.

The relation of this fact to our study is to be made clear. Theology, for instance, has not always realized that shape and language are not necessarily the thing itself, and that, so long as this is a growing world, doctrines must forever restate their inner life. This is true also of ethics. It is true in economics and in human society. Finality lies in the principle but never in the expression of it, and yet every generation is in danger of supposing that the words and modes with which it has become familiar are final. A certain natural and not wholly unhealthy conservatism is here; always on the verge, however, of sliding over into a fossilized and static condition.

To pass out of our own times for a safe and dispassionate illustration, feudalism is not Christianity. We can see that without dispute. Yet it can

also be seen that there may have been a time when feudalism, better than any other known social arrangement, helped the practical incorporation of the Christian principle and made it work among men. Allow that for the moment. And it can be understood how, after a thousand years of feudalism, when profound world changes began to make it no longer adequate to human requirements, the restlessness being caused by new impulses, the criticisms being made inevitable by new ideas, the break-up of long-established foundations under the strain of new territorial expansions, caused heretical dissatisfaction with the old order. Then arose many fears, heart-burnings, and reproaches, as the scandalized and challenged old order turned with self-righteous chastisement upon this graceless and half-shaped newness. Nevertheless, feudalism, for all its ancient and respectable state, had not been from the beginning of the world and would not endure unto the end. It served its day and, if it best served the Christian principle, it deserved to have its day, but it was not Christianity, and neither was it final.

Socialism, Pacifism, Monarchy, Democracy have each by their more ardent disciples been now and again identified with Christianity, but they are not identical. Christianity has no interest in any one of them as such. Christianity can be interested only as these or any other doctrines advance among men the expression of the Christian principle. If Monarchy should ever be found a better way to do it than Democracy, there will be no question where Christian sympathies lie, but even then an intelligent Christian will probably be feeling out beyond Monarchy, or whatever else seems better at the time, toward a social theory, perhaps not yet born, that will better express the principle of Christ.

For each of our social systems and theories are expressive of some principle or other, and the principle's the thing. From our point of view the theory is credentialled, or otherwise, by the human principle that's in it, and, if the principle be right, then the theory is to be retained, or superseded, or modified, according as it proves adequate to the expression of its principle. In our view, the Christian idea is the one we are jealously concerned about, as concerned as a chemist who believes that all experiments departing from a certain principle are so much muddling and futility.

Reflective men, informed men, respect the power and importance of principle. At this point it may be well to reinforce Christian respect for Christian principle therefore by drawing attention to Jesus' undoubted respect for it. He seems to have had a sense of the inevitability of law.

If a man build on "sand" his house will not stand in the day of tumult, yet, as we know, to "dig deep" and to find the "rock" is a harder task. The law, as he sees, controls even Jesus himself. He cannot destroy it, it is of the nature of things, just as two and two make four and shall never make anything else, and not until "heaven and earth pass," if such a thing could be, taking with them the very genius and determination of the universe, "one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law until all be fulfilled." Opportunists and others may go romping easily along broad ways to destruction, but it is a "narrow gate" that leads to life, one that must be sought for and arrived at by thoughtful and selected paths. Lip service counts for nothing at all. "Lord, Lord!" becomes an opiate and an illusion unless a man does the will of the Father. One who probably heard Jesus speak offered his sense of him thus: "He will not wrangle or shout, no one will hear his voice in the street," and, I take it, here we have something touching the awful quietness of truth! Truth comes with no flare of trumpets and is utterly indifferent to the thunder in your drum. "He removeth the mountains—and they know it not!" Jesus, as becomes a profound mind, has great respect for the inner essentials of things, a respect to be heartily recommended among those who would incorporate his way in human affairs. We are too prone to consider self-interest or prejudice first, and there is never an exciting election, or a crisis that threatens our customs, or our possessions, but the extreme reluctance of our minds to lift from narrow and superficial considerations is illustrated afresh. Principles of biology or of architecture do not wait upon our preferences, nor in any sense do principles of human life. The Christian way would seem to be to clarify the mind concerning what Jesus saw as the natural ground of healthy living and then to "follow the argument" with it without stipulating first that it must lead in the direction of our own interests.

This is my first preliminary. Doubtless there will never be a social doctrine among us that satisfies completely the exacting idealism of Christianity, but Christianity must ever be most sympathetic with the doctrine that advances its viewpoint best. My second preliminary can be more briefly stated.

II

It is this. Why should I bother any man, why should I delay you, or occupy myself with any discussion of "principles"? As has been pointed

out, the Chicago "Century of Progress" has shown plainly enough that we are not interested in principles, we are really only interested in ourselves. Those who planned the "Century of Progress," like men who plan such fairs anywhere, possessed what they conceived to be real insight into human nature, a shrewd insight in which they believed so much that they were ready to back it with millions of dollars. When men stake cold cash they usually have faith. In the present instance the faith and the insight amounted to this, that you will not sell your goods to the people by appealing to their rationality, to their conscience, to their idealism, or to any such thing. You must appeal to their self-interest. People, it appears, always want to know "What do I get out of this?" Automatically they relate every question to their own comfort, or pleasure, or advantage. We want or we don't want, it will serve our desire or it will not serve it, it will advance our social, or political, or business ambitions, or it will not advance them. A summons to our intelligence, a call to heart or conscience, an enunciation of Christian or any other principle is all irrelevant. Nobody really cares. When one comes right down to it, it is ourselves that we care about. So runs the terrible appraisal of our modern populations, an appraisal so convinced that apparently you need not hesitate to invest your money here, in human vanity and selfishness, the security is gold-edged. . . . Why, therefore, should I write of principles? Nobody is really interested. People are interested in themselves alone. When advertisers pour out millions of money on this faith of theirs it gives one pause. "Perhaps they are right," one has commented, "but if they are right, what of the Republic?"

III

With these two preliminaries out of the way we may now come to a statement of that principle referred to so often.

There is a sense in which it may be said that the master principle of Christianity is the primacy of man. The primacy of God, while true to Jesus' thought and practice, has too frequently shown a tendency to assume a significance not true to Him, leading to temple devotions, immolations, and vows which had little vision of the human actualities of the street. The glowing truth of the primacy of God has had a way of becoming the primacy of religion, and as often the religion has been a far cry from Jesus' religion; the degeneracy of the idea has been great. For Jesus' service of God was

not ceremonial. His thought of God is not speculative and metaphysical but is always interwoven with human life, where God is passionately present and active, where he is to be sought if he is to be found, and where he lifts man above his constrictions and impotences to human maturity. Any other thought of a God is of no interest to Jesus. The "Son of man" sees human personality centrally and sees it passionately and his message with respect to man is without hesitation or equivocation. Man is to be lived for, planned for, stood aside for. Man is of more value than property, of more value than "sheep" or "swine." "How much is man better" is one of the most characteristic reflections of Christ's thought. No interest, Jesus maintained, not of the rich, not of the ambitious, not of the pleasure-seeking, and no institution, not of the nation, not of religion, not even the institution of the venerable Sabbath, dare impinge upon and hurt this first value of all values, Man. "The Son of man is lord also of the Sabbath," cried Jesus. The sons of men always are lords of the institution. That is, any voice that is speaking for Man, any authority grounded on Man, any championship of Man always has the right to bind or to loose, to retain or to dismiss. The primacy of Man, personality and the interests thereof, is Christianity's basic principle, all the rest is comment. All the Sermon on the Mount, all the other words of Jesus, all his deeds and spirit are but illustrations and enforcements of this one theme.

IV

Because man, man in completeness of powers, of nobility, and of happiness, is the first concern of Jesus, he states without hesitation what is the Great Commandment: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God . . . thy neighbor . . . thyself," which upon examination is discovered to operate toward a round and manifold unfolding of human personality. Thus:

1. Upward, in spiritual and intellectual flowering. "Love the Lord thy God," ere it is finished, induces the loftiest of expansions. The history of religions may be declared to disappoint us here, religions discouraging, as they often have done, at least the intellectual independence and curiosity of their devotees, and yet perhaps the contention may not be invalid that wherein religions have done this they have been less than pure in love of God. Whereas religion may begin in a spiritual experience it invariably passes on to an intellectual concept and, among progressive races, the interests of that concept will be sought by an increase of knowledge, so that the

spirit and the mind of man will of necessity walk together in reciprocal service, seeking to know God better and developing themselves as they seek.

This is what I mean.

In order to love God one must know something about him. What does one mean when he says "God"? By "God" I mean the One who disturbs my soul in supreme moments. By supreme moments I mean moments when I escape from my customary half-consciousness to full consciousness. Those supreme and awakened moments are variously caused. Pain causes them, so does temptation, catastrophe, love. They are caused by any immense human experience that presses me back upon reality. Then it is that I become conscious of the Great Other. I call him God.

But this has been the way men have felt and done from the beginning, and in the course of time something happens to this spiritual experience. Instead of remaining a bright blur, or an overpowering awe, it acquires character. It acquires character by what men learn about nature and about themselves, and by what the artist does with beauty, for the trails of the Lord lie through all the sciences, the arts, the philosophies, as well as through the meditations of the saints. Thus it is that one who desires to know God in order that he may love him intelligently will feel drawn to welcome the sciences and the cultures, and he will perceive that there is no real loving of that One who disturbs his soul in supreme moments and whose character and mind are continually being found in our investigations of truth, beauty, and goodness, unless he resolutely seeks to conform himself to the nature of that divine character and mind so revealed. "He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me." A falling off in intellectual curiosity would betoken no true love of God, for how shall we intelligently love one who is unintelligently known? Yet it would seem that the effort to "think God's thoughts after him" in order that he might be less unknown places the most exacting demands upon the intellect and assures its highest future.

Thus both mind and spirit, the supremest and latest born functions of human personality, are safeguarded by this commandment to love God, which encourages man evermore upward from superstition and ignorance, as well as from materialism and selfishness.

2. Outward, toward all social evolution. "Love thy neighbor." Inasmuch as Jesus' word, which we have done the best we could with in translat-

ing it "love," is not affectional, emotional, but a more robust, rational, and ordered significance, it implies an extraordinarily constructive ethic. It becomes a deliberate and calculated effort toward right human relations, sometimes in the face of one's contrary emotion. Certainly one does not turn the other cheek through any emotion of pleasure in having been struck. High rational considerations must override nervous explosions and be backed by considerable volitional energy ere behavior so mature can result. One's obligation to live in a decent and civilized fashion, Jesus seems to have taught, does not cease with an exasperating provocation, but a man of the divine kingdom must be adequate to the situation, despite "enemies," still respectful of the principle under which he has elected to live and which directs him to be considerate of the widest interests of personality. The Christian injunction to "love" our neighbor is not interested in whether we happen to "like" him, for liking may be an accident of temperament, whereas the Christian ethic is bigger than temperament and more stable. Neither is this a thing of class, as if we should confine our salutes to those who salute us, absolving ourselves from our responsibility to bridge, by patient and skillful engineering, the chasms that lie between man and man. Nor is it affected by tribe, race, color, or clan.

In illustrating this vigorous ethic it was characteristic of Jesus that he should make our "neighbor" to be not the man in whom it is profitable, or entertaining, to be interested, and whom, perhaps, for that reason, we need, but the man who needs us. Unattractive, unprofitable, a burden and an interruption to the day's business, without claim of family or even of race, the man lying robbed and beaten on the roadside affords us no thrill, offers us no reward. But he is in need. Therefore he is selected by Jesus as an example of a neighbor. Priest and Levite, doubtless with all the excuses of clever and respectable people, sinned in that they looked the other way.

"But a certain Samaritan. . . ." Was Jesus studying to be offensive? The depth of the mutual animosity between Jews and Samaritans can scarcely be credited by us. Find the place where racial strain is sharpest in our times if you would approach it. Or survey our social strains. "But a certain Communist. . . ."

Observe that in the Christian the human sense has to be more commanding than the antagonisms of either temperament, self-interest, or race. You may not successfully control your affections but you shall control your

behavior, and to your opposite or your "enemy" you shall behave with the same justice and consideration that you are accustomed to show to one who holds your heart. "Robbed" of privilege, security, or any of the rights of men, the wretch suffering on the roadside of life, be he lovely or unlovely, be you attracted or repelled, has so great a demand upon the Christian that the day's business must be halted in his interest.

The Good Samaritan did three things.

He had to stop and think out a way to meet the case.

Having decided upon a course, he then had to execute it.

In carrying it out he had to accept the cost thereof, which he did without limit, paying down moneys and effort, but with no washing of his hands of further responsibility. In that day of only twenty-four hours there were other duties awaiting him, there must be, and should be. He had to give himself to them. But, "when I come again," he said. So he would be back! And he expected to foot the bills when he came.

This, as Jesus might have said, is the spirit of the outward moving heart. In this lie all social reforms and evolutions, all ameliorations of human life.

But it is not only social. The unfolding of the individual who happens to have this spirit is here, and without it one's personality can only be narrowed, cramped, and maimed. He who "loves" his neighbor is he who shows consideration of him, who recognizes human claims as having precedence to the day's business, precedence to questions of personal inclination, taste, or temperament, precedence to questions of class or race. And while this of necessity involves great things for human society the quality, creativity, and superior life of the individual is involved not less.

3. Inward—for the word is: "Thou shalt love . . . thyself." A man must be within himself the champion of truth, of honor, of self-control, of kindness and magnanimity. A man must defend at all costs his personal altars. How he lives with himself is the basis of all else. Man's "value" does not lie in his having achieved an erect posture among mammals and a more ingenious brain.

In these days when false living is turning many into cynics and when Freud is being popularly abused into meaning that human nature has no peculiar value or sublimity in it, it is well to have Christianity's assurance that it is not a proper description of a water-lily to exclaim: "Mud!" Wherever the roots may be, the lily has drawn also from the sun and the

free wind. The cathedral, wherever its foundations may be, is not buried in the earth. "Ye are the temple of the Holy Ghost!" There are aspects of human nature which can never be described by any cynic. A hush falls upon the spirit when one listens with imagination to Jesus: "I and the Father are one." This is the discovery of all good men, and this is Christianity's extraordinary faith that human life is interpenetrated, inbreathed, and indwelt by God. This is Christianity's ancient and central sense of the incarnation of God in human life. It is the cultivation of this sense which brings man to his Kingdom. Self-reverence is born of it, without which there can be no great thinking, no great doing.

V

Here then is the fundamental Christian position, as I see it. The principle of the primacy of man is served by the Great Commandment, obedience to which induces the unfolding of that principle in spiritual, intellectual, social, and personal maturity. All is for Man, for him the way must be cleared, his rights are the first of all rights—if, indeed, there be any other—his happiness, goodness, and destiny are to be the chief business of our life. Such is the Christian position.

It is not necessary to befuddle thinking by raising irrelevant questions of this way or that way in achieving this Christian end, for human wisdom is imperfect and human experience far from complete, so that the question of method remains embarrassing. But it is of immense and directive value to say that the Christian's aim is forever the achievement of a civilization which will best give man his chance.

We must say it with an intelligent understanding of what we mean, however. In general the meaning becomes apparent in the implications of the Great Commandment. Those implications are not obscure. They certainly induce a radically different fashion of regarding human personality from fashions that have generally been in vogue among us. Before Jesus Christ, for instance, it becomes not possible to reverence property as the great value, not in itself; if its service to man is of such a kind as to bear Christian scrutiny it will be sure of Christian welcome. From Christ's point of view it may be said that whereas there was a time when man was regarded as a chattel, and now is a time when he is regarded in some quarters first as a "consumer," both are wrong: that "efficiency" is not a big enough word; that life in terms of goods is pagan: that systems and organizations, how-

ever venerable, however strong, have no divine sanction except as they serve Man. This is the principle by which all cults must be tested and what cannot satisfy it must go into the discard as the human enemy.

VI

With our Ithuriel's spear, then, I proceed to "touch lightly" the three notable social systems of our day.

Communism, in the light of most far-reaching human interests and well-being, must, I think, be said to have serious limitations in its service, to begin with, of our human spiritual life.

In saying truly that Communism affords to its ardent disciples much of the emotional devotion usually associated with religion, examination of the ideal content of that emotion ought to be faced. With all their importance, housing, eating, earning considerations are not quite the highest that human thought has conceived, nor are human "rights" the highest if those rights are to be constricted to immunity from arbitrary oppressions of czars and aristocrats and a more equal possession of the world's commodities. Nothing is to be gained by implying that Communism's ideal is lower than it is, and for every generous and self-sacrificing impulse in it one can only feel respect. Nevertheless it will scarcely be claimed, I imagine, that that ideal is big enough to take care of the future of mankind, not at least if that future requires the spirit's creative outreach into a provoking and friendly Beyond—which it will scarcely have without some sort of faith in God—nor if it requires recognition of the august regalities of conscience and morality; not if it requires, in brief, some conviction that ideas and deeds which most generations have agreed are our noblest are not merely pretty daisies growing shallow-rooted on a superficial soil but are imbedded deep in the final nature of things, not to be eradicated without destruction of personality, not to be explained without impinging upon a Will, a Mode, a "Something not ourselves," yet intimately with ourselves, often called God. Religious emotion is not enough. It can even be corroding. Its object, its aim, the conception that kindles it are of essential concern and I think Communism fails there.

It fails also, by its fettering of human thought, speech, and conscience. Here it hinders the intellect. Again, it impedes the outward and social movement of man in its preaching of class war and hate. Its coercion of the individual conscience and the sense of right leaves little room for that

reverence for one's self which is so handsomely safeguarded by Christianity, and the long view can scarcely be said to regard with equanimity both the immediate and the ultimate effect on human personality of these restrictions. The service rendered by Communism to our social thinking by its trenchant criticisms of the present order—as when it points out that the modern working class is, to quote Karl Marx, “a class of laborers who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labor increases capital”—Communism's heroisms, devotions, and achievements must not blind us to its very grave lacks in the light of Jesus' searching requirements. Jesus makes one feel that, while there are some things in Communism he would roundly condemn and some things he would approve, there are some other things the absence of which he would unhesitatingly declare to constitute a fundamental weakness in the system. Of some things he would say: “This ought ye to have done,” but of certain lacks he would add: “And ye ought not to have left these other undone.”

VII

Fascism must be described, I fear, as being still less satisfactory spiritually than Communism. It seems to me to be eminently more respectable to deny God altogether than to make a puppet out of him, beshaped and bestringed to serve a purely local interest. Many a man has preferred to be shot rather than enslaved, and one can well believe God might also. The fruits of atheism will not be seen in one generation, nor the fruits of Fascist religion, but one may well suppose that the issue will be less injurious to man's spirit if he frankly destroys the idea of God in him rather than if he keeps that idea merely as a convenient reinforcement of his purposes.

Intellectually, Fascism must be subjected to the same blame as Communism, for it too permits men to think no more than is convenient. Morally the parallel still continues, conscience having no more freedom than opinions have in any Fascist rule.

But socially Fascism falls below Communism, for Communism is enthusiastically interested in human well-being, even if that interest is narrowed in its ideology and narrowed to a class. Fascism narrows it still more, to a nation. Beyond the astonishingly provincial boundaries of its own local territory Fascism does not care to look.

As Fascism is not interested in religion pure and undefiled, neither is

it interested in humanity, and like Communism it chokes the ego with its oppressions and poisons the self with narrow aims.

Capitalism's story, one fears, runs much the same. It is Dr. James Truslow Adams who draws attention to the unhappy change that has come to the American type since, in an earlier generation, standing free and self-respecting upon the soil of his New England farm, the American could possess his own conscience and his own creed, and in these respects nourish a "rugged individualism" that was a thing to be admired and respected in him. He owned no man as his master, and no man dictated the terms by which he lived. That day has passed. Capitalism has caused it to pass. In place of that free man Capitalism has presented us with the "Yes" man, hurrying to assent to his superiors, nodding, cowed, acquiescent to the "boss," whether of the great corporation or of the gang sweeping the city's streets. There has been a depressing surrender of inward royalty for inward servitude. Insecurity, another curse of Capitalism, felt by the hundred thousand dollar a year man as much as by the humble clerk or plasterer, overshadows life with fear, and while life can never be without its risks, nor one hundred per cent safe, the extraordinary measure of our insecurity has been most startlingly illustrated in these past years with the wholesale dissolving of foundations that had seemed of granite. Furthermore, the ferocities of our competitive system have overrun all reason and all decency.

For its provocation of our fears and of our wolfish instincts, Capitalism has been indicted as demoralizing. For its driving of men to closer alliances with the earth and materialistic prizes, it is charged with being despiritualizing. For the point of view it encourages in the individual it is blamed as desocializing and, estimating the system as we have known it and not in the light of certain virtues that have managed to survive in spite of it, Capitalism, it is insisted, is deintellectualizing. What time have men for culture in a system where even their best concentration upon business is scarcely enough, and the wider wanderings of the mind are left with neither strength nor interest?

These are heavy indictments and they are not answered by pointing out how many good men have been and are in our present economic system, or how, out of our large accumulations of wealth, have come many things that have added to the universal benefit. The Christian cannot be satisfied merely to admit that there is good in everything. He insists that no civilization is Christian that does not consciously aim to give man all his chance.

If our present system of Capitalism cannot be acknowledged as satisfactory to a Christian point of view, its motives not being the Christian motives, and its principle not being the primacy of man, can a Christian, then, be a Capitalist? And how shall a Christian feel about earning his livelihood in a system that is at odds with his religion? The question might be widened to include other areas, the army, for example. Can one be a military man, and a Christian? We are born into a system, grow up with it without questioning, are dependent upon it for life's necessities, and presently are told that it is not Christian. Yet we want to do the Christian thing, we do not wish to be inconsistent. What can we do?—we cannot just step out and walk away.

The answer may emerge by asking another question. Can a Christian man be a slave owner?

1. In the days before this present Christian antislavery conscience was awakened—yes, he could be a Christian and a slave owner.

2. After the awakening and ere yet the slave system passed—yes, he could be a slave owner if, not darkening the light nor turning from the heavenly vision in order to confirm his hold upon selfish interests, or personal pleasure, or profit, he became, with his awakened conscience, critical of the system and co-operative with whatever good influences were making for its cure. If his Christian conscience and judgment showed him that the system was not in itself bad but only needed modifying and correcting in certain of its abuses, as a Christian man he would have to go after such modifications and corrections. If on the other hand it grew upon him that the system was basically injurious to man he might say: "I did not make this system. I was born into it, and I am of it, I cannot escape from it. But I am against it. I shall get my living honestly and kindly as I can as part of the system, but I shall work for great changes."

3. In these days—no, if I understand the Christian principle aright, a Christian cannot be a slave owner.

And this is true also of war, is it not, and of Capitalism, and of some other things? In these days of aroused conscience and of clearer Christian vision, the man who is not critical is condemned.

Problems and Progress in Achieving a Christian Commonwealth

FRANK A. HORNE

PERSONAL AND SOCIAL RELIGION

THE mandate for the ultimate establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth is found in the Lord's Prayer and in the commands of Jesus. How can we pray "Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven," and not believe in and work for social salvation as well as individual redemption? How can we be genuine followers of Jesus and not seek to obey his commands to love our neighbors as ourselves? Not to see the social implications of the parable of the Good Samaritan which he used to illustrate the meaning of his injunction to love our neighbors, amounts to spiritual blindness. To seek first the Kingdom of Heaven implies a dual objective, personal and social, and the quest cannot be attained without realization that the two are interdependent and inseparable. This would seem axiomatic and obvious to a discerning Christian, but we have two groups, one declaring the Church must keep silent on social issues, and the other proclaiming only the social gospel. In this time of distress, disillusionment and human tragedy, the mark of a truly religious person is concern for social justice and brotherhood. It is no time for a Christian to allow special privilege to distort political or social judgment or permit class consciousness to block human fellowship. To plead for an exclusive personal gospel smacks of insincerity and the setting up of a defensive mechanism.

If the Church fails in this crisis and remains formal and static, then, as we know it, it will soon pass out as an ecclesiastical relic of the past. No minority, however strong in wealth or position, should divert the Church at this juncture of human emergency. An acute social conscience and belief in real brotherhood comes from vital faith in God and man. Personal faith without social works is dead just as social action without individual religion is impotent.

E. Stanley Jones declares in *Christ's Alternative to Communism*:

"It is not enough to tell me that Christianity can and does change the lives of

individual men."—"I know it, and am grateful beyond words for that fact. But it is not enough. Shall we rescue individual slaves and leave the slave system? Shall we reclaim individual drunkards and not touch the liquor traffic? Shall we pick up the wounded in war and leave intact the war system? Shall we pick up the derelicts of a competitive system and give them doles and leave the system to go on producing its poverty, its hates and its exploiting imperialisms?"

Another authoritative word comes from John C. Bennett in his volume, *Social Salvation*, when he says:

"We have here the constant problem of avoiding on the one hand the extreme of thinking of persons as isolated individuals, and on the other hand the extreme of supposing that there can be any group welfare which does not show itself in the depths of personal life."

Again he convincingly puts it:

"It is one of the curious perversions of a great faith that there ever arose the confusing division between personal and social Christianity. The perversion has many roots in social situations which have passed away. It is supported by the fact that it is convenient for the protection of existing selfish interests. But its influence is also the result of theological error. It will not be overcome until there enters into the consciousness of Christians a fuller conception of the conditions and the fruits of personal salvation."

The wholeness of our religion is seen by the interplay between personal experience and social conviction. The incentive for public good proceeds from the character and disinterestedness of the individual. Likewise the execution and administration of a co-operative and just society must come from Christian motivation for the common welfare rather than from the incentive of aggrandizement. Herein lies the twofold task of the Church in supplying the leaven of the new era.

Chambers of Commerce have their place, but Christian laymen should take their applied religion from gospel sources, spiritual leaders and the findings of authoritative bodies. Special class pleading and a reactionary press are invalid for creating social conscience. The way of Christ and the social vision of the prophets are needed, in their social idealism, to confront the stark realism of present-day calamity and distress.

It is stated that the social declaration of the Protestant denominations, the Federal Council, the Conference of American Rabbis and the National Catholic Welfare Conference only present a minority opinion. This is numerically true but from the standpoint of spiritual intelligence and leadership, the findings are authoritative and representative. Our Catholic

friends have the high sanction of Pope Leo XIII and the present Pontiff, Pius XI, in their social encyclicals.

A FACTUAL APPRAISAL

Abundant case material is available to indicate inevitable technological and economic changes, and much data abounds compelling adjustments for human welfare. Reports are at hand from many university, engineering and governmental commissions containing testimony in condemnation of our economic system. This is supplemented by the better known results of recent congressional hearings. How soon we forget the traitorous cupidity revealed by the Nye Committee on the munitions racket. The spectacle of what the system does to men and what their selfish mania for money does to society, was brought out in the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, and by the exposures in the recent utility investigations. Here we have a demonstration of the workings of the profit motive and its anti-Christian implications.

Poverty and Abundance

The United States possesses 45 per cent of all the wheat, oats, coal, lumber, cotton, corn and oil in the world. Equitable distribution and use means abundance but it was not so allocated. Poverty in face of plenty is shown by the Department of Agriculture. In 1929 one-sixth of our families not on farms spent \$350 a year for food for an average family of five. 62 per cent of city people live on mere subsistence with inadequate supplies of milk, fruit, vegetables and meat. Only 10 per cent of city families had sufficient food for proper health and nutrition. Like figures are available showing lack of ability of the masses on farm and in cities to purchase enough clothes, provide decent housing and have funds for medical and dental care. It is a curious anomaly that while the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was pursuing its policy of curtailment of production, the Department of Agriculture reported that if all persons were to have a liberal and nutritious diet it would be necessary to increase the 1929 production of milk 53 per cent, butter 108 per cent, citrus fruit 84 per cent and eggs 43 per cent. An increase of lean meats is also indicated. The Department states that this would require 40 million more acres, while the Agricultural Adjustment Administration would reduce the acreage by about the same amount to maintain prices. This would seem to be sharing

poverty rather than making available possible abundant production. An acute agricultural problem is thus presented, but it is involved in our whole economic maladjustment, national and international. Buying power of the masses in the industrial centers and tariff readjustments are essential to a real solution.

Technological Trends

The substitution of machine horsepower for man power increased ninefold from 1900 to 1929, and has developed in larger acceleration since that time. The net result of this trend has helped to produce the present unemployment and relief problem. Examples of this tendency are found in the following cases: In cigarette wrapping now one person and the machine replaced one hundred workers; in petroleum refineries forty-two persons were eliminated; in electric bulbs sixty-nine operatives went out. In this process prices were reduced and quality improved, but of what avail when men and women are scrapped and ability to buy the surplus production is not assured? We cannot have mass production without mass consumption. If our present system is to stand there must be a more equitable distribution of the products of agriculture and industry. That is, definitely less large dividends, bonuses and salaries to the privileged classes so few in number, and more real wages to the underprivileged groups so large in number.

Maldistribution

Government studies indicate that eighty per cent of retail purchases come from families receiving \$3,000 per year and under. In 1929 there were 36,000 families at the top of the income scale receiving \$75,000 or more per annum, and this group obtained ten billions of income. But it took eleven million families at the bottom of the scale to receive a total of the same amount and their income was less than \$1,500 per annum, less than a minimum living wage. More recent income tax analyses since 1929 show that this contrast has been greatly intensified.

At this point we discover the practical identity of religious and economic principles. Religion stands for the rights and privileges of the entire human family, for justice among men, for equitable sharing, assurance of opportunity for the young and security for the unfortunate and aged. Economics requires equitable distribution and just sharing in order to establish

buying power and the consumptive demand, but our financial leaders fail to realize this truth.

Savings and Debts

During recent years our savings and investments have greatly increased, and likewise our public and private debts. In 1932 our government debt had increased seven and one half fold since 1909 due to the war and the economic crisis. Farm, business, and individual indebtedness rose threefold during the same period, allowing for the liquidation since 1929. This is an intolerable burden thrust on generations to come, beyond hope of amortization. It resulted largely from projecting liquidation of fictitious boom prosperity to the future and serves as a blight on real recovery or re-organization.

PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

We turn now from the factual appraisal of conditions to the substantial problems of working out a solution to the economic enigma. We may not wistfully close our eyes to the difficulties, but find in them a challenge to faith and endeavor. There is that abiding hope in the progress of universal forces working to the ultimate better day which we must keep bright in the face of adverse circumstances.

Problem of Divisions

The divisions in Church and society constitute a major difficulty in a democratic solution. These diverse groups are difficult to unite and their views hard to compose. They lap and overlap from the reactionaries on the extreme right to the radicals on the left. Between are the conservatives and liberals and a large number of unclassified people who lack social knowledge and conviction. The chief difficulties are with the extreme positions. The most stubborn resistance to social change comes from the economic group now in control of commerce and finance. They are individualists of the old school now for the most part exercising power through the modern corporation. They have a strong class consciousness and are inhibited to social concern by self-interest and conventional economics. They fail to recognize the solidarity of society and take a position against their own real interest in not recognizing the mutuality of capital and labor and that they cannot permanently prosper without the co-operation of the

masses of folks who are the customers and consumers of their product. Class selfishness and the acquisitive motive will be their undoing if they do not change. This group has many dependents and lesser lights who share their views with hopeful aspirations. In the Church, many conservative laymen are apt to substitute the rule of the market place for the Christian way of life and hold that religion has no voice in social salvation.

On the other extreme are the radical group who do see the evils of the present system and who do exhibit real human interest and understanding but propose drastic means and solutions for correction which are not acceptable to the large majority and therefore are futile. These extremists are impatient of orderly processes and democratic methods and would generally resort to force and class warfare to accomplish quick results, without realization of difficulties and obstacles. They therefore stir animosity and resentment and really retard actual progress which could be made by educational processes and the creation of public opinion. Prejudice is engendered against them because many of this class are irreligious and atheistic. In the Church the radical bloc as a minority seek to commit the membership to positions far ahead of the rank and file and thus provoke misunderstanding and a divided household. Both extreme parties should be given freedom of expression and tolerance so that we may have checks and counter-checks both to reaction and too rapid advance.

Liberalism has been decried lately as impotent and ineffective. There are many however of this type of mind and attitude on social questions in church and state. They freely admit the tremendous evils of our system, take cognizance of social and technological changes, but hold to democracy and orderly progress for the solution. They believe the better order will come by educational preparation and political action, and will evolve by the coming of a composite system based on justice, brotherhood, equality of opportunity and by substituting co-ordinated and planned co-operation for ruthless competition. The unclassified group is composed of the large number of social illiterates, traditionalists, political partisans and those swayed by the demagogue or the propagandist press. This is the field for social education and enlightenment in self-interest.

Problem of an Established System

Many people accept the present order as fixed, permanent and inescapable. They lack perspective and knowledge that all history is a transition

and that at certain epochs rapid changes occur, and do not realize we may be in the throes of shifting social movements with the depression as a symptom of upheaval and the indication of a new and better social order. Social forms, customs and usages do become fixed and static and therefore we must take account of the entrenched power and widespread culture of the economic order under which we live. Our society has grown rapidly during the last century from the primitive conditions of the early explorative and pioneering days to the present complex organization.

We have emerged from the economy of scarcity to the economy of plenty without adjustment and have disregarded the technological changes and the substitution of corporate for individual enterprise. All unconsciously this transition has fastened upon us a selfish philosophy and an atmosphere of aggrandizement which is subversive to the Christian spirit. This all embracing culture of the dollar mark and materialism and its grip on our civilization is exhibited in our banking and money system, debt structure, production distribution and consumption of the essentials of life and ramifies in the economic imperialism of international relations. It touches habits, customs, religion, education, amusements, politics, the press and radio, and government itself.

Corporate Power

The corporate form of our industrialism with its growth and centralized control is a major problem of social reorganization. Jerome Davis, in *Capitalism and Its Culture*, calls this "Corporacy"; and Berle and Means discuss it in their volume *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*. These studies show how far we have journeyed from small business units and private initiative. The gross assets of the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations grew from about twenty-six billion of dollars in 1909 to eighty-one billion in 1929, an increase of over threefold. The same study shows that the net profits of the same 200 largest corporations increased much faster than the total net profit of all financial corporations from 1920 to 1929. Ninety-four per cent of the assets of the same group of large corporations were directed by minority management and joint control or by legal devise, and only six per cent were controlled by private or majority ownership. These facts show that private initiative now resides in our corporacy under a few men, which with its hundreds of thousands of em-

ployees and countless dependent consumers constitutes virtual regimentation which the opponents of social reform so much fear.

Problems of the State

Harold J. Laski in *The State in Theory and Practice* refers to the coercive power of the state which he affirms is necessarily employed in the interests of the class controlling the instruments of production. This volume, by the Professor of Political Science in the University of London, is authoritative and philosophical, but its realistic argument produces a pessimistic mood which only religious faith and belief in ultimate progress can counteract. The following gives an impression of his reasoning:

"So long as the state expresses a society divided into economic classes, it is always the servant of that class which owns, or dominates the ownership of, the instruments of production. Such a society can be a truly equal society in the vital sense that response to need is organized not in terms of a power to acquire built upon the bare facts of ownership, but upon a service arising from a function measured in terms of social value."

The problems of the fascism of extreme capitalism or the class autocracy and revolutionary program of communism together with the demagoguism of the Huey Long and Father Coughlin types must be faced, but repudiated and discarded as un-American and un-Christian.

The problems and forces against a Christianized society seem impregnable and overwhelming. To a Christian "with God all things are possible" and therefore spiritual forces and their expression in economic evolution must be looked to for social salvation.

The mood of impatience and discouragement must give way to faith in the final victory of individual and social righteousness. We need to look beyond the perplexities of the contemporaneous to ultimate realization through orderly process and progress under Divine Guidance, and by each contributing our best in the march toward the goal.

SOCIAL PROGRESS

It is the thesis of this article that in spite of obstacles and difficulties advance is inevitable and sure. Evolutionary economic development now in evidence must be supported by enlightened public opinion and eventuate in popular action for the greatest good of the largest number of people. It should be remembered that there is nothing necessarily permanent in

our present system, just as there was not in ancient imperialism or the feudalism of the preindustrial age. It is premature to predict the precise form the new order will take, except that it will embody greater human unity, real co-operation and equality of privilege and security.

Marks of Progress

There has been marked social advance in our country during its history. The triumph of racial democracy in the overthrow of slavery marked a big social advance and this was accomplished against tremendous vested power as a by-product of the preservation of the union. This gave a great impetus to recognition of human rights and indicates possibilities in achieving industrial democracy. The rise of the labor movement in spite of its defects, the enfranchisement of women, compulsory compensation insurance, national and state regulatory bodies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Trade Commission, State Public Service Commissions and the Federal Reserve System, are all indicative of social trends. Regulation, if not sufficient, will be followed by social control and operation of utilities, and the exploitation of natural resources must be ended and their control and management vested in the interests of the people. The present administration, while it may be criticized for its temperance position, its big Navy program, its Farleyism and its betrayal of the lamented Senator Cutting, must be credited with more social legislation than that accomplished in any similar period. The N. R. A. has been declared unconstitutional but it did provide social benefits to labor, elimination of child labor and rules of fair competition which must now be secured by other means. The Banking and Securities Acts, the Social Security Law for unemployment and old age, the farm mortgage and home loan acts, the public utility and Tennessee Valley Acts, the public works and relief measures and the Neutrality Act are all noteworthy steps in socialization and were accomplished by parliamentary methods. These may be criticized as inadequate and burdensome but should be measured by the public good to be accomplished and the economic collapse which they helped to overcome.

Socialized Activities

Progress in the socialization process is shown by recalling the functions formerly under private auspices and now generally regarded as properly under social control without being labeled as socialistic or radical.

The public school system, state universities, fire protection, water supply, public roads and parks, the postal system and the growing development of publicly owned utilities, are all examples of successful socialization. Co-ordinator Eastman believes that our railroads ultimately will have to be owned and operated by government controlled corporations just as thirty-nine different business and railroad operations in the Panama Canal Zone are under government organized corporations. Even our conservatives would not wish to return all of these operations to private commercial control. In the main they are conducted with efficiency and integrity and with effective civil service and career management there is no reason why this trend should not continue for the public welfare.

The Russian Experiment

One must be fair and judicial in appraising progress made under the Russian experiment. We may condemn the class warfare, the ruthlessness of their methods and their irreligion, which, however, may be condoned somewhat because of the old monstrous ecclesiasticism. Nevertheless, we ought to weigh the results attained and give credit for actual progress made, in the hope that the good will prevail and the evil be overcome. Stanley Jones points out that their literacy has gone up from thirty-five per cent in 1913, to eighty-five per cent today, and that instead of three and one half million pupils in 1912, there are now twenty-five million students. In industrial production they have risen from eighth place in 1927 to second place today and are now next to the United States. This means that they have doubled their gross output from twenty-one million rubles to forty-two million under the five year plan. Russia has no unemployment and no millions on public relief.

The Co-operative Movement and Business Progress

The rise of the co-operative movement in Great Britain, Sweden, Japan, in our own country and elsewhere, is a mark of progress in substituting communal advantage for private gain. The advocacy of Kagawa in Japan, and of such men as Bowen and Filene in our country, is significant. It is a wholesome sign of progress when business men like Mr. Robt. W. Johnson of Johnson & Johnson, New Brunswick, N. J., out of real experience affirm that the immediate solution of unemployment and depressed business is to adopt "a working day short enough to re-employ those who

are unable to find work" and provide "minimum wages high enough for the people to buy what they produce." If industry will not do something like this voluntarily, a way must be found to accomplish the ends by government intervention.

Conclusions

1. The Christian motive for social change must be the interrelation of personal and social religion.
2. The Christian conviction must be based upon the obligations of human sympathy and brotherhood and founded upon economic facts and trends.
3. The Christian method should be a just appraisal of the problems to be faced and awareness of the upward movements and social progress of mankind.
4. The judgment is expressed that at this time no precise social remedy has been perfected suitable to the American problem, and that the ultimate solution will be worked out by a composite development and by the coming of a plan yet to be devised.
5. The Christian ideal of accomplishment is in the democratic method of adjustment resting upon the will of the people. Any resort to ultra nationalism, fascism or to the accomplishment of reform by class warfare is therefore opposed and repudiated. As Christians and as Americans, we cherish our democratic traditions, especially those liberties so clearly enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, and guaranteed in the Bill of Rights of the various states and by our national constitution.
6. Christians should advocate the adoption of a definite policy of social education to inform and train our citizenry in the principle of social justice, human brotherhood and sound economics as a prerequisite to the creation of an informed public opinion.
7. The members of our churches should be called upon to examine all the anti-Christian implications of the present social order and to face the issues free from prejudice and regardless of political affiliations or newspaper propaganda, and to support those political parties, statesmen and measures that most nearly approximate the Christian ideal.

Some Recent Discoveries

KIRSOPP AND SILVA LAKE

FEW periods have been so rich in the discovery of New Testament and early Christian documents as the last four years. The greater part of these are in the Chester Beatty collection in the British Museum, in the University of Michigan, and in Yale.

The source of the Chester Beatty papyri was probably 'Alâme on the east bank of the Nile, near the ancient Aphroditopolis. This, at least, was the information gained by Professor Carl Schmidt¹ from the dealer, who says that they were found in a pot. As Schmidt says, they were probably worn-out and discarded fragments, which were not destroyed because they were sacred.

I

The new documents in the Chester Beatty collection are as follows:

- (1) Thirty leaves of a manuscript of the Gospels and Acts, catalogued by the late Professor E. van Dobschütz as Papyrus 45 (not later than 250 A. D.).
- (2) Ten leaves of a manuscript of the Pauline Epistles, Papyrus 46 (third century). Some are in Michigan.
- (3) Ten leaves of a manuscript of the Revelation, Papyrus 47 (late third century).

This discovery of papyri also included one hundred and fifty leaves of Septuagint manuscripts, divided between Genesis (961 and 962), Numbers and Deuteronomy (963), Isaiah (965), Jeremiah (966), Ezekiel and Esther (967), Daniel LXX (968) and Ecclesiasticus (964).²

Besides these biblical manuscripts, there is a long fragment of the latter part of the Book of Enoch (chs. 97-107) and of a Christian Homily, of which a part went to Michigan. Professor Campbell Bonner made a brilliant discovery in identifying the Homily as the lost treatise of Melito of Sardis on the Passion.³

¹ See Carl Schmidt, *Die Evangelienhandschrift der Chester Beatty-Sammlung* ZNTW, xxxii. 4, 1933.

² The numbers in brackets are those given to the papyri by Prof. Rahlfs.

³ The British Museum has asked him to include the London portion in the forthcoming edition of his Michigan fragments. The text both of Enoch and of Melito will be published soon in *Studies and Documents*.

A general introduction⁴ to the Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri was published by Sir Frederic Kenyon in 1933. It is a beautiful piece of work both in contents and typography; though remarkably full it is very concise, and all who are interested in the technical side of palaeography should read it. It establishes almost beyond question that the codex form was first adopted by Christians.⁵

Sir Frederic Kenyon has also published⁶ a line for line transcription of Pap. 45 and a collotype facsimile of the whole. With kindly forethought he has published these separately, so that the private scholar can buy the relatively cheap transcription, while no college library will pass over the chance of purchasing the beautiful facsimile.

The leaves of the papyrus of the Pauline Epistles alluded to above (Pap. 46) are partly in the Chester Beatty collection in London, partly in the library of the University of Michigan. By a friendly arrangement between the two, Professor Sanders was entrusted with the editing of the whole and he has published the text with a very interesting introduction.⁷

The Chester Beatty Papyri, when taken together with fragments of the same collection in Ann Arbor, are the most important addition which has been made to our knowledge of the Greek text of the New Testament since the first publication of the Codex Vaticanus. Their full importance will not be worked out for many years, but the splendid publications of Sir Frederic Kenyon and Prof. H. A. Sanders have provided us with all the means necessary for discussing them. Meanwhile, certain problems can at least be stated.

I. THE GOSPELS

Sir Frederic says, and he is doubtless right, that the textual character of Pap. 45 varies from gospel to gospel. According to his lists, the text is more or less "Caesarean" in Matthew⁸ and Mark. In Luke, however, it is a mixture of readings agreeing about equally with B and D. This may

⁴ *The Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri, Description and Texts of Twelve Manuscripts on Papyrus of the Greek Bible, Fasc. 1*, general introduction (with twelve plates) by Frederic G. Kenyon, Henry Walker and Co., London, 1933.

⁵ Incidentally, I would draw attention to Professor Sanders's brilliant elucidation of codex (= caudex) as originally derived from the custom of joining together two wax tablets. See *Classical Philology*, xxix, 3, pp. 251ff.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *The Gospels and Acts*, by Frederic G. Kenyon, Fasc. II, Text 1933, Plates 1934.

⁷ *A Third Century Papyrus Codex of the Epistles of Paul*, edited by Henry A. Sanders, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1933.

⁸ A fragment of the second leaf of Matthew is at Vienna, see H. Gerstinger, *Ein Fragment des Chester Beatty Evangelien-Kodex (Pap. Graec. Vindob. 31,974)*, in *Ægyptus*, xiii, 1933, pp. 67ff. Cf. C. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

be the Caesarean text of Luke, but though we have collected the quotations from Luke in Origen, we have not yet analyzed them. It is, *prima facie*, much more likely that Θ , etc., change their type than that Pap. 45 has done so, but it all turns on the quotations of Origen and Eusebius. There has been a discussion on part of this problem between Canon Streeter and Mr. Tasker, but the point is scarcely settled. In John, of which little is extant, the text seems to resemble D (but without its peculiar readings) and Θ more than anything else. Once more the first *desideratum*, which will soon be supplied, is the quotations of Origen and Eusebius.

All this may well raise in an acute form the question whether the papyrus varies or the other codices. We know that the text of B in the Gospels has quite a different set of adherents from what it has in the Epistles. Even within the limits of the gospels Ψ has a different text in Mark from what it has in Luke (Matthew is missing). So has Δ . So has 565. So has W. In the Gospels, we have almost unconsciously taken B (via Westcott and Hort) as our standard, and regard most other manuscripts as mixed. Now we get a codex a century or so older than B, and it also seems to be mixed. Or can B be mixed? This is almost textual blasphemy, and the situation becomes even more sad when it is realized that Streeter and we ourselves have spoken of Origen as using a mixed text. The truth is that we have to begin all over again, and ask what is "mixture" and who mixed it. It will be long before these questions can be answered.

A question which fortunately can be answered better concerns the order of the Gospels. The papyrus certainly had Mark as the last Gospel, since the end of Mark and the beginning of Acts come together.⁹ It is therefore not improbable that it originally had the order Matthew, John, Luke, Mark, found also in DWX and the European Latin, but not in the African Latin, or the archetype of D, which, as E. Lippelt pointed out, placed Luke at the end of the Gospels,¹⁰ or the Curetonian Syriac.¹¹

Sir Frederic identifies the text of Mark as predominantly Caesarean. It may be remembered that in the *Caesarean Text*¹² we decided that, judged by several standards, Θ , 565, 700 and the Georgian version were the best extant witnesses to the text used by Origen and Eusebius in Caesarea. W (after Mark 5), 28, Family 1 and Family 13 were inferior. Later on

⁹ See Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

¹⁰ See F. Blass, *The Philology of the Gospels*, pp. 75ff.

¹¹ See further in Nestle's *Einführung*, 3rd Edition, pp. 174ff.

¹² See K. Lake, R. P. Blake, S. New, *The Caesarean Text*, in the *Harvard Theol. Rev.*, Oct., 1928.

Streeter added von Soden's Φ Family to the inferior group, and it is very probable that the other families of von Soden's I text will prove to have the same character. It is therefore immensely important to find the oldest existing manuscript of Mark belonging to the same "inferior" category, but also a little disconcerting, because the papyrus is certainly older than Eusebius and perhaps even than Origen.

A glance at Kenyon's apparatus shows that he is right to this extent: the papyrus agrees with some or all of the Caesarean group of manuscripts, more than with anything else. But further scrutiny shows, as he points out, that the agreement of Pap. 45 with the "worse" members of the Caesarean is much more marked than with the "better." The obvious answer to this observation would be to say that the manuscripts which were thought to be worse are really better. But unless we drop the name "Caesarean," this is impossible.

It is sometimes forgotten that "Caesarean" is merely the name given to the type of text used by Origen and Eusebius in the Gospel of Mark. The ultimate standard is the quotations in Origen and Eusebius, and the fact that these Caesarean writers used it justifies the use of the term Caesarean. Using this standard, the manuscripts which especially approve themselves as Caesarean are, in order of merit, 565, Θ , 700 and the Georgian version. W, 28, Family 1 and Family 13 are distinctly inferior. Thus 565, Θ , 700 and the Georgian are the primary authorities for the text used by Origen or Eusebius, and when a long quotation is found, such as for Mark 14. 66-72a, it appears that Θ , 565, and 700 give an extremely good representation of the text used by Eusebius in Caesarea, so that the text of Origen and Eusebius can be pieced out by the readings of Θ , 565, etc., when patristic evidence is imperfect¹⁸ or absent.

It is therefore impossible to regard Pap. 45 as a new witness to the Caesarean text, older and perhaps better than the existing codices. It cannot reverse the judgment that Θ and 565 are excellent and that W, Family 13, etc., are inferior witnesses to the Caesarean text in the limited and only proper sense of the word. But the recognition of this fact gives a changed and much increased importance, not only to Pap. 45 but also to W, 28, Family 1 and Family 13.

¹⁸ Short quotations, especially in Origen, are deceptive because the writer is apt to accommodate them to the grammar of the passage in which they are embedded. Moreover, they are likely to be *memoriter* and therefore "harmonistic."

If Pap. 45 be not Caesarean, what is it? It is clearly allied to the Caesarean text, just as are W, 28, etc., but, whereas it was easy and natural to say that 28 was a "weak sister" of the Caesarean group, and W, although with some misgivings, could also be so ranked, it is impossible to do so in the case of Pap. 45, and Pap. 45 takes W, etc., with it, for the papyrus is older than Eusebius, probably older than Origen. But there is another possibility. We have always supposed that Origen found or made the Caesarean text in Alexandria and took it to Caesarea, and that probably it was based on a text current in Egypt. Surely that suggests that Pap. 45 and W—both Egyptian—are not the Caesarean text, but the kind of text from which the Caesarean developed.¹⁴ Perhaps it should be called the Egyptian text. If so, all the "weak sisters" of the Caesarean text have a new importance. In clearly defined texts, such as the Vulgate, for instance, codices which are careless and generally bad often contain a number of readings which are survivals from an older text, and sometimes are very important for that reason. In the same way, anyone who studies the Ferrar group will find that in each manuscript in turn (but especially in 124) there will be a reading which is not the Ferrar text, cannot be late, and is generally supported by other Caesarean witnesses. It represents, in fact, the Pre-Ferrar Caesarean text. Similarly, many readings in W can now be recognized by the evidence of Pap. 45 as the Pre-Caesarean, or Egyptian, type. Quite the same explanation may be given of other variants found, for example, in Family 1, Family 13 and in 28, but not in Θ or 565.

But, once more, the recognition of this possibility suggests another source of information as to the Egyptian text. It has long been recognized that, for the Neutral text, the readings of Ι B are often supported by another group of which in Mark CL_Δ 33 are the most important. But not infrequently one or the other desert B and join what is generally called a Western group. The most notorious examples are the "short conclusion" of Mark found in LΨ and in the African Old Latin, or the extraordinary *πᾶσα οὐσία ἀναλαθήσεται* for *πᾶσα θυσία ἀλι άλασθήσεται* in Mark 9. 50 in Ψ, in agreement again with the African *k*. Are these readings "throw-backs" to an earlier Pre-Neutral Egyptian type, and what are their rela-

¹⁴ This is also the opinion of Prof. H. Sanders. We believe that he has said this in print, though we cannot find the reference. Certainly, he has done so in conversation. So far as he and we differ, it is chiefly in our definition of the "Western text," and we are not sure that we really differ at all, at least as to the gospels.

tions to the Caesarean text, or Pre-Caesarean Egyptian text found in Pap. 45, W, etc.?

It is not easy to work this out through the whole gospel, but we hope that the process will be completed before many months and some of its results included in our "Caesarean Text," which should appear next year.

The bearing of the papyrus on the general theory of the text of the gospels can easily be summarized. It undoubtedly represents a type of text current in Egypt in the third century. In Mark, at least, and possibly in the other gospels, the Caesarean text of Origen and Eusebius was based on it. It agreed about equally with that of κ B and with that of D, but it did not have the spectacular readings of D, or of the Old Latin; in that respect it resembled the text of the Old Syriac, and probably that of Clement of Alexandria. It also had no share in the peculiarities of the Old Syriac. This raises again the question which the late Prof. Burkitt presented in his preface to F. M. Barnard's "Clement of Alexandria's Biblical Text" in *Texts and Studies*, V. 5. Burkitt asked whether a text could not be based on the agreement of Carthage and Edessa, that is, of κ and the Old Syriac. That has never been done, though Mr. Huffman, of Brown University, is now working at the problem. The thought which was in Burkitt's mind was whether a text constructed by a comparison of κ (supplemented by D) with the Old Syriac (supplemented by Family 1) might not prove to have been used in Egypt in the second and third centuries, and to be that of which κ B is a "scholarly revision." It must be remembered that when Burkitt talked in this way the "Caesarean text" was unknown. It was represented only by Codex 1 and its relationship to Origen and Caesarea, though it had been suggested, was thought to be improbable.

Now, we have an "Egyptian text" in Pap. 45, supplemented by W, and probably by Family 1, Family 13 and by the intrusive variants in CL $\Delta\Psi.33$. To reconstruct this text will not be very hard—indeed a large part of the work is merely copying out variants. The really critical questions are (a) the relation of κ B to this "Egyptian text," (b) the relation to it of Dk, (c) the relation to it of the Old Syriac.

But one other observation should be made. It seems doubtful whether there is a sufficiently general appreciation of the meaning of "text" in this connection. Owing to the uniformity introduced by printing, we have a

much narrower sense of the variations introduced by copying than the facts justify. Without entering into the complexities of the Synoptic question, it is obvious that even after the Synoptic Gospels had become distinctive entities, there was a period when the difference between a copyist and an editor was vague and uncertain. Was the man who first inserted the *Pericope de adultera* an editor or a copyist? Most people would say "an editor." Was the man who wrote *κῆνσον* for *ἐπικεφάλιον* (or vice versa) in Mark 12. 14 a scribe or an editor? Or he who with some consistency put *εὐθέως* for *εὐθύς*? These questions present problems which need to be recognized rather than solved. But in course of time the editors ceased to exist in the original sense, and men such as Origen or Pamphilos were concerned in selecting the "accurate" copies and in correcting mistakes. Thus in Caesarea there must have been a number of manuscripts which were generally approved. They were not necessarily all copies—directly or indirectly—of a single codex, and before long there were many codices in Caesarea which varied considerably among themselves, and there never was a *single* archetype of them all. They were, however, all "Caesarean," and therefore in an edition of the Caesarean text—such as that which we hope to publish before long—there must be in the apparatus readings which have probably as good a claim to be called Caesarean as those in the text, as well as readings which are merely the mistakes of individual codices. The difficulty is to draw the line between them.

But the textual critic has also to deal with manuscripts which were closely related, and form a "family" not a text. These are groups which demonstrably go back to a single ancestor. Such groups are the Ferrar group, Family 1, and the relatively large number of manuscripts which von Soden calls K^a. It would be better if the custom were generally accepted of calling these "families," and keeping the word "text" for wider and generally older groups of manuscripts which have a common relationship, but no recognizable single ancestor.

2. THE PAULINE EPISTLES

Papyrus 46 probably belongs to the third century; Kenyon dates it 200-350, Sanders 250-300, Wilken (*Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, xi. 113) "about 200."

The papyrus presents one very curious problem. It begins with Romans 5. 17 and ends—so far as extant—with 1 Thessalonians 5. 28.

The pages are numbered, and Romans 5. 17 is the first line on page 14. The amount of space which would be required for Romans 1. 1-5. 16 shows that the first page was blank and the numeration shows that it was not numbered (page 1 was the second side of the first leaf). As was often the case with early Christian papyri, the manuscript consists of a single gathering. There are fifty-two conjugate leaves, making two hundred and eight pages, of which all except the first and presumably the last were numbered consecutively. Thus it would seem possible to reconstruct the probable contents of the original codex, page by page. Unfortunately, this is not so. The codex in its original state certainly contained, in the following order, Romans, Hebrews, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, Ephesians, Galatians, (Philemon), Philippians, Colossians, 1 Thessalonians. Parts of each of these Epistles, except Philemon, are preserved, so that there is no doubt, and only Philemon would fill the space between Galatians and Philippians. This takes us to page 193 and leaves fourteen pages to fill, or thirteen if we assume that the last was blank. 2 Thessalonians would take three of these pages and there are still left eleven (or ten) pages to account for. The three Pastoral Epistles would take eighteen pages ($8\frac{1}{4} + 6 + 3\frac{1}{2}$). This is clearly too much. But it is hard to see what else can have been on the fourteen pages?

The problem is unlikely to be solved. But the scribe was squeezing nearly thirty per cent more on each page in the last extant pages, as compared with the former ones, and making allowance for this there is room for 1 Timothy and Titus, but not for 2 Timothy. Is there any evidence for a Pauline canon which had 1 Timothy and Titus, but not 2 Timothy? I do not know any, but it is quite possible that it may be found. Sanders and Lietzmann make other suggestions. Sanders thinks that the writer may have had the Pastorals in an abbreviated form. This also is possible, but there is no evidence for such a text. Lietzmann¹⁵ (before the publication of Sanders' edition) thought that 1 Timothy filled up the lost leaves, as the writer found that there was not room for more. It is, of course, also possible that the scribe had intended to make a copy of all the epistles, but found that he had not enough space. Possibly he added another small gathering.

It is, of course, obvious that the order of the epistles is strange. Pro-

¹⁵ Zur Würdigung des Chester-Beatty-Papyrus der Paulusbriefe, von Hans Lietzmann, Sonderausgabe aus den Sitzungsber. d. preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil. Hist. Klasse, 1934, XXV.

fessor Sanders, however, shows that it was probably found in Pap. Oxy. 657, which also has the same type of text.

It would seem as though we could now suggest with some confidence that the order of the epistles in the Egyptian Corpus Paulinum at different times was as follows:

- (1) In the early third century, Romans, Hebrews, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, Ephesians, Galatians, Philemon, Philippians, Colossians, 1 Thessalonians, 2 Thessalonians, (1 Timothy? Titus? 2 Timothy?).
- (2) Origen's list had the following epistles arranged in the following order: Corinthians, Ephesians, Colossians, Thessalonians, Philippians, Romans. He had the others but we do not know the order.
- (3) In the archetype of the Codex Vaticanus, the order is Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Hebrews, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 1 and 2 Timothy, Titus and Philemon.
- (4) In the Sahidic version of the Festal Letter of Athanasius, the order is Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Hebrews, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 1 and 2 Timothy, Titus and Philemon.
- (5) In the Greek of the Festal Letter and in κ B the order is the same as in (3) except that Hebrews is put between 2 Thessalonians and 1 Timothy.

The text of the Epistles in this papyrus presents much the same aspect as that of the Gospels in Pap. 45. It agrees exclusively neither with κ B, nor with the Western group of manuscripts. We think that we should be inclined to accept its readings rather more frequently than Lietzmann has done. In general, we imagine that it represents the text of the third century as it existed in Egypt, and this, we believe, is essentially Professor Sanders' view. Both in the Epistles and in the Gospels, it becomes clear that the problem of the text may very probably be narrowed down to the question whether the κ B text is merely a revision of the Old Egyptian text, or was based on other manuscripts of which no records remain. It is obvious that on the whole the probabilities favor the former theory. Those who wish to maintain that the text of κ B is really superior to anything else will have to show that there is a sound basis of intrinsic probability in

favor of their recension. Speaking generally, it would seem that the text of this papyrus, and probably that of Egypt generally in the third century, was not identical either with the κ B recension or with the so-called Western text of DEFG. As with Pap. 45 in the Gospels, it has a large number of Western readings, but is devoid of the striking peculiarities of that recension. Moreover, it must be remembered that, as Hort always pointed out, B is, in the Epistles, nearer to the Western type than it is to the so-called Neutral text. That seems to account for the fact that the papyrus is a little closer in the Epistles to B than to anything else, and that D comes next after B.

There is one unique reading in the papyrus which, as Professor Sanders points out, is particularly worthy of notice. It has the Doxology in the Epistle to the Romans, at the end of chapter 15, not at the end of either 14 or 16. Professor Sanders remarks, we think correctly, that this implies that chapter 15 was regarded as the end of the Epistle, and chapter 16 as a covering letter introducing Phoebe of Cenchreae. That, of course, applies only to the long recension which was current in Egypt, but the problem of the short recension has still to be settled. That the short recension existed seems to me perfectly clear. If so, it either had no Doxology anywhere, or it had it at the end of chapter 14 only, because chapters 15 and 16 did not exist in it. But the whole matter of the short recension of the Romans and the relation of it and of the text of the Epistle to the Ephesians to the making of the Corpus Paulinum is likely to be a matter of consideration for many years.

II

More spectacular, though probably in the end less important than the Chester Beatty Papyri, are those published by the British Museum under the editorship of Dr. Bell and Mr. Skeat. They consist of four documents. The first is a fragment of an unknown gospel, the second fragments of a gospel commentary, the third a short extract from 2 Chronicles, and the fourth is a leaf of a liturgical book. They are beautifully edited and the first, at least, raises many interesting problems. Let us deal first with the other three, which are relatively less important.

The text of the book of Chronicles is, in the main, closer to that of the Codex Alexandrinus than to anything else, and contains in agreement with it an interesting and impossible variant which is obviously a mistake.

The liturgical fragment is curious in that it gives the text of two prayers, both quite unknown in Christian literature. There is, unfortunately, no clue as to the source from which they were taken although, as the editor says, the name of Serapion comes at once to one's mind. He thinks, however, that it is more probable that it belongs to a definite service-book corresponding to the modern Euchologion. It is also probable that it is not an extract from a liturgy. There is, in fact, very little in it which proves that it is Christian rather than Jewish.

The commentary on the gospels is interesting and tantalizing. It contains references to Matthew 4. 5, Matthew 27. 52ff., Matthew 5. 8, Psalm 11. 7, John 1. 14, John 1. 29, John 6. 55, Philippians 2. 6 and to 2 Timothy 2. 19. The editor is rightly reluctant to identify this commentary. He points out that it might quite conceivably be an extract from Irenaeus or from Heracleon. The two references on the second column of the verso to the *λόγια* of the Lord remind one of Papias but there is nothing else in the fragment to favor such an idea.

Finally, the fragment of an unknown gospel is extremely interesting. The problem set by the editor is whether it is a source of the fourth gospel or a book written by someone who had knowledge of it. In all probability, the majority of readers will be forced to take the latter alternative.

Those who wish to see the original text must look at the splendid reproduction and transliteration into ordinary Greek type provided by Doctor Bell. But an excellent idea of the fragment's character is given by a translation, which I take from page 28.

“. . . And Jesus) said unto the lawyers, (? Punish) every wrong-doer and transgressor, and not me. . . . And turning to the rulers of the people he spake this saying, Search the scriptures, in which ye think that ye have life; these are they which bear witness of me. Think not that I came to accuse you to my Father; there is one that accuseth you, even Moses, on whom you have set your hope. And when they said, We know well that God spake unto Moses, but as for thee, we know not whence thou art, Jesus answered and said unto them, Now is your belief accused. . . .

“. . . ? they gave counsel to) the multitude to (? carry the) stones together and stone him. And the rulers sought to lay their hands on him that they might take him and (? hand him over) to the multitude; and they could not take him, because the hour of his betrayal was not yet come. But he himself, even the Lord, going out through the midst of them,

departed from them. And behold, there cometh unto him a leper and sayeth, Master Jesus, journeying with lepers and eating with them in the inn, I also became a leper. If therefore thou wilt, I am made clean. The Lord then said unto him, I will; be thou made clean, and straightway the leprosy departed from him. (And the Lord said unto him) Go (and show thyself) unto the (priests).

" . . . coming unto them he began to tempt them with a question, saying, Master Jesus, we know that thou art come from God, for the things which thou dost testify, above all the prophets. Tell us therefore, Is it lawful (to render) unto kings that which pertaineth to their rule? (Shall we render unto them), or not? But Jesus, knowing their thought, being moved with indignation, said unto them, Why call me with your mouth Master, when ye hear not what I say. Well did Isaiah prophesy of you, saying, This people honor me with their lips, but their heart is far from me. In vain do they worship me, (teaching as their doctrines the) precepts (of men) . . . shut up . . . in . . . place . . . its weight unweighed? And when they were perplexed at his strange question, Jesus, as he walked stood still on the edge of the river Jordan, and stretching forth his right hand he . . . and sprinkled it upon the. . . . And then . . . water had been sprinkled . . . before them . . . and sent forth fruit."

The first paragraphs appear to be a mixture of John 5. 39 and John 9. 29. Then follows a section connected with John 7. 44, John 10. 39 and John 7 especially verses 30 and 59, or alternatively with Luke 4. 30. It seems to be a variant account of a leper, similar to that in Mark 1. 40ff, and the parallel passages in Matthew and Luke. The next paragraph is a curious mixture of John 3. 2 and Matthew 15. 7ff. The last paragraph seems to contain an unknown story, the text of which is, unfortunately, very defective, relating how Jesus stood by the banks of the Jordan and produced a crop of seed by pouring water from the river onto the ground. That, at least, is the impression which the fragmentary text makes upon us, although a reference to baptism has been suggested.

Doctor Bell is evidently inclined to think that it may well be that the archetype of this fragment is earlier than the Gospel of John, or is derived from one of the sources of the Gospel of John, and that, though it may have been acquainted with the Synoptic tradition it was so in a form which was markedly variant from the one we have now. In other words, he is

willing to consider the possibility of explaining the difference between this fragment and the Canonical Gospels by assuming that it is earlier. Professor Casey, who has reviewed the book in the *American Journal of Philology*, and others are inclined to think that on the contrary its differences are to be explained by the theory that it is later and that, as Professor Casey puts it, it is half-way between the Gospel of Peter and the Diatessaron. I am a little skeptical as to the arguments Professor Casey produces as to the secondary nature of the text in the fragments, as compared with the Canonical Gospels, because I think that such arguments can generally be reversed. It is very hard to say, especially in dealing with more or less illiterate documents, whether the better or the worse reading has the greater claim to be accepted.

I am inclined to think that the possibility that this document may be a fragment of the Gospel according to the Hebrews has been rejected a little too summarily on the grounds that the Gospel according to the Hebrews was closely connected with the Gospel of Matthew. This is "Harnack" and perhaps a slight overstatement. A Gospel according to the Hebrews in Greek is quoted by Origen, or, rather, referred to by him, and one in Syriac by Jerome. Harnack identified these, but the question might well be reopened. There seems to me not the slightest reason to suppose that Jerome was wrong in saying that his Gospel according to the Hebrews was connected with Matthew. Origen's Gospel according to the Hebrews was a different thing altogether. There is no sufficient reason to suppose that it was in Aramaic or Hebrew or was a translation and it is contrasted with the Gospel according to the Egyptians. We take it that it is another of the many things which would indicate that the formerly Jewish population of Egypt was largely converted to Christianity. The Hebrews, in this connection, would mean "ex-Jews" and Egyptians would mean what we now call Copts. In the first or second century they would almost certainly use Greek rather than any other language for writing. It is, however, clear that the identification which we suggest can neither be proved nor disproved. The most that can be done is to make it a little more or a little less probable. Until something more is discovered, that is all that can be said. Nor do we think that it will ever be very profitable to ask whether the allusions in this fragment imply a different text of the Synoptic Gospels from that which we now have. It is extremely likely that the texts of both differed at the beginning of the second century from what we have now,

but in the absence of evidence it is impossible to make any sure statement on the subject.

III

A small but very important find was made at Dura by the Yale Expedition and has just been published by Professor Kraeling in *Studies and Documents*. It is no less than the only known fragment of the *Diatessaron* of Tatian. It can be dated as earlier than the year 250, and it is in Greek, not in Syriac. To our minds, that settles almost beyond the shadow of doubt the long-standing question whether Tatian wrote in Greek or in Syriac. Professor Kraeling published a most valuable introduction to the fragment and we think has shown that the Greek of this small piece of parchment is probably preferable to any other evidence we have as to the text of Tatian. We should like to make two points in this connection. First, we are wholly skeptical whether the Tatian who wrote the Address to the Greeks is the same as the Tatian who wrote the *Diatessaron*. The Tatian who wrote against the Greeks believed in the Logos Doctrine, and took, so far as we can see, no interest in the life of Jesus or in his crucifixion. The Tatian of the *Diatessaron* was obviously a man who was completely saturated in the text of the four gospels. Secondly, it is to be noted that one element in the extreme importance of the excavations at Dura, in general, is that it makes us abandon any tendency to regard the district of the Euphrates as essentially Aramaic or Syriac in speech. On the contrary, it was predominantly Greek. The same thing is true of Palestine. Excavating has been disappointing in the amount of inscriptions discovered, but such as it has been, it has shown that we have overestimated the amount of Aramaic and underestimated the amount of Greek that was used.

Affirmations of Art

ALBERT E. BAILEY

ART is an affirmation of value.

An artist looks upon the world of objects and finds certain things that are fundamentally and permanently satisfying: they are order, proportion, rhythm, balance, light, color. He looks upon human life and discovers qualities to which the hearts of men everywhere respond: strength, courage, love, patience, forgiveness, sacrifice, faith, idealism. Having perceived these elements that lay hold upon the soul and express its truest quality, he resolves to hold them up to men's view, give to their fleeting manifestation a permanent form and thus affirm his belief and his joy in the reality of a spiritual world nearer to the heart's desire than is the visible world.

The result is a work of art: the application of insight and intelligence to the crude data of experience to the end that the recreated world of the artist may meet more fully man's instinctive desires. And that which is permanently and deeply satisfying we call Beautiful.

Thus the artist manipulates the forms of nature; selects, arranges, organizes, imposes the categories of his thought upon them, until he has flashed upon us the wild joy of waving grain (Van Gogh), the brute strength and fascination of an Atlantic storm-wave (Homer), the opulence and peace of October (George Inness). He masters the vocabulary of lines and surfaces and proportions, and speaks to us of dignity (Saint Paul's, London), of elegance (Folger Library, Washington), of aspiration (Chartres cathedral), of imposing power (Rockefeller Center, New York). He surveys the conflicting emotions of men and now and again breaks forth in affirmation. Velasquez proclaims the nobility of courtesy (The Surrender at Breda); an unknown sculptor, the conquering loveliness of young womanhood (the Aphrodite of Cyrene); Raphael, the mystery and peace of union with God (The Transfiguration); George Barnard, the grandeur of vicarious suffering (the Cincinnati Lincoln).

In this way the artist adds something to life. He is the creator of spiritual wealth through his discernment and affirmation of values.

It is worth dwelling a few moments in this world of values, for so we may supplement our feeble insights with the penetration and the creative skill of the world's geniuses.

Somebody in old Egypt discovered the beauty of Geometry.

Having been educated to confuse beauty with elaborate ornament, we moderns would never look at a pyramid in the hope of getting a thrill. But ride out on that five-mile straightaway that crosses the lush Nile valley westward from Gizeh village. There they are—those three toy blocks—resting on the long level platform of the desert. Distance obscures the evidence of man's vandalism, so that the surfaces look almost as smooth as when the casing blocks were in place—geometric planes without a particle of ornament. The morning sun behind us turns their eastern faces to burnished gold. The north faces lie in purple shadow. The line between sunshine and shade is sharp as a sword and the outer edges keenly cut the blue sky which also is without the ornament of clouds. As our car whirls us nearer, the three blocks grow to giant size and they approach each other till they impinge. This is their moment of beauty: they are perfect in their proportion of height to base, perfect in their incarnation of strength and repose, perfect in their adaptation to the ageless desert that has nothing with which to hide the sharp lines of its nakedness. Just lines, angles, planes—the tawny earth, the cobalt sky!

How would you like to have an architect modernize and improve the pyramids?—drape some balconies about them with an Eiffel tower at each corner—lay on a few broad courses of polychrome tile in zigzag patterns—add a gothic portal on the north side and a gothic spire at the top—or do any of the hundred stunts known to builders? That would be a profanation! There are times—and this is one—when the totality of setting and meaning cries out for pure geometry. Some ancient genius saw that and affirmed it. He discovered an eternal value and disclosed an eternal beauty.

The Egyptians did not confine their use of geometry to architecture; it underlies their decorative work as well. When you become familiar with their artist-ways you will find that a canon of proportions based on squares determined the drawing of all their strangely-compounded human figures—so many units to the shoulders, so many to the head and feet. You will find that spaces for figures and their accompanying hieroglyphics were also geometrically calculated; that their brilliant tomb-paintings were laid out

with reference to number; and that even their exquisite jewelry had a basis in mathematics. I am thinking of a gold and faience pectoral made for Sesostris III about 1875 B. C. and designed on the proportion of the side of a square to its diagonal: that is, if the height of the pectoral is taken as one, the length of the pectoral is the square root of two; and all the subdivisions of the design—the cornice of the dais, the position of the hieroglyphics under it, the bodies of the human-headed lions, and even the angles of the arms and legs of the king's prostrate foes—are rigidly controlled by the diagonals, meeting points and spatial relationships that are implicit in that particular incommensurate rectangle.

Follow art down through the ages and you will be met at every turn by the geometric basis of design. Man discovered these forms in nature: in the circles of sun and moon, in the infinitely varied planes and boundaries of crystals, in the spirals of tendrils and leaf whorls and sea shells and running water, in the ovoids of eggs, the parabolas and ellipses of breaking waves, thrown stones and planetary orbits. And observing the satisfactory results of all this geometrizing, or to put it more factually, yielding his creative hand to nature's law imbedded in his subconscious soul, the artist impressed law, order, proportion, rhythm, balance upon his designs. Only so did the designs completely satisfy.

Said a painter to me: "I worked for a long time over this landscape but I couldn't get it to suit me. Then I tested its areas by the proportions of Dynamic Symmetry [exemplified in the pectoral above] and found that my horizon line was half an inch too low. I raised the horizon and now the picture suits me."

One is tempted to paraphrase Saint Augustine's famous affirmation: "Our artistic hearts are restless till they rest in Thy Law."

The Greeks knew all about this. They never tried to be original. Repressing their impulses for idiosyncratic design they followed their subconscious instinct for geometry, held fast to "the pattern shown them in the mount," and produced the subtle proportions of the Parthenon, the exquisite curves of their volutes and their vases, the restrained decorations of their drinking cups; and they disguised with flesh the starkness of the mathematics that dictates all the ratios of the human frame.

The Byzantine designers knew about it, as did their Persian and Arab imitators; and they carried geometric design to its ultimate pitch of intricacy and beauty.

The Romans knew about it when they turned architecture into engineering in their arched aqueducts at Pont du Gard and Segovia, in their circular temples of Vesta and the Pantheon, in their elliptical Colosseums and their rectilinear basilicas.

The great geniuses of the Renaissance bowed to mathematics when Pollaiuolo and Ucello discovered the laws of perspective, and when Leonardo and Raphael found the effectiveness of composition in triangles.

The modernists have rediscovered it. The "Art for Art's Sake" movement in the late nineteenth century was an endeavor to get away from the storytelling of the Victorian age with its appeal to sentiment, literature or morals, and get back to the so-called purely aesthetic aims, which are, really, to embody the geometry of abstract design. That seems to be the chief virtue of Matisse; that is part of the animus behind Cubism; that is the secret of the revolt against Impressionism and the return to the solidities of Cezanne and Grant Wood. That return to the elements of unadorned geometry is largely responsible for twentieth-century architecture and the increasing beauty of our machines and art-craft products. Pure functionalism, whether of form or motion, is pretty nearly synonymous with pure geometry.

Art study from this point of view becomes a discipline in the fundamentals of aesthetics. By comparing this masterpiece with that, in this culture and that, you will find yourself growing in an appreciation of what is truly beautiful not only in plastic things but in all situations that involve the application of intelligence to the crude data of experience. Thereafter when you write a sermon or frame an argument or talk with a friend or discipline a child you will think of Geometry!—of relationships, proportion, restraint, balance, nothing-in-excess. For the right ordering of life is said to be the greatest of the Fine Arts.

If an artist affirms aesthetic values in the world of things, he sometimes also affirms spiritual values in the world of persons. To be sure, the artists of the world have not steadily held these values in mind, having been sometimes overborne by the impact of material objects with their shimmer and sensuous vitality; but whenever Art has reached a crest in western culture it has had something to say about human values; it has become a critique of life. No one who aspires to understand the world's art therefore can

ignore this spiritual element which has registered unmistakably down the ages the ideals that men have held dear.

Let us look at Greek sculpture for illustration.

It took Greek artists four hundred years to master the human figure. By the end of that long self-discipline they could think a human body of any type, sex or age, in any position, from any point of view; and they could embody that thought adequately, supremely, in bronze or marble. Having acquired this mastery, what did they do with it? They gave the world, among other things, a record of what each generation of Greeks felt were the supreme human values. To show what this means I will ask you to look at the goddess Athena through the eyes of Greek sculptors.

In the Acropolis museum at Athens is a bronze statuette of Athena, made in the sixth century before Christ. She is stocky and masculine. Her left arm, extended straight, once bore a shield; her right arm is striking with a spear as she strides forward. A big horsehair plume on her helmet adds to her height and impressiveness. This is a fighting Athena, a "Pallas" or brandisher. She is the personification of the war spirit, which in that primitive age was all that kept the Greek race alive. She represents that stage of development when a man says,

"For by Thee do I run upon a troop,
And by my God do I leap over a wall."

That was the value a Greek found in divine help; Athena was his ideal of what a goddess should do—fight for him!

The early fifth century brings a new insight. On the west pediment of the temple at Aegina the goddess stands majestically in the midst of the fray while her warriors do the fighting. She is still clad in the panoply of war but she does not fight. She is there as the symbol of their cause, as the background and inspiration of their endeavor, as the wisdom and purpose that devises strategy and nerves the warrior's arm. The value expressed is intellectual rather than physical, victory through divine guidance.

Another note is struck at Olympia in this early fifth century. There in the metopes of the Zeus temple Athena appears as the friend of the hero Herakles. Now Herakles was not a warrior. We read of the labors of Herakles but not his battles; and nearly all these labors had for their purpose some amelioration of human life, a swamp or an Augean stable cleaned, a boar or ravaging lion struck down. Those works required strength but

also wits and a social purpose. So here Athena stands, not clad in the arms of combat, but with gentle face and feminine charm counseling the hero as he starts on a perilous adventure, or lending a helping hand as he shifts the sky from his shoulder to that of Atlas. Athena the wisdom and the purpose behind useful toil and sacrifice; God the friend and counselor of man.

This companionship with man, this association with him in his struggles and hopes and defeats, made Athena tender. In that beautiful relief in the Athens museum, fifth century again, the goddess stands leaning on her spear before the grave of one of her fallen comrades. Her body is quite human in its meditative pose, her head drops forward and her gentle face is full of sympathy and grief as she thinks of the price this hero has paid for his loyalty to her. Here is a goddess who can be "touched with a feeling of our infirmities," and whose tears are a testimony to a man's value to his city.

Athena is keeping pace with Greek development. The concept of her changes as life itself advances from stage to stage, and socialization reveals higher possibilities of character.

As the Athenian commonwealth grows and after the victory over Persia becomes consciously the leading representative of civilization, new values register themselves in Athena. The goddess is now the patron deity of a great state. Athenian generalship has beaten back the Asian hordes, Athenian statesmanship has made the city supreme in Hellas, Athenian genius has created great drama, lofty poetry, supreme art, Athenian shrewdness has made trade to flourish and wealth to increase. Clearly these good things came not without divine inspiration. Let us make then to the glory of our goddess the finest temple art can create, and let us embody in one superb statue the character of this resourceful, benign and all-wise Saviour!

So Phidias rears his Athena Parthenos of gold and ivory, dweller in the holy of holies of that wondrous temple, in the midst of the people whom she loves. He gives her a helmet and shield, for she is still a warrior. But the shield now rests at her feet, a covert for the snake of Erechtonios the old earth-god worshiped here before Athena banished superstition from the minds of men; and on the shield's edge he engraved the battle between the Amazons and Titans—intelligence and skill against brute force. On her helmet he placed winged horses and a sphinx, reminders of her early conquests over nature for the sake of man—her taming of horses, her plowing, her instruction in husbandry. In her left hand he placed a golden

victory, her supreme gift to her beloved city; not only victory in war but in the peace-time arts that are now capturing the world.

On the breast of the goddess Phidias placed the Gorgon's head with snaky locks, by which we are to remember not only her help to the hero Perseus but that unapproachable chastity that turns to stone all those who would approach to violate it. For never in the long years of Greek mythology did any man dare breathe a syllable of slander against her character. She was the Parthenos, the Virgin, the untouched ideal of steadfast virtue. And when the awe-struck worshiper raised his eyes to her face, he saw features that were wise and thoughtful, gentle and lofty, kindly and generous; all that one would expect from the daughter of aegis-bearing Zeus, from whose brain she had sprung and whose wisdom she incarnated—a Logos who brought down to man's level of comprehension and made dear to his heart the ineffable Godhead.

These are the moral values men are ultimately seeking; the smiling angel-faces they have alternately loved and lost awhile. For barbarism now and then through the centuries has overwhelmed civilization and blotted out man's view of the Highest. But the fragments of art that have escaped destruction can help us recapture portions of this vision, put back the emphasis on spiritual things, and through the poignancy of their beauty force us once more to worship.

Now these spiritual—that is to say, human—values are as varied as life itself. While many of them persist in art from age to age, some of them receive special emphasis in certain epochs and cultures. Never, for example, did any people surpass the Egyptians in their desire for everlasting life, with all that implies of creature-comfort and companionship. This ideal and this hope are summarized in an inscription on the alabaster wishing cup which King Tut-ankh-amen's girl-wife gave him for his solace in death: "And for millions of years mayst thou sit with thy face to the north wind and thine eyes beholding felicity." More spiritual longings are often found on the walls of tombs and in papyri, the expressed desire for realities that men acknowledge are worth striving for. Have you seen in the Papyrus of Ani that vignette of the Weighing of the Soul?¹ What are the affirmations there made?

That man's conscience presupposes a standard of conduct and demands a judgment; that the gods are the administrators of justice; that the test

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applied to man's heart when weighed in the balances is Righteousness; that the man who is found faithful over a few things shall enter into the joy of his Lord, shall partake of the food of eternal life and associate on equal terms with the gods who people the sky. These hoary truths have sometimes disappeared from man's treasury of precious things. Perhaps they need reaffirmation in the art of today.

Christian art has affirmed the truth of salvation through suffering: for a thousand years it held aloft the beacon of the Cross. How incomprehensible such an idea would have been to Praxiteles! To him the greatest value was the perfection of the body, the luxury of health, the ecstasy of love, a timeless aloofness from care and the sorrows of mortal life. You cannot look at his Hermes or his Cnidian Aphrodite without realizing it. "My body broken for you" would have been to this Greek, foolishness; and to Phryne his model and mistress, a stumbling-block. These two children of the gods had not suffered deeply enough to attain the insight of renunciation. Only in the medieval art of Christendom, in its painting and sculpture, its mosaics and flaming windows, is the fact revealed that the highest blessings are won only by some one's sacrifice; that life goes forward and upward only over the broken bodies of men "here martyred and hereafter glorified."

Gothic architecture embodies at least two spiritual truths: one is the value of the intellect in directing life, the other the value of the emotions as the dynamic of life.

The very structure of a gothic church is an affirmation of the intellect. It is a clearly thought-out scheme for obtaining repose through the balance of opposing forces and the articulation of parts. A cathedral is as logical as the theology of Thomas Aquinas. A glance at the ground plans and cross sections of cathedrals given in Fletcher & Fletcher: *A History of Architecture* will impress anyone with the extent to which careful calculation, logical relationships and the solving of problems enter into such construction. On such an achievement men adjudge intellectual supremacy to the thirteenth century builders. But in the sculptural decoration we get further affirmation of the dominance of the intellect in religion. The artistic representation of sacred subjects was governed by laws laid down by the church. No individual imagination could take liberties with them. Every detail had a definite meaning, a place and only one place in the scheme of the whole. From the orientation of the church to the number, grouping and

symmetry of its parts, law held sway. And the range of sculptural decoration covered the whole encyclopedia of knowledge from Creation to Doomsday, from the signs of the zodiac to the professions and occupations of men, from Bible history and story through prophets and martyrs to secular and contemporary history, and the whole realm of nature as well. On his cathedral the medieval theologian acknowledged that mathematics lies at the heart of the universe, though not in a Greek sense: they assigned to such numbers as 3, 4, 7, 12, a mystic meaning that explained both nature and religion. They affirmed that God is Law and Order, that history and science are only a revelation of his unchanging will, and that man's highest duty is to submit both his intellect and his will to the divine purpose. A cathedral is therefore a perfect image of the medieval mind: it showed the range of both his knowledge and his belief.

But a cathedral expresses also the longings of the medieval soul. It is a visible incarnation of Faith and Aspiration.

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The other affirmation is more vague but more true: that the spirit of man demands worship, that it yearns for God. It was that quite as much as rivalry between cities that caused men to build higher and yet higher till they reached the very limit of what stone could endure; and when stone could go no higher it burst into flame in pinnacle and crocket as if its soul would still mount to heaven. That structure towering over the roofs

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of cities, a landmark to travelers leagues away, was a symbol of the supreme place religion occupied in medieval life, and of the constant endeavor of man to lay hold on the Infinite.

And that same aspiration, that upreach of the soul for God, is induced in the worshiper today as he stands within the lofty nave. Both his eyes and his soul are drawn upward by the slender shafts that cluster about the piers, upward past the capitals that blossom in joy with vine and leaf and flower, upward with the arches that spring and soar, till among the fretwork of the lofty vault he catches glimpses of the stars and beyond them the blue of infinite space. A gothic cathedral is man's yearning for the Highest.

Not all the affirmations of art are of equal value. They follow the currents of the time-stream. Life as seen by the prosaic Ghirlandaio is not life seen by the mystic Rembrandt. Michelangelo saw life dynamically: his world was made up of forces struggling for the mastery, and evil seemed to him destined to win. His contemporary Raphael saw not the passion of life but its beauty, and affirmed with Platonic skill that men are only broken arcs of that perfect and abstract beauty that is eternal in the heavens. Frans Hals affirms that human personality is the most fascinating thing in the world. El Greco affirms that the only real and significant world is the spiritual. Millet affirms the dignity and the pathos of peasant toil; Goya the brutality of war and the asinine stupidity of men.

With the "Art For Art's Sake" tribe we learn that the chief end of man is to have aesthetic thrills run down his spine; with Picasso and his satellites we discover that the world is "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." Rivera knocks us down with his assertions that the history of America is nothing but a sordid struggle for power between two classes, the exploiters and the workers; and Thomas Benton sober us with his revelation of the richness, the vital energy and the materialism of our present-day American scene.

In his affirmations each artist flashes to us a facet of truth. As we try to understand these messages we are astonished by the complexity of life, by the diversity of its interests, the terrific impact of its forces and the infinite variety of the approaches men may make to reality. But as we grow older we learn to discriminate. The lesser voices fail to disturb us as formerly, and the great affirmations, the truths men live by, begin to loom large like the giant peaks of the Himalayas with their snows, resplendent and inspiring above the foothills and the scorching plains of life.

Human Values in Literature

LEWIS H. CHRISMAN

LITERATURE is "human at the ripe red of the heart." It is not made within the narrow walls of the book-lined library. It takes its rise upon the wind-swept mountain, amid the crash and whir of the factory's wheels, by the fireside of home, in the turmoil of the city's crowded streets, wherever human beings live and love, struggle and aspire, fail and achieve; wherever man plays his part in that tragi-comedy which we call life. He who would learn to write must first live. Books and life cannot be separated. First comes life and then literature. Phillips Brooks tells of a schoolmate who at the ripe age of twenty published a volume of poems called *Life Memories*. Naturally this publication died an early and unheralded death. In his Harvard Phi Beta Kappa address of 1837, "The American Scholar," Emerson with clear-seeing wisdom said, "Only so much do I know as I have lived. Instantly we know whose words are loaded with life, and whose not." Life is not talk but action. A pedantic, academic-minded dilettante can never be a maker of literature.

No thought is vital in any mind until it is tested in the crucible of life. The value of a work of literature varies in proportion to the richness of the experience upon which it is based. All great masterpieces of literature illustrate this truth. Over five hundred years have passed since Geoffrey Chaucer was "nayled in his chest." His incomplete masterpiece, *The Canterbury Tales*, is, however, still read for pleasure and will be read for sheer enjoyment five centuries to come. It is one of the most unbookish of cycles of poems. One needs no occult gift to see even yet that little procession winding along the Gadshill road. They are all there, the sleek, bald-headed monk on his brown palfrey with bells on its bridle; the cadaverous Oxford clerk and his horse "lene as is a rake"; the bronzed pirate with dagger hanging by his side, riding a sorry old nag "as well as he could"; the gay-hearted, lovesick youth, "fresh as the month of May"; the foul-mouthed, red-bearded miller with a wart on the top of his nose, the country gentleman with a beard white "as the dayseye"; and all of the rest of that ever-to-be-remembered company, with shrewd, discreet, well-

taught Harry Bailey, landlord of the hospitable Tabard Inn, keeping peace in his varied family.

How far away seem those days of Dan Chaucer, "the first warbler!" How many times since then have the April zephyrs blown over the green meadows of England! Generations have come and gone. History has been made and written. A noble procession of masters of prose and poetry has followed in the wake of him who told of the pilgrimage to Beckett's tomb. The snorting steam and piston strokes have replaced the pack horse on the down. The nations' airy navies have grappled in the blue of the skies. The borders of the empires of human knowledge have extended themselves upon every side. Old things have passed away. The world of Chaucer is real only upon his pages. Yet in spite of the progress of mankind, man remains the same. Humanity is still human. Man's interest in man is the same throughout all of time's mutations. Chaucer lives today because he wrote not of the dead but of the living. They who have in common an intense, consuming zest for life can clasp hands across the chasm of the intervening centuries.

Literature that is detached from life is built upon straw and stubble. An imitative, mendicant book, reflecting experience only as it can be garnered from the printed page, is sure of a rapid journey to oblivion. Most of the early American poetry is today as dead as Julius Caesar. It is a conglomeration of secondhand English verse. The English meadow lark soars over the pages of poets who never crossed the Atlantic. The nightingale sings above rocky Massachusetts meadows. This tendency is what Lowell had in mind when he made Hosea Biglow say:

"Why, I'd give more for one live bobolink
Than a square mile of larks in printer's ink."

In Riley's "Out to Old Aunt Mary's" a decidedly unpoetical bird makes his appearance in the lines:

"And the buzzard 'raised' in the 'clearing' sky,
And lolled and circled, as we went by."

This is a long way from the skylark and the nightingale. No poet could say here, "Hail to thee, blithe spirit!" Yet to many a one-time country boy, Riley's couplet brings a picture of the old "clearing" on a somber afternoon in early autumn with the loathly bird wheeling above it. Had Riley tried

to make a skylark soar and sing over an Indiana woodlot he would have been promptly and deservedly laughed out of court.

The first novel which James Fenimore Cooper produced was a tale of English society life entitled *Precaution*. Since he wrote concerning that of which he knew nothing, the volume fell dead from the press. But when the man who had passed his youth on the manorial estate on the edge of the American wilderness began to dig for literary treasure in American soil, his search was speedily rewarded. Over sixty years ago Edward Eggleston published the little story of Indiana life known as *The Hoosier Schoolmaster*. In comparing this novel with the studied and intricate fiction of today it is found to be crude in plot and clumsy in style. Yet this immature little book, as it has passed through edition after edition, has seen many a more ambitious work fade into obscurity. It has vitality because it is undilutedly sincere. Its background is that fascinating drama of the frontier with which its author had a firsthand acquaintance. Eggleston wrote another book of sincerity equal to that of *The Hoosier Schoolmaster* and of superior literary skill. Its title is *The Circuit Rider*, and although it is today essentially a forgotten book, it is one of the half dozen great clerical novels in the English language. Probably its most gripping passage is the account of the men of the saddle bags in conference assembled just as "the awful hour of appointments" has come. "The brave-hearted men sat before the bishop, and before God, not knowing what was to be their fate." Some were to be sent to miasmatic canebrakes. Others were to go to the deadly cypress swamp. They knew that before another year rolled around some of them would fall in the ranks. In sublime ignorance of their destiny they sang the militant words of Charles Wesley:

O that the world might taste and see
The riches of His grace!
The arms of love that compass me
Would all mankind embrace.

His only righteousness I show,
His saving grace proclaim;
'Tis all my business here below,
To cry, "Behold the Lamb!"

It is safe to say that few who read this passage will forget it. The book is not beyond criticism but it is one of the vivid portrayals of the Iliad of the canebrake, the *Odyssey* of the frontier.

The post Civil War period of American history was a time of literary sterility. Perhaps this was due to some extent to the uninspired materialism into which the idealism of the sixties had reacted. Another reason was the fact that some of the most promising authors of that generation became obsessed with a bookishness which blinded them to the literary values to be found in their immediate environment. They were men who sought refuge from the rawness of their times in a palace of art. Oriental sensuousness, artistic tinklings, echoes of Keats, Shelley and Heine were dominant characteristics of their verse. They sought for inspiration in the wrong place. Literature is not created in the land of "make believe."

It is in the writings of Mark Twain that we find the life of these years best epitomized. How kind the fates were to him in giving him contact with a sweep of life that was broad, rich, racy and vigorous. His most potent teacher was the Mississippi River. No boy whose formative years are spent by a great river can ever forget it. Almost from the dawn of memory Samuel Clemens had seen "the great Mississippi, the majestic, the magnificent Mississippi rolling its mile-wide tide along, shining in the sun." It was the Mississippi which added a touch of glamour to the sordid little out-at-the-elbows Southern town of his boyhood. Clemens, however, was to know the river in an even more intimate way.

The printer became a pilot's "cub" and then a pilot. For four years he guided the great boats up and down the twelve hundred mile length of the mighty river, which in those days was a veritable clearing-house of American life. Nowhere could one come nearer to its center. In speaking of this experience Mark Twain says, "In that brief, sharp schooling I got personally and familiarly acquainted with all the different types of human nature that are to be found in fiction, biography or history. When I find a well-known character in fiction, biography, I generally take a warm personal interest in him, for the reason that I have known him before—met him on the river." The next step in his education was a period in Nevada and California in the gold and silver mining days. This was not the world of the cushion and the slipper, the peaceful and the studious. Around him surged the raw, colorful, vivid, virile life of the untamed West. It is to the highest degree fortunate for the world of letters that this unique and talented personality, in the days when his genius was maturing, acquired a wealth of experience which made it possible for him to interpret for his own and other generations American life in some of its most romantic and

significant aspects. In writing to Mark Twain, Bernard Shaw pays him the following tribute: "I am persuaded that the future historian of America will find your works as indispensable to him as a French historian finds the political tracts of Voltaire." Mark Twain added to American literature primarily because he was a part of life and it was a part of him.

All literature, however, does not chronicle social history. It was Robert Browning who wrote: "My stress lay on the incidents in the development of the soul; little else is worth study; I at least always thought so." Some writers depict the world around them; others tell of the world within. The prophet of the inner life, like the depicter of the external world, can only write with sincerity and truth about that which he knows. Imagination cannot make something of nothing. No deep note can be sounded by him who lives entirely upon the surface.

The early poems of Tennyson are for the most part dainty echoes. They say little because the poet had little to say. The young poet, no matter how haunting his melody or how glorious his ideal, cannot fathom "deeper than did ever plummet sound." But when Tennyson's volume of 1842 appeared, all England recognized the fact that another great poet had risen above the horizon. A new and deeper note pervaded his verse. No more was Alfred Tennyson a mere maker of musical meters. Almost ten years before, God's finger touched his "more than brother," Arthur Hallam. He had walked through the deep waters of bitter experience. He had through eating his bread with tears, learned of the power and the love of the Infinite.

Only in the stream of the world can one master the deeper truths of existence. A starved, namby-pamby experience incapacitates either for producing or for appreciating literature. This, however, does not mean that the writer must travel over land and sea in search of literary material. There is no environment without its phases of perennial interest. Whittier's Flemish picture of the Quaker family sitting around the rude old-fashioned hearth in tumultuous privacy of storm is of vastly greater worth than many a chronicle of "moving accidents by flood and field," of battles and sieges and "fortune's rise and fall." Sometimes a man of the cloister may be the microcosm in which the spiritual struggles of a generation are epitomized. In Cowper, "a stricken deer that fled the herd," we catch the faint but unmistakable adumbrations of the world-transforming romantic movement. It was the melancholy, cloistered Thomas Gray, dreaming in

the softened twilight of the little churchyard at Stoke Pogis of "the short and simple annals of the poor," who sounded the first distinctly social note in English literature. Tennyson, shy, retiring and a lover of solitude, more than any other man reflected the thoughts, the feelings, the negations, the affirmations, the defeats and the victories of his age. "The man who rings the fire bell cannot walk in the procession." Sometimes the prophet must view life from the isolation of the watch tower. His message, though, must be based upon truths which he himself has learned in the relentless school of living. If it is but a re-echo of the thought of another it will be the resonant clanging of sounding brass.

Literature always mirrors forth that which is responsible for its origin. Without a familiarity with its literature, no man can know the most significant aspects of the history of any given period. In an address given in 1919 Dr. Caleb T. Winchester makes the following statement: "If you want to understand the growth of thought and accompanying changes of feeling on matters of scientific, religious and social importance, say in England from 1840 to 1880, you must read Tennyson, Browning, Carlyle. You will find there the best record of the inner life of the period." Dante is indeed "the voice of ten silent centuries." His *Divine Comedy* musically embodies the spirit of the far-off Middle Ages. To turn its pages is to live among the warriors, the poets, the ecclesiastics and the other luminaries of the days of long ago. Dante, however, was not the poet of the external world. Guelph and Ghibelline, "black" and "white" Florence and Ravenna upon his pages are after all only incidental. His concern was not with Italian "old clothes" but with the reality of which they were the garments. His stress was upon the knowledge and yearnings, the doubts and fears, the aspirations and the achievements of the life within.

Shakespeare, on the other hand, was the interpreter of the visible. He has made "the spacious times of the great Elizabeth" real for every generation. Carlyle says: "Dante has given us the Faith or Soul; Shakespeare, in a not less noble way, has given us the Practice or Body. This latter also we were to have; a man was sent for it, the man Shakespeare. Just when that chivalry way of life had reached its last finish and was on the point of breaking down into slow or swift dissolution, as we now see it everywhere, this other sovereign poet, with his seeing eye, with his perennial singing voice, was sent to take note of it, to give it long enduring record." Shakespeare had an insatiable hunger for a knowledge of life.

Both in books and in life he sought that which is human. His plays reveal a wise, rich, kindly, tolerant nature. Nothing that pertained to mankind was alien to him. His sympathetic imagination enabled him to understand the spiritual significance of that which every eye can see. He knew of the heights and depths in the human soul. To read him is to stand on the busy streets of a great city, where the seething crowds forever pass; children with the light, happy hearts of innocence, hopeless, disillusioned men and women who have drunk at every poisoned cup of pleasure. There are the joyful and the sorrowful, and there are bitter melancholy and robustious "laughter holding both his sides." All kinds of men live in the myriad-peopled world of him whose potent art has given a tangible immortality to the full-blooded splendor of an age of which he himself was the crowning glory.

Literature not only comes from the living and through the living but it is for the living. It feeds itself from life and at the same time broadens and deepens life. W. T. Harris used to say, "Literature is vicarious experience." There is creative reading as well as creative writing. The first requisite of being a good reader is openness to experience. The development and enrichment of personality is no insignificant part of the obtaining of an education. Real literature has within it that which broadens the personality and expands the soul. The lack of wide contacts limits the perspective of a life. Dr. Austin Phelps once said: "Who as a rule are the liberal thinkers in theology? In whom do you find the most evenly balanced faith? Are they not the men of profound and enlarged literary sympathies? On the other hand, if you find a preacher who holds and tries to preach an impracticable dogma which outrages the common sense of man can you not safely affirm beforehand that he is a man of contracted reading?"

There is no greater impediment to human progress than provincialism. Township-mindedness means a circumscribed intellectual life and a petty soul. In George Eliot's *Adam Bede* we are allowed to see the workings of the "hardscrabble township" mind. The rustics of Hayslope are gathered at the harvest supper at the Hall Farm, and the discussion turns to the Napoleonic wars. Craig, the Scottish gardener, is holding forth and concludes a rather lengthy disquisition by saying: "But it's my opinion as there's them at the head o' this country as are worse to us nor Bony and all the mounseers he's got at 's back; but as for the mounseers, you may skewer half-a-dozen of them at once as if they were war frogs."

"Ay, ay," said Martin Poyser, listening with an air of much intelligence and edification, "they ne'er ate a bit o' beef i' their lives. Mostly sallet, I reckon."

Later in the evening Craig gives some more information in regard to the French: "Why it's a sure thing—and there's them 'ull bear witness to 't—as i' one regiment where there was one man missing, they put the regimentals on a big monkey, and they fit him as the shell fits the walnut, and you couldn't tell the monkey from the mounseers."

Tennyson mentions some who thought

"the rustic cackle of their burg
The murmur of the world."

This parochial-mindedness manifests itself in ways almost innumerable. The narrow specialist, although he may be bent with the weight of dead learning acquired by long years devoted to delving in esoteric books, is sometimes more of a provincial than many an unlettered man who has been broadened and deepened by sympathetic contact with his kind. The narrow man is the individual unable to look at life except from one point of view. He may be illiterate or he may be

"A learned blockhead, ignorantly read
With loads of learned lumber in his head."

But years ago he made up his mind and it has stayed made-up ever since. As a rule trials for heresy have been the result of a lack of that "sweet reasonableness" which comes from a kindly tolerance and a rich human sympathy. It is through sympathy and imagination that one can enter into the lives of others, and often an individual possesses these qualities in proportion to the scope and range of his personal experience. Professor Woodberry says, "Sympathy and imagination are the faculties which literature most cultivates by exercise, and the enlightenment which literature brings is in the main achieved through them." When we know what a man reads we know the size of the world in which he lives. Patrick Henry once said, "Sir, it is not books, it is men that we must study." Books may be a poor substitute for life. Yet when the last word is said, it must be admitted that our human contacts are necessarily few. Life itself is selective. The ordinary demands of existence tend to narrow our range of activities and interests. Unless the scope of our experience is broadened through literature it is of necessity pitifully limited.

Literature does more than reveal life. It interprets it. In Browning's "Fra Lippo Lippi" that decidedly likable scamp, in speaking of his work as an artist, utters some words of singularly vital meaning:

"God's works—paint anyone, and count it crime
To let a truth slip. Don't object, 'His works
Are here already; nature is complete:
Suppose you reproduce her—(which you can't)
There's no advantage! you must beat her, then.'
For, don't you mark? we're made so that we love
First when we see them painted, things we have passed
Perhaps a hundred times nor cared to see;
And so they are better, painted—better to us,
Which is the same thing. Art was given for that;
God uses us to help each other so,
Lending our minds out."

This is not only the task of the painter but also of the artist in prose and verse. Before he can write he must see. His is the seeing eye. What others pass unnoticed is an open book to him. He is the "forthteller" of his own deepest and richest experiences. He sees beneath the surface. The genuine lover of books cannot but be a lover of men. His life has an emotional richness which is comparatively seldom obtained in any other way. Through books man can transcend the limits of time and place. In the words of Emily Dickinson:

"There is no frigate like a book,
To take us lands away,
Nor any coursers like a page
Of prancing poetry."

With a real book before us without leaving our own fireside we can sail the most distant seas and climb remotest mountains. We can live in a world of magnificent vistas and limitless contacts. We can look into the very souls of man of every type and every generation. As we read, our companion may be Othello or Bartley Hubbard, Teufeldrökhh or David Copperfield, Tom Sawyer or Tom Jones, Saul Kane or Paracelsus, Ivanhoe or Silas Lapham, Eustacia Vye or Meg Merilles, Polonius or Becky Sharp. Charles Lamb on one occasion was asked to meet a man whom he disliked. He refused, saying, "I want to hate him and I cannot hate a man whom I know." Narrow sympathies are the result of a limited acquaintance. Antipathies are driven away when men learn to know each other.

How genuinely human are the men and women whom we meet in this

world of books. Age cannot stale them nor custom wither. They will not quarrel with us nor we with them. We can for a little while turn our backs upon the present and with the long-tried royal Odysseus breast the storms of many a wine-dark sea and with him reach at last the shores of his well-beloved Ithaca. We can tilt at windmills with lean old Don Quixote and fat little Sancho Panza. We can hold converse with Mantuan Virgil, "lord of landscape, lord of language." We can hear the mournful symphony of the world-worn Dante. We can listen to the thunders of the blunt old doctor while Boswell's busy pencil does not cease to write. But sometimes the company of the great is palling. Now and then we long for everyday human beings. We have them by the thousands at our beck and call. Let us go to Cranford where we will find Miss Mattie, Honorable Mrs. Jamieson, Miss Barker, Miss Pole and "Mr. Peter," a good angel in a complete disguise. But perhaps this minute tea-drinking world is too serious. Then let us find Mr. Pickwick and his friends. Possibly they will take us with them on their skating expedition, or we may have a chance to hear the eloquence of the barristers in the case of Bardell against Pickwick. Perhaps we can listen to the piquant conversation of Mrs. Poyser: "I'm not denyin' women are foolish; God almighty made 'em to match the men," or "An' you may be right in thinking it'll take but little to save your soul, for it'll be the smallest savin' y' ever made with all your scrapin'." If we are piscatorially inclined, then we can journey to some quietly-flowing, meadow-bordered stream and angle for trout with amiable, philosophic Izaak Walton and afterwards go with him to the cool, clean, oak-shaded inn to eat the fish. If that does not appeal to our palate the bill of fare may be a roast of sucking pig, just done, with the crackling, crisp, tawny, well-watched, not over-roasted, and "the tender blossoming of fat—fat cropped in the bud—taken in the shoot—in the first innocence—the cream and quintessence of the child-pig's yet pure food."

Or we might listen for awhile to the interminable talk of Coleridge who asked Lamb if he had ever heard him preach and received the reply, "I never heard you do anything else." Better still it would be to go to No. 5 Cheyne Row and hear the thunderous eloquence of Thomas Carlyle, the militant prophet of Ecclefechan and Chelsea, and the flashing wit of his brilliant wife, as recorded in the pages of Froude, or in Wilson's six rewarding volumes, the most detailed biography in the English language. What a procession of great and near-great crossed the doorway of that old

brick house. John Stuart Mill, Tennyson, Browning, Dickens, Thackeray, Emerson from the village of Concord across the sea and some that he sent to visit his friend. There was Margaret Fuller telling Carlyle that she had decided to accept the universe and receiving the reply, "You'd better," and Alcott, "the potato Quixotic," who was treated with some irreverence. It would be good to "listen in" to that tilt between Carlyle and Thackeray, in which the former for once came out a bad second. Several artists are talking. One says, "The great fact about Titian is his color." Another adds, "And the second great fact about him is his drawing." Then the strong Scottish burr of Carlyle broke into the conversation. "Here I am, a man made in the image of God; and I know nothing about Teetian and care less about him. There's your third great fact about Teetian." "Pardon me, Sir," said the gentle-voiced Thackeray, "that is not a fact about Titian. It is a fact and a very lamentable fact about Thomas Carlyle."

"Literature," said Goethe, "is the humanization of the whole race." It has well been termed the foremost of the humanities. It is an instrumentality for humanization and civilization. He who finds reading a task has never learned to read. Great books are more than tools for what the gerund-grinding pedant calls "research," and as a rule mispronouncing the word. Professor Paulsen, in one of those weighty philosophical texts with which college students of another generation were compelled to wrestle, tells the story of an Englishman who was fishing without any bait on his hook. When his attention was called to the deficiency he replied, "I am not fishing for fish, I am fishing for pleasure." In a sense all effective reading is reading for pleasure. He who has a zest for life finds upon the pages of literature something of the thrill of the

"watcher of the skies
When a new planet swims into his ken."

Dr. George E. Woodberry in a passage packed with thought has said: "The secret of appreciation is to share the passion for life that literature itself exemplifies and contains; out of real experience, the best that one can have, to possess oneself of that imaginary experience which is the stuff of larger life and the place of the ideal expansion of the soul, the gateway to which is art in all forms and primarily literature; to avail oneself of that for pleasure and wisdom and fullness of life." Literature is not writing about life. It is life. That which is not life is not literature.

The Angel of the Lord

R. W. FRANK

FOR some time I have been attracted to that recurring and fascinating figure in the Old Testament, that terrible and tender figure, the angel of the Lord. This angel is a presence which confronts and convicts men and women, which comforts and crushes them, which protects and wastes them, which lifts up the fallen and slays the proud, which brings providence and pestilence to mankind.

It assumes many guises. It walks in human flesh as a stranger before the tents of Abraham and becomes a voice calling out of heaven to Hagar. It appears in a dream to Jacob, and in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush to Moses. It manifests itself to women, old men, young men, dumb beasts, cities, tribes, armies and nations, to both the friends and foes of Israel.

It exercises divers functions. It stays the hand of Abraham as he is about to sacrifice his son, Isaac, and then blesses him for his willingness to offer human sacrifice. It condemns the children of Israel for disobedience in making a league with the inhabitants of Canaan. It pronounces a curse upon the village of Meroz because the inhabitants thereof came not to the help of the Lord against the mighty. It appears to Gideon to encourage and hearten him to save Israel from the Midianites.

It is sent to slay Balaam and stands in the way with a drawn sword. The ass, the dumb beast on which Balaam was riding, saw the angel, turned aside out of the way, and scampered across the field. But Balaam saw not the angel. This early chronicler had a vein of humor in his makeup.

In 2 Samuel 24 it stretches forth its hand for three days of pestilence, "and there died of the people from Dan even to Beersheba seventy-thousand men." In 2 Kings 19 it comes in the night to smite the camp of the Assyrians, and "in the morning there were an hundred fourscore and five thousand" dead bodies in the camp. The suggestion is made in the book of Job that this angel interprets the meaning of God's afflictive providences to men. Psalm 34 represents the angel of the Lord as encamping round about them that fear him, and delivering them. The next Psalm, however, depicts the angel as the wind which driveth the chaff away.

What can we make of this strange, enigmatic figure of contrasts and contradictions? Has it any significance other than as an instance of super-

stitious angelology which, along with demonology of the Old Testament, should be allowed a quiet repose in the graveyard of all primitive myths?

I confess to a prejudice against such ultraconfident, scientific disposal of this figure. I should like to know, and from other sources than psychologists, what mysterious, quivering and fertile experience lay back of these records and gave rise to this dramatic figure. Such knowledge, of course, is not available. I should like to suggest what the angel of the Lord may possibly signify, and to point out its relevance to contemporary life.

I

For one thing, this figure is a witness to the deep experience and conviction of the Jews that this is not a secular world or a secular universe. On the contrary, it is instinct with the divine. There are no God-abandoned areas or God-forsaken processes. The Jews were not Deists or Humanists. God was neither absent nor extinct, but a living presence. He might confront and startle men anywhere, any time. Inasmuch as this is God's universe he is very much at home in it, though not always visibly or audibly evident; and he may manifest himself in its events, in unexpected places, and at any season in the life of a man or a civilization.

The Jewish outlook on life and the world was religious. The opposite outlook is secular. Western civilization is today much nearer the latter than the former. Since the break-up of the medieval world it has been steadily secularized. What is the difference between these two outlooks?

The secular view of the world is the thin view; the religious, is the thick view. Secularism believes in the sufficiency and efficiency of man. Man is his own providence. His science, industry, philosophy and economics can satisfy all his wants and give his spirit the peace which passeth all understanding. The world has only four dimensions, namely, those exhibited in a block of wood and in the flow of time.

The religious view of the world is the thick view. The world has another dimension than those measurable by clocks and calipers. It has a spiritual dimension. Man has wants which the machine, laboratory science, and ingenious business enterprise cannot altogether satisfy. The evidence for this wider spiritual environment (aside from mysticism) is man's sense of value, and his craving for self-completion, which the four-dimensional world does not account for, could not generate, and cannot sustain.

I said that western civilization was becoming secularized, moving to

the left rather than the right philosophically, more and more adopting the thin view of the world rather than the thick. Our age is enamored of thinness. The reducing mania is not confined solely to those whose *summum bonum* is a low pointer reading on bathroom scales. Psychology has been reducing. As has been wittily said, it first got rid of the soul, then lost the mind, and rather recently it has lost consciousness.

Religion, too, has been undergoing a process of progressive subtraction. There are those, for example, who propose to revitalize religion in terms of religion without, that is, religion without the supernatural, religion without revelation, religion without God. More recently we have the avowed attempt to maintain a national culture without religion. And there are many persons outside Russia, not Communists, who have relegated religion to the rank of "an optional luxury, necessary neither for the comprehension of the world, nor yet for the conduct of life."

Now the problem in reducing is to know when to stop. Too often the elimination of the superfluous proceeds beyond the proper limits to the removal of the essential. And the last state of that man or woman, or civilization, is often worse than the first.

It would seem that the secularization of western civilization is in that last state; its movement toward the thin view of the world has proceeded too far. For increasing secularization has brought increasing disillusionment about the worth and significance of life in a thoroughly secular world. Some men, having gotten rid of the supposed incubus of religion in the interest of fuller, freer life, now discover that life is not worth living—or at least they are very dubious about it. They are trying to live, as Professor Halford E. Luccock says, "in a sort of spiritual vacuum from which the vitalizing oxygen of faith and idealism has been withdrawn."

The outcome of trying to live in a religionless world was anticipated by William Makepeace Thackeray. Concerning one of his greatest novels he wrote, "What I want is to make a set of people living without God in the world." He called this story *Vanity Fair*. He described it as a tale "more melancholy than mirthful." A headlong secularist civilization is apt to end in a *Vanity Fair* where life is "more melancholy than mirthful."

That is where a large part of our western civilization has landed, as Thackeray foresaw—if we judge by its self-disclosing art. For these secularists, as John Masefield writes, "Life's a long headache in a noisy street." Or as Professor Luccock pithily compresses the secularist mood—as found

in contemporary fiction, drama and poetry—"We are such stuff as glands are made of, and our little life is rounded with a reaction."

It is not the men who have clung to the thick view of the world, the religious view, who have lost their courage and hope; it is the men who enthusiastically embraced the thin view, the secularist view, who have pared away the divine; it is they who have lost not only courage and hope but their zest for life.

Ah, but you say, there is Russia! There is a booming, bustling, energetic, secular civilization. Let me ask, how long will the altruism and passion for justice necessary to sustain the communistic experiment be nourished by its secularist philosophy? Thus far, the Marxian's altruism and passion for justice have been fed and fueled by the moral indignation and outraged sense of justice kindled under the Holy Russia of the Czars. But a new proletariat generation is growing up which knows not the Czars and is increasingly without these dynamic moral resentments. Already they are asking, why should we be altruistic and self-sacrificing for the sake of the proletarian community? Well, what is the answer of secularism? So far, according to one student of the Russian scene, the only answer given them is, "We have all descended from monkeys, therefore, let us love one another."

Professor George Burman Foster once wrote that "it is not the man who trusts in a God who is on the side of right against wrong, and of love against selfishness . . . whose energies are paralyzed; it is the man who builds solely upon his own weak powers and doubts cosmic righteousness, that suffers moral collapse." Recent developments have amply confirmed his assertion.

We may seem to have left the angel of the Lord far behind. But not so! This striking Old Testament figure is the dramatic expression of the profound Jewish experience and conviction—that this is a non-secular universe. The strange harvest which a secularist civilization reaps in such a universe is the loss of survival interest as well as of survival power.

II

The angel of the Lord attests another discovery made by the Hebrews. Not only is this not a secular universe; more positively, it is a moral universe.

What do we mean by that? This, that we live in an order which

favors and furthers moral growth; that no matter what historical epoch or geographical area or cultural level one lives in, moral faithfulness and adventurousness lead to moral development and character and bring the deepest satisfactions of life, whereas moral faithlessness and moral cowardice always disintegrate character and bring a sense of frustration and futility. These outcomes seem to be largely independent of the external fortunes and successes which attend them.

We are seeing today that the principle of the spiritual harvest also governs what a civilization reaps.

Consider that economic organization of the western world which we call industrial capitalism. Such capitalism is not distinguished by the existence of large fortunes. The Antonines in ancient Rome were very rich yet we should hardly term the age of Marcus Aurelius capitalistic. Again, the pursuit of gain for the sake of a livelihood has nothing to do with capitalism, as Max Weber pointed out.

It is the alliances of great wealth and, primarily, the uses to which wealth is put that distinguish capitalism. Where wealth owns and controls the techniques of the production and distribution of goods, and, chiefly, where wealth operates those techniques solely for the pursuit of profit by means of continuous, rational enterprises, you have the capitalism of today. Where money is earned through profits and interest in order that the money earned may earn still more money, there you have capitalism according to Dean Gauss.

Modern industrial capitalism, by the aid of applied science, has developed the power of mass production. Mass production, if it is to continue successfully, requires mass consumption. And mass consumption depends upon the purchasing power of the masses of the population.

If capitalism consisted only of the alliance of vast wealth with science and technology, it might be an unalloyed blessing to mankind. Mass consumption and the consequent improvement of the standard of living for all might have followed the wizardry of mass production.

But the central motive, the soul of industrial capitalism, has been the pursuit of profit. This has been its dynamic genius, and also its evil genius. It has led to such a concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, and to such a diminution of purchasing power among the masses, that a tragic world-wide depression has ensued. The nemesis of capitalism is its exclusive devotion to profit; this is the serpent fostered in its own bosom.

The foregoing is not what socialists, communists and "crack-pots" are saying. It is what some leading and far-sighted capitalists are saying. Proctor Hansl, a Wall Street broker and banker, says we have, at the long last, to face the fact that the system has ceased to function, due to its inherent selfishness. "Under profit-seeking capitalism the machine produces goods in greater volume than it creates purchasing power to absorb. . . . The constant piling up of mass production on the one hand, coupled with the whittling down of purchasing power on the other, has had much to do with the economic impasse that exists today." Of the central profit motive, Hansl writes, "With all its boasted achievements . . . this vaunted incentive to progress has resulted only . . . in creating a generation of self-seekers whose greed and recklessness have plunged us into disaster." If this analysis of capitalistic civilization is correct, then capitalism, it would seem, must either acquire a new soul, or destroy itself. In a moral universe the exclusive pursuit of selfish ends can lead only to destruction and catastrophe. In such a universe, evil is eventually self-defeating.

The angel of the Lord represents the moral grain of the universe. Note to what this dramatic figure appealed in the Old Testament record. Its appeal was twofold—first, to the consciences of men, then to the consequences of their choices and acts. Failing in the former appeal, God's will was nevertheless accomplished in the latter.

A favorite Old Testament passage of many theological students with whom I am brought into contact is 1 Kings 19, wherein we are told that the Lord came to the dejected Elijah, not in the great and strong wind, not in the earthquake or the fire, but in a still small voice. That passage does very well for the morally sensitive Elijahs who can hear the still small voice. But what of those men and women who have drugged and seared and deadened their consciences until they cannot hear the still small voice? Well, there is the angel of the Lord, the whirlwind that driveth away the chaff. A man or a civilization may suppress or disregard conscience; they will hardly suppress or escape the harvest of consequences.

A further interesting parallel is that the angel of the Lord often appeared *incognito*. The doom of conscienceless men and civilizations creeps upon them often unawares. Slowly but surely the innermost, evil motives of men mature in an unexpected and often sudden harvest. As the Greeks were wont to say, "The gods creep up on feet of wool."

III

There is a third fact for which the angel of the Lord stands. It is not stressed so heavily in the Old Testament as in the New Testament. But it is present as a profound insight. In the thirty-fourth Psalm we read, "The angel of the Lord encampeth round about them that fear him, and delivereth them," and in the ninety-first Psalm, "For he shall give his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways. They shall bear thee up in their hands, lest thou dash thy foot against a stone." Here the angel of the Lord is a tender, solicitous, protective presence—and more—an empowering presence: "Thou shalt tread upon the lion and adder; the young lion and the dragon shalt thou trample under feet."

This dramatic presence testifies not only to the fact that God is, and that he is righteous. God is also a redemptive presence. There is a healing, morally reclamatory force at work in the world, available for men.

The religious experience, inspected from within, seems to have three moments, or levels: first, moral tension and conflict; then, spiritual peace; and, finally, moral power. It is an experience of tension, peace, and power progressively to overcome tension through moral victory.

Here we see the significant difference between moral experience and religious experience. Man's moral experience moves in a perpetual tension—a conflict between the ideal and the actual, between his moral possibilities and his present moral attainments. This perpetual moral tension is exhausting; it is a prolonged strain to which the sufficiency of man is not altogether equal. Moral victory may bring a sense of power with which to meet the next and greater tension. But that has its peril in pride. Thus the merely moral man tends to move toward either moral exhaustion, or moral pride. A religionless morality tends to issue in either moral weariness, staleness and even futility, the so-called tired radicals, or in moral Phariseism. Moral pride is the moralist's method of escaping moral tension.

Now religious experience begins in and always involves moral tension. But the tension is occasionally relieved by the sense of dependence upon a higher spiritual power from which accessions of moral strength come. The angel of the Lord is the primitive symbol of what, in Christian thought, has been called the grace of God. The symbol is ancient, but the experience is as fresh today as among those primitive Bedouins of the desert.

When, in 1899, William James was working on his Gifford Lectures, he wrote to his wife of a mystical experience which occurred to him in the Adirondacks one night. He called it "an indescribable meeting in my breast with the moral gods of the inner life." He spoke of its intense significance and appeal—and concluded, "In point of fact, I can't find a single word for all that significance, and don't know what it was significant of, so there it remains, a mere boulder of impression." Among the less sophisticated and more imaginative Bedouins, "this boulder of impression" for William James, became the angel of the Lord that "encampeth round about." More recently Baron von Hügel called this experience of peace and grace an "overflowing interior plenitude."

But note the sure insight of the ninety-first Psalm. This peace is not the peace of escape from moral tension, but peace and grace in the midst of tension. Over whom does God give his angels charge, to bear them up in their hands, lest they dash their feet against a stone? Everyone and anyone? Hardly! "Because thou hast made the Lord . . . even the Most High, thy habitation, there shall no evil befall thee." To those who make the Most High their habitation, and nothing less than the Most High, to them are grace and peace available. Those who make the most expedient, the most profitable, the most pleasurable, the most advantageous their habitation—to them there is no assurance of spiritual grace.

In both the crises and the routine of life we live and conquer, partly by our own moral effort, partly by the aid of a sustaining, spiritual presence from beyond ourselves. If we would transcend our present selves in the direction of our ideal selves we must rely much upon our own moral exertion; but there is a "More" beyond our conscious and known selves "from which saving experiences come" and to which religious persons in every age bear confident and verifiable testimony. The ancient Hebrew symbolized this redemptive presence in the angel of the Lord.

It seems reasonable to suppose, therefore, that this dramatic figure of the Old Testament represented and rendered articulate certain basic discoveries of religious experience, namely, (1) the fact that God is; this is not a secular universe; (2) the fact that God is righteous; we live in a moral universe; and (3) the fact that God is a redemptive force at work in personal experience and human history; there are accessions of grace and power available for the morally needy and morally aspiring.

Normative Psychology of Religion¹

EDWIN LEWIS

WE have here a consideration of religion which will be welcomed with open arms by those who have themselves capitulated to the cult of contemporaneity. Those, on the other hand, who believe that certain aspects of the thinking of the past on the high theme of the soul, its relationships, its necessities, its significance, and its destiny, are not without a value sufficiently permanent even to be vested with authority, will regard this book as one more evidence of the desperate condition into which the church of our time has come.

This is not to say that a reader who belongs to the second group will find in the book nothing but that which evokes his dissent. It would be a sheer impossibility for two persons as sincere, earnest and well equipped as Doctor and Mrs. Wieman undeniably are, to write a book of between five and six hundred pages dealing with religion, and not say much for which any disinterested lover of his kind would be profoundly grateful. This book is in no sense a hasty and ill-considered pronouncement. It bears on every page the marks of alert and often penetrating minds. One might, indeed, complain that it is unnecessarily large. Points are frequently labored beyond the necessities of the case. Analysis is on occasion carried so far, as, for example, in Chapters VI and XXV, that it loses force by reason of its very detail. Sometimes there is a touch of the naïve, as in some of the suggestions made concerning the alleged necessity of new religious symbolism. Religious behavior is frequently treated as though it were nothing more than an ethic. It is asserted that all effort looking to social reconstruction is entitled to be called "religious," irrespective of how it may be estimated by those who engage in it. What might be regarded as "minor" criticisms of this sort could be continued almost indefinitely, and if that were all that fell to be said the book, having been read, could be put on the shelf with other similar "Psychologies of Religion," and in due time forgotten.

But the book cannot be so easily disposed of, and for the reason that it presents and defends certain drastic positions which are undoubtedly symp-

¹ *Normative Psychology of Religion*. By Henry Nelson Wieman and Regina Westcott-Wieman. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. \$3.50.

tomatic of our time, and which portend the end of Christianity as it has hitherto been generally understood and proclaimed. There should be no mistake about that. The divided house cannot permanently stand. When all allowance has been made for the forthrightness of this book, its concern for human good, and especially its well-informed discussions of the more practical phases of psychology as these have to do with "personal adjustment," "personal growth," and the like—when all this is allowed for and generously appraised, as it should be, it still remains that the book carries a menace to certain great central truths without which Christianity must disappear. In a way, the authors admit this. Their interest is not primarily with Christianity at all, but with what they regard as *religion*, and they by no means treat the terms as identical. Christianity is simply one form of religion for which no permanence can be claimed. It has always been subject to change. This change will continue until it becomes something entirely different from what it has been hitherto. It must be willing to bring about its own transformation—or, more exactly, even its own displacement.

Such claims make of the book more than a mere psychology of religion. A whole philosophy is implied here, and even a theology. The book does not stop with a description of the psychological processes of religion and a statement of the underlying laws. It goes far beyond this into an interpretation of reality. It sets up a certain frame of reference which, for all the occasional mention of the "superhuman," is purely naturalistic, and it treats religion (and Christianity) as falling wholly within that frame. The fact greatly complicates the reviewer's task, although what is written in the introduction sheds some light on the situation. The authors acknowledge joint responsibility for everything in the book, but the reader who checks the contents by the introduction will see that the chapters which are more purely psychological and methodological represent Mrs. Wieman, while the chapters which raise more sharply the philosophical, theological, and even historical issues represent rather Doctor Wieman. If the figure may be permitted, there is plenty of attractive coating on the pill, but the pill is there nevertheless, and it is only fair to point it out.

For one thing, Doctor Wieman (to confine attention henceforth to what appears to be more distinctively his contribution) utterly surrenders theism in any sense which that word properly bears. He would, of course, strenuously deny that he was nontheistic. He would doubtless

call attention to the fact that the autobiographical article which he contributed to *Contemporary American Theology* (Vergilius Ferm, editor, First Series, 1932), was entitled "Theocentric Religion." He might also refer to the "Conversations" on the question, *Is There a God?* carried on through *The Christian Century* in 1932, in which, while he took violent exception to much that was said by Dr. D. C. Macintosh, an unqualified theist, he crossed swords no less vigorously with Dr. Max Otto, a confessed atheist. But, on Doctor Wieman's own showing, meanings are more significant than any mere signs or symbols. A man is not necessarily a theist simply because he uses the word "God." What is important is not so much the word—the *nomen*, the *status vocis*—as what the word is intended to represent. Doctor Wieman should be the last man in the world to deny this. For him, "meaning" is everything, so much so, indeed, that his most frequent formal definition of God is that "God is meaning." Variations on this are occasionally met with, such as that "God is growth," "God is process," "God is unity," "God is Highest Value," "God is the Supremely Worthful," and the like, but, at least as far as the present book is concerned, Doctor Wieman evidently prefers the statement, "God is meaning," as best representing his own thought. There is the same emphatic and even dogmatic (for it is that) denial to God of anything approaching "personality" that has characterized his other writings—for example, his article in *Religious Realism* (D. C. Macintosh, editor, Chapter VI) and others already referred to. But a little reflection quickly shows that all such terms as these are pure abstractions. Doctor Wieman would readily enough admit this, but would defend it on the ground that "accurate thinking demands cold abstract terms." This is well enough if it is then implied that the abstract term does not completely represent the concrete reality, but is only one of a system of convenient categories. In that case, reality would not be wholly given in "accurate thinking" such as Doctor Wieman understands it. Friendship is well enough if one has a friend, but what is abstract friendship worth to a lonely soul! Doctor Wieman, however, will not allow this limitation on "reason" or "accurate thinking." His approach to the nature and meaning of existence is that of a pure rationalist, and it is always the danger of rationalism that it will commit the fallacy of the abstract. Pascal recognized what he called *l'esprit de géométrie*, but he did not make it all-comprehensive. "The heart hath its reasons that reason doth not know." Not for nothing has the philosophy of "the great tradition" insisted on such

distinctions as those of "substance" and "attributes," "essence" and "qualities," "being" and "becoming," "reality" and "process," "the existent" and "the conceptual." When abstractions are treated as existing, so to speak, of themselves, or in their own right, such fundamental distinctions are denied, or at least lost sight of. We still need Joubert's protest: "*Personnifier les mots est un mal funeste en théologie.*" To equate "God" with "meaning," and then to say that wherever one finds "meaning" one finds "God," and that precisely this "meaning," actual and possible, is all that God ever was, is, or can be, is to set up the purely conceptual and treat it existentially. It is to make an absolute out of a relative. If Doctor Wieman were a philosophical idealist, the procedure might be defensible in view of what he would then take "being" to be, but that is the last thing anyone could claim for him. There is hardly a living American thinker of note who is more unblushingly and one had almost said naïvely realistic than he. It is not without significance that he should confess himself to have been unimpressed after a year with Rudolf Eucken. Indeed, there are those who will say that in his philosophical creed is the fruitful source of many of his unsatisfactory claims—for example, the fundamental and oft-recurring one that in religion, as in science, "observation and reason" are all-sufficient. One who is so committed to the absoluteness of "meaning" that he makes it his God ought to recognize that he is giving to the word "God" a "meaning" that it never had before. Not that men have not always thought of God as meaningful, as the source of meaning, and as the Creator of those very conditions in which alone meaning can be given. But to make God the one ultimately meaningful Fact, because of whom alone any other meaningful fact or situation can be, is a different thing altogether from saying that "meaning is God." For although in ordinary syllogistic logic, a universal affirmative proposition like "God is meaning" is not necessarily reversible, Doctor Wieman does in actual fact reverse it, so much so that his position is better stated by "meaning is God" than by "God is meaning."

If a person wants to make "meaning" the ultimate category, not merely of thought but also of existence, that is his privilege. If he wants to say that "In the beginning was 'meaning,'" the all-creative principle in whose light the cosmic process is not only to be explained as to its details but even accounted for as to its totality, so that "meaning" is "the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last and the Living One," again that is his privilege. Nobody has the right to issue philosophical injunctions. But it

is also the privilege of another to point out that this is what is being claimed, and to point out also what seems to him to be the utter inadequacy, philosophically, religiously, theologically, and even psychologically, of the claim as to what is ultimate. Without a doubt, there have been nontheistic religions; but equally without a doubt, Christianity is not one of them. It is as theistic as that Hebrew faith from which it sprang, and with which it is forever to be associated. Doctor Wieman retains the word "God," but between what he uses the word to represent and that God who is presupposed in the highest reaches of the Old Testament and in the New, there is no manner of equivalence. The God of historical theism is a Being, and Doctor Wieman's God is not. The God of historical theism knows that he exists, and what he is doing, and why he is doing it, and Doctor Wieman's God does not. The God of historical theism has a purpose by which the vast drama of creation is to be understood, and the God of Doctor Wieman not only has no purpose: he has not a single one of those attributes of conscious intelligence apart from which the very idea of purpose is meaningless. Doctor Wieman's God is as impersonal and as helpless as a Sphinx, incapable of even propounding the riddle of existence, much less of solving it. Undeniably there are places—many places—in the book where Doctor Wieman talks of God in a way that is reminiscent of a Jeremiah or a Paul. But that is either because he is not so entirely emancipated from a traditional and out-moded personalistic theism as he thinks he is; or because there are certain aspects of the relation of God and man about which he can write only as he forgets his formal definition; or because—and one would like to believe it to be the case—he is an example, not without precedent, of an irreconcilable dualism between a set of ideological categories which are in control of his formal reasoning, and a deep personal religious experience, with its associated desires, purposes, aspirations, and emotions, for whose proper expression the categories are unable to provide. Doctor Wieman would have us pray, he would have us worship, he would have us practice the presence of God, he would have us work together with God in self-forgetting devotion, he would even have us say, "In his will is my peace." But if an enquiring soul were to ask him for unequivocal answers to the question, "Who is this God to whom I may pray, whom I may worship, with whom I may commune and with whom I may co-operate?" he would answer, "There is no *who* or *whom*, only a *what*." The general acceptance of that answer might not mean the end of religion if religion is simply

"growth of meaning" or "increase in socialization," but it would certainly mean the end of any intelligible theism and of that type of religion which it supports. It would take the heart out of the Hebrew Psalter. It would retire the Hebrew prophets. It would make the Gospel story a mere landmark in the history of human bafflement. It would transform into lifeless fossils most of the best-loved hymns and prayers and liturgical utterances of Christendom. Possibly in saying this one is too remorselessly logical; but if one is not to be that, it can be only on the condition that Doctor Wieman, too, stop short of his own logic (or else go very far beyond it!) and permit us to suppose that his head, so naturalistic, so humanistic, so rigidly categorized, lags far behind his heart, so indisputably and warmly religious. For it is a curious and suggestive fact, that all the attitudes and emotions of a religious faith that were originally engendered by a creed that has later been abandoned, may still remain as the alleged concomitants of a new creed not able in itself to account for them, and certainly not able to engender them in other people. Verily, "philosophy would clip an angel's wings." It would measure love by glands, life by abstractions, and the soul's loftiest aspirations by reflex arcs. Perhaps. But—"there is still something to be said for God," as Job protested to his unseeing friends (Moffatt's translation of 36. 2).

In the second place, Doctor Wieman in effect dismisses that entire body of belief which is to be included in any adequate statement of historical Christianity. This dismissal goes with his general position. It is true enough, as he insists, that historical Christianity exhibits changing features. This is of the very nature of the case. To use Doctor Wieman's own figure, the "coinage" must be "re-minted." But there is a difference between re-minting the coinage and debasing it. Any reasonable metaphysic has to allow not only for the truth in the claim of Heraclitus, but also for the truth in the claim of Parmenides. Change is under a limitation set by the nature of the subject of the change. That fact alone justifies us in speaking of continuity and identity. Doctor Wieman says that the Christianity of today would not be recognized as Christianity by those who lived a thousand years ago, and that changes even more radical are to occur in the future which would make it unrecognizable to us of today. That it would be unrecognizable if the changes which Doctor Wieman anticipates, and regards as desirable, and has even written parts of this book to promote, should come to pass, is beyond question. But when he speaks of the Chris-

tianity of today, it is only fair to ask what he means by it. Christianity is not something depending for its nature and meaning upon passing human caprice: rather it is something that has been "once delivered." If Doctor Wieman is identifying Christianity with his own peculiar views, he is undoubtedly right in saying that it would be unrecognizable by the church of a bygone day. In historical Christianity, God himself has a place and a significance which Doctor Wieman for his part does not recognize. Jesus Christ has a place and a significance which he does not recognize. The Holy Spirit has a place which he does not recognize. In historical Christianity, there are great doctrines like the holiness of God and the love of God and the wrath of God and the mercy of God; doctrines like that of revelation and incarnation and atonement; doctrines like that of reconciliation and salvation and "the witness of the Spirit." Not only so, but there are uncounted numbers of people today, notwithstanding what Doctor Wieman says, to whom these doctrines, however imperfectly understood, represent the deepest realities of existence. In the light of them, they read life itself. Without them, the whole drama of creation would be meaningless. Without them, what would otherwise be sheer chaos, or at the most a purposeless because self-explaining, self-sufficing, and self-acting mechanism, takes on some appearance of that "meaning" on which Doctor Wieman so steadily insists but for which he can give no reason. To deny Christian continuity at the point of doctrine—even when the most ample allowance is made for "heresies" and for "vagaries" and for the distinctive "tenets" of various groups and communions—is to deny it at the one point whose surrender makes continuity impossible. There is a way of talking about the things of faith which any Christian, from the beginning until now, would understand, and he would not need to be a theological expert to do so.

Christian doctrines represent the intellectual formulation of certain aspects of reality and of history and of experience which escape the mesh of the exact sciences. Doctrines are therefore beliefs. We are here told that doctrines, in common with all other beliefs, must be "tested." It is categorically stated that "propositions that cannot be tested should not be believed." Every person to whom the Christian faith is deeply precious, who himself believes in God and teaches others so to do, who sees in the facts connected with Jesus Christ a temporal representation of the interior drama of that "steep and trifid God" who by much tribulation is seeking

to enter and capture and redeem and sanctify the kingdom of man—every such person should take due note of the statement. The “testing” in question we are told consists in “observation combined with reason,” such being “the only valid test of any belief.” This may be well enough while one is engaged with those aspects of existence which lend themselves to observation, but to equate the believable with the observable—assuming that “observation” bears its usual meaning—is to doom mankind to a dungeon deeper and narrower and darker than that which Bonnivard trod with restless and unconsenting step. The very glory of man is to “believe where he cannot prove.” The anchor whereby he warps his frail bark into the haven where he fain would be is always “within the veil.” In a word, man is a believer by the sheer necessities of his nature, and sometimes his beliefs bring thorns for his brow and spikes for his hands and feet. That is “testing” without a doubt, but is it also “proof”? Proof it is, but what shall we say of that truth which finally rests its case with man on the fact that it denies the absoluteness of “pure reason”? Tertullian was not talking nonsense when he pleaded for the credibility of the absurd and the certainty of the impossible.

Everyone assumes today that man has grown up, so to speak, from within nature, and that all his vast capacities of awareness and faith and trust and venture are in some sort of organic relation with the whole complex web of existence. “The freezing reason’s colder part” is not the only door which connects him with reality. He knows himself confronted by a *numinous*. There is an awareness of “Otherness” from which he cannot escape. Invisible and intangible it may be, but not therefore purely imaginary. To say of all this penumbra of extrarationality that it has no interpretive significance, either as respects man himself or as respects a circumambient objectivity, is clearly to say that that mysterious background from which man has come has endowed him with capacities which are forever deceiving him: he can satisfy his deepest self only by making false assumptions, only by believing what is not so, only by creating a world that is wholly fictitious. He has a voice wherewith to sing, but there is no song. In his discussion of mystical experience (Chapter X), Doctor Wieman allows that any organization of the personality at once reveals to it some aspects of reality and incapacitates it for others. Under certain conditions, however, the established organization may be as it were temporarily held in abeyance, and the soul becomes aware of a realm infinitely greater and

richer than eye hath ever seen or ear heard. Doctor Wieman is far from denying value to such an experience, but beyond question it eludes "observation" in the sense in which he seems to use the term, and it can as little be "tested by reason"—directly. To use Bergson's contrast, what functions at such times is "intuition" rather than "intelligence," or as Daniel Lamont is saying, the "person-attitude" rather than the "observer-attitude." Nevertheless, men have always tried to throw into intellectual statements what it has seemed to them this experience signifies, and with the further purpose of deepening, interpreting, and co-ordinating the experience. They are likely to cling to these statements with the tenacity of the prehensile. Why are they? Because, says Doctor Wieman sometimes, of a mere disinclination to change or to be disturbed or to be driven from a haven of security. But surely there is a deeper reason, without which the world's greatest souls, believers all, become incomprehensible, namely, because they do not see how their indubitable certainty of another world than that of measurable and ponderable fact can be retained if what they have come to believe about it, as expressed in definite statements, is not "true." In the very nature of the case, such "truth" is not susceptible of scientific or syllogistic demonstration. It cannot be "tested" in the same way that things are tested in a laboratory or evidence tested in a court of law. Here are some definite propositions from the Christian creed: "God lays his will upon me." "God loves me." "Because God loves me, he suffers with me and for me." "Jesus Christ is the supreme evidence of the suffering love of God." "The presence of Jesus Christ in history is specifically related to God's purpose to save the world from sin." "By virtue of the miracle of Resurrection, Jesus Christ is still active in the world." "The Eucharist mediates to the soul the fact that in Jesus Christ the divine wholly gave itself for the human." These are perfectly definite propositions. The historic church witnesses to them. But Doctor Wieman tells us that "only those propositions are true which can be tested by reason." Can these propositions be so tested? No—not if "reason" is under the limitations that Doctor Wieman seems to imply.

Then must they be declared false? That, of course, is just the point. Inability to offer scientific proof of a proposition is not equivalent to a demonstration of its falsity. Which is simply to say that human nature is constituted with reference to the prerogative of choice. But it is not a blind choice. Good reasons may be assigned for that by which pure reason

is itself baffled. These propositions come to us by way of a Voice. If I choose to believe—and choose one way or the other I must—that that Voice is the Voice of God, mediated by a process called "revelation" through a historic body called "the church," a Voice, one admits, sadly muffled at times by reason of the unresponsiveness of the medium, but nevertheless authentically divine even when least clearly heard—if I choose to believe that, I submit that the choice does not mean that I am childishly credulous. I choose because—! Here are affirmations, meaningful, overwhelming, revolutionary—and *testable*. For they are testable in the arena of life itself. They invest existence with a certain dread solemnity. They release man from the grip of coldly impersonal law. They challenge to high endeavor. They keep hope alive even in a day so dark as this. They supply motivation for the pursuit of a "Supremely Worthful" which is that indeed. They reveal sin as the dark blot which the Eternal God is in sore travail to wipe away for ever. They utter high rebuke to all selfishness, all sinfulness, all supine acquiescence in social wrong.

"Is it a dream?
Nay, but the lack of it a dream,
And failing it, life's love and wealth a dream,
And all the world a dream."

Doctor Wieman would say—and one gladly believes it—that he wants to see all the fruitage in life of such "truths" as these, but that the truths as stated can no longer command the assent of men. He admits that, cast in such forms, they are "dramatic," and hence eminently preachable, but he finds that that is no consideration. Truth is truly stated only when it is as nearly naked as language can leave it. Doctor Wieman therefore proposes that we strip away from the historic statement of the Christian religion most of its familiar and well-tested forms. Many reasons are given for this, but chiefly that "thought patterns" must inevitably change. The position needs careful scrutiny, for many share it with Doctor Wieman. If ideologies changed so completely from time to time as we are today being told that they do, the literatures of the distant past would be unintelligible to us—and they are not. We may admit peripheral changes, but there is in Christianity a core of truth not only unchanging in itself but unchanging also in the patterns through which it is expressed. So far is it from being the case that the church has to adapt itself to every passing ideologic fashion,

that one rather says that one of its most important tasks is just to refuse to do so. There is an anti-Christ not only of spirit and of action but also of conceptual forms. A death-blow may be aimed at the church simply by depriving it of that frame of reference to which its message is intrinsically germane. "What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." It must needs be that we have thought-patterns, but it must not needs be that no thought-pattern has permanent significance and adequacy. The Christian Church exists to witness to certain truths. So far it maintains its continuity. But it also exists to witness to those truths in certain ways, through definite statements, definite cult practices, definite spiritual exercises. It may be true, as Doctor Wieman claims, that in many Protestant circles these historic emphases are being neglected, or even flatly repudiated, brushed aside as the small dust of the balance. We are told that the remedy is a new ideology. But consider those situations where the new ideologies are being employed. Are they proving gloriously and contagiously effective? Hardly. Wherefore we are seeing the rapid disintegration of that rationalistic, humanistic, naturalistic modernism whose specialty it was to compel Christianity to come to terms with contemporaneous patterns. If the reaction from the disintegration shall be the recovery of the biblical and historical emphases, it will be well for Protestantism. Failing that, Protestantism is doomed, and it will be left to the Roman Catholic Church to be once again the sole witness to the world that God is our Father, that we are his erring children, that an alien power works against his purposes, and that to win his erring children to himself by overcoming this alien power he achieved the miracle of Incarnation, and by his own descent to our human depths to share our lot and meet our foe, paved the way for our ascent to such life as is his, holy, sacrificial, eternal. The Christian God is such a God as that, not a mere impersonal value-bearing "structure." The Christian faith is such a faith as that, not a mere general theory of meaning which is most true when stated most abstractly.

It can readily be believed that to write like this has been a thankless task. But it is well for us to know what the emerging issues are, and to make up our minds where we are to stand. Surely there are those sufficiently convinced of the truth and power of biblical and historical Christianity not to acquiesce lightly in the proposal, however well-intentioned and well-argued, to dispense with it and to replace it with a human invention.

Book Reviews

Luke the Evangelist. By WILFRID L. HANNAM. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.50.

WHY another book on Luke? This question may well be asked by the minister who surveys the long row of books on his shelves devoted to what Ernest Renan said was "the most beautiful book in the world." Large commentaries have been made on the third Gospel: Godet's, Dr. Plummer's in the *International Critical Commentary Series*, and Professor J. M. Creed's, which latter uses the latest methods of Form Criticism, to attempt to explain the situations Luke's selection of incidents and stories from Jesus' life was intended to meet. What, then, is fresh in this new study?

Mr. Hannam tells us why he avoids the method of comparison of Matthew and Mark with Luke, now in fashion. He leaves such comparisons aside and reads Luke as if it were the only story of Jesus' life and work in existence. He says his book "is an attempt to demonstrate that Luke's presentation of the life of Jesus can be understood only if we concentrate upon the finished work as it left the painter's hand." Luke the artist, selecting his materials, combining them into a portrait, which is more than a photograph: this is the angle of approach to the Gospel which Mr. Hannam takes up. And he succeeds admirably. He has a fine eye for perspective: he knows how to put contrasts of light and shade, as for example, when he puts a pair of turtledoves, Mary's offering, against the splendor of Herod's temple. He has a rare gift of exposition also; many a Greek word is held up to the light and flashes new meanings in the

writer's skillful hands. Here the wide-awake minister will find himself well in sight of material for a telling gospel sermon. In twenty-one chapters the career of Jesus, as Luke gives it, is closely studied, and the situations in human lives are sketched in masterly fashion, so that the old story is put as if meant for our twentieth-century needs and fears.

Mr. Hannam has not only the artist's eye, he possesses a subtle sense of humor. Again and again the irony of Luke comes to the surface in these expositions. And a rare gift of coining chapter titles—a thing Cardinal Newman excelled in—is in Mr. Hannam's store. "Diggings and Going Deep" is an instance; "Manners for Missionaries" is another; "The Indispensable Condition" is a third—a most searching sermon indeed! Literary allusions abound, not a trite one in the bunch. Above all, like a good Methodist, this preacher draws upon his varied experiences as a Mission Leader in London, Cambridge, Edinburgh and Manchester. Only a born preacher could give us such a study of Jesus and Zacchaeus as meets us in "The Way to Win a Man." How poignant, too, is the chapter on "And They Blindfolded Him," where for once Mr. Hannam makes comparison with the other gospels.

So then this study of Luke's Gospel deserves a place on a minister's bookshelves for its insight, suggestiveness and charm. And the common man who would fain "see Jesus" will see Him better if he uses the glasses provided by this delightful book.

R. BIRCH HOYLE.
Exchange Professor at
Western Theological Seminary.

The Psychology of Christian Personality. By ERNEST M. LIGON. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$3.00.

To those readers who are looking for a thoroughly Christocentric psychology, here it is. The author, holding his theological degree from Yale Divinity School and his doctorate of philosophy from Yale University, approaches his subject with both a religious and scientific background. Furthermore, his theories have been tested by experimental work, not only at Union College where he is a member of the Department of Psychology but also in the church school of a nearby city parish and at ministerial conferences where he is an increasingly popular speaker.

"It is the purpose of this book to consider the teachings of Jesus in the light of the psychology of personality." To do this requires the presentation of three sets of data: first, the elements of Christian personality as summed up in the Sermon on the Mount; second, the psychological evaluation of those factors; and third, the methods of developing the desired attitudes.

While the interpretations of Jesus' teachings follow in general the accredited lines of exegesis, there are often original and arresting insights. Take this one, "Jesus did not teach brotherly love; he taught fatherly love." What a departure that statement suggests from the traditional and hackneyed summary of Jesus' teachings as the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. The reader may be challenged to question the validity of the author's interpretation here, but this reviewer finds the argument commanding his respect. If one can accept this view of Jesus' use of "love," it gives a new reasonableness to such injunctions as "Love your enemies,"

and "Turn the other cheek." Fatherly love is infinitely forgiving. And the person who takes a Christlike fatherly attitude toward his neighbor assumes no irritating paternalism but rather a real partnership.

When the author turns from the exegetical to the psychological interpretations of the Sermon on the Mount, he talks the language of the laboratory and also of the street. Conversant with the latest technical trends, he draws his illustrations from life situations and makes his applications to personal problems. How to cure an inferiority complex, how to dispel the fears which shadow us and the ills which never arrive, how to tap our hidden sources of power and how to stimulate an experimental faith—these are some of the objectives which serve to make the treatment valuable for the cure of souls. Here is more than psychoanalysis. Here is psychosynthesis.

It may be open to question whether we have in the Sermon on the Mount as complete and formal a compendium of Christian personality as the author would have us believe. But even if the presentation is a bit more schematic than the fragmentary nature of the New Testament would justify, that fact does not lessen the value of the book. Professor Ligon has not read too much into Jesus' sayings in order to fit his thesis nor has he read too much out of them in order to fit his readers.

In this volume the preacher will find material for his sermon series, the Church school teacher will discover helps for exposition, the parent will receive guidance for the rearing of his children and the layman will get illuminating insights for his own living.

RALPH W. SOCKMAN.
Christ Church,
New York City.

The Accuracy of the Bible. By A. S. YAHUDA. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc. \$3.00.

THIS volume originated in a series of popular articles contributed to the London *Daily Telegraph*, in the years 1932 and 1933, under the title "The Truth of the Bible." A wide interest was the apparent response and the author has now published them in book form.

The title is somewhat challenging but is readily understood from the author's main interest, which is that of a good Jew in his Scriptures. The book, as thus might be expected, deals largely with the letter of Scripture, but there are those to whom the letter means a great deal. It is questionable, however, whether this is any more than the sawdust of criticism and it is more than doubtful whether this is the way to reach the truth of the Bible.

The sub-title is "The Stories of Joseph, the Exodus and Genesis illustrated and confirmed by the Egyptian monuments and language." The treatment is somewhat detached and scrappy as was inevitable in such a popular presentation. As to the author's main thesis, that Egypt exercised an influence on the Old Testament, there will be quite general agreement; as to the degree and extent of that influence few will agree with all the writer's contentions. He is obviously in revolt against the Pan-Babylonian school—perhaps rightly—but he overshoots the mark on the other side. There is no doubt that from very early times there was a continuous coming and going of commerce in the "fertile crescent" between Egypt and Babylon and that all the intervening states were occupied therewith; that commerce was not only of wares and merchandise but of intangible things such as thoughts and ideas. Myths are wonderful travelers and are found through the whole Orient; there

is no copyright in ideas. But whether they came from Babylon or Egypt or the Arabian steppe, the Hebrew baptized them all with a total immersion and transmuted them by his genius so that when we see them in the Bible, they are new creations, entirely distinct and original. Their truth is the truth of life itself.

Probably the origin of this book made it inevitable that it should seem popular rather than scientific; the author asserts rather than argues. There are surprising statements at times, such as the assertion that Genesis chapter one is an earlier composition than Genesis chapter two; if literary criteria mean anything the judgment must be the other way. Whether Eden be in Mesopotamia or Egypt does not seem to matter greatly for in either case the description is inaccurate; the truth is that Eden to the early writer had no geographical location; it was away in the never-never land of imagination. This is poetry and to turn poetry into prose is to sin against truth itself; it misses the universal in search for the local and loses the morning joy of life itself.

One can appreciate the author's enthusiasm for the accuracy of the Bible; he loves the Word and so do the biblical scholars who use all the apparatus of a reverent scientific criticism to elicit its truth. These scholars and their works are anathema to the author, a fact which will commend him to many; but it also constitutes our judgment of the book.

JOHN PATERSON.
Drew Theological Seminary.

A God-Centered Faith. By HUGH THOMSON KERR. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. \$1.75.

THERE was a need for a fresh, popular, yet adequate, statement of Calvinism

for the preacher and the layman of our Reformed Churches. Karl Barth has made many aware that Calvinism has a noble answer to a great problem. Shallow answers are no answer. The problem that Calvinism was called to answer was nothing less than the problem the New Testament arose to answer.

It was the New-Testament experience of God in Christ that gave both St. Paul and John Calvin the exhilarating doctrine of Sovereign Grace. For any man, who is saved, knows he is saved not by his own efforts or by social processes, but by God's unmerited love.

Many are aware that it is time to restore the word "grace" to its proper place in our hearts, and in our theological vocabulary. The place is a large one. Doctor Kerr's book will help. Under five chapter headings, he gathers the significant things: "The Evangelical Experience," "God: The Eternal Reality," "The Church of the Living God," "The Worship of the Reformed Churches," "Sovereignty and Social Justice." Here is evangelical warmth and light. Here is seasoned thinking and a style worthy of royal truths.

There was need for a fresh statement of Calvinism. Doctor Kerr has supplied the need.

GEORGE ARTHUR FRANTZ.
First Presbyterian Church,
Indianapolis, Indiana.

Frontiers of Christian Thinking. By
FREDERICK C. GRANT. Chicago:
Willett, Clark & Company. \$2.00.

THIS is a book which should be warmly welcomed by those who are aware of the need of accepting and adopting the scientific method in their religious thought yet are afraid that in so doing they may be jeopardizing religious values. Dean Grant regards science

and religion as mutually supplemental approaches to reality, and by them arrives at a working philosophy of life in which the God of the visible universe known to science is identified with the God of men's religious intuitions, of their common worship and of their ethical ideals.

In his critical-historical approach to the New Testament the author shows that the scientific school, far from undermining traditional Christology, actually strengthens and confirms it. Modern liberalism has failed signally in its attempt to strip off "accretions" to the Gospel and to get back to the "Jesus of history" and his original body of ethical teaching; but a like failure has confounded the attempt of eschatologists to refer back to Jesus the primitive messianic faith enshrined in the earliest records. Form criticism has made it impossible to be wholly sure which elements are original and which are later accretions made during the long period of oral transmission. But the very failure of both attempts points to the true character of the New Testament and the real nature of its message. What we have is "the literary deposit left by a mighty stream of spiritual life," both messianic and ethical but also more than both: something essentially new, which older terms are inadequate to convey. Though the "documentary" Christ eludes us, we have the present and life-giving reality of the Spiritual Christ, faith in whom is self-evidencing.

Dean Grant's approach to the problem of Christian Reunion is extraordinarily vital, and the case for the historic episcopate is presented without the dogmatic presuppositions which scholarship has rendered untenable, but with refreshing realism and candor. His approach to the problems of world fellowship and world co-operation through

religion shows an adequate conception of the Realm of God as older than the idea of the Church, but lacks the note of urgency appropriate to this time of crisis. Christendom as a political term has ceased to exist; several great nations which it once included have reverted to the Caesarism of the Roman Empire which deified the state; the prospect of martyrdom for religion is no longer unthinkable. *Hora novissima, tempora pesima sunt, vigilemus.*

HOWARD CHANDLER ROBBINS.
General Theological Seminary.

Modern Trends in World Religions.

Edited by A. EUSTACE HAYDON.
Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. \$2.50.

We are living in a day in which overwhelming transformations of environment are taking place over night. It is not the *fact* of change; it is the *rate* of change that marks the problem. We face the question whether or not our shifting environment has outrun our capacity for adaptation. There is a gap between the brilliant development of scientific knowledge on the one hand, and the almost stationary position of our knowledge of man on the other. The divergence between the natural sciences and the social sciences, between the kingdom of this world and the kingdom of the spirit, between the secular and the religious constitutes a major problem.

The great historic religions are being forced to face this fact of change. Habits of thought and customs of living which have been the background of stability for centuries are now being challenged. We live in a world where cultures and faiths and folk-ways are now being brought into intimate relation.

The problems of living are pretty largely the same in the Orient and the

Occident. The whole world faces the same problems, is reaching toward the same purposes, and is endeavoring to adjust inherited interpretations of life to the same scientific ideas. The modern machine which was once thought of as a means of freeing humanity from slavery has now brought its own form of enslavement. At the same time man faces the opportunity of using this machinery for bringing a new social and economic order.

What have the religions of the world to say to modern man in this new environment? Dr. A. Eustace Haydon brought together in the summer of 1933 a group of eminent scholars under the Haskell Foundation at the University of Chicago "to interpret the nature of the adjustments of six of the great religions to the crucial factors of change." Islam, Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Hinduism were interpreted from four aspects. First, from the standpoint of modern scientific thinking, and second, from the viewpoint of the modern economic situation. Then followed studies in intercultural contacts and the task of modern religion.

As is almost inevitable in a book of this character, the sixteen interpreters of the half dozen religions bring about as many variant points of view. However, the humanist point of view predominates. Here in compact form is a direction pointer for anyone who would get the feel of the currents of life as they move through the great historic religions of the world.

The great qualities of universal religion never become true apart from life. The ultimate test of all truth is the test of life. In the modern world any religion that is to live must contribute to that well-being of man that will make him a vehicle of truth and justice and righteousness. The crux of man's salva-

tion lies not in his relations with nature, but in his relations with himself. Here he must have great faiths to impel him, great ideals to allure him, great principles to guide him. Wherever science gives man the most power there man faces his greatest problems, problems that science creates but does not solve, for which there is no solution save within man in qualities of mind and character.

OSCAR THOMAS OLSON.

The Epworth-Euclid Methodist
Episcopal Church,
Cleveland, Ohio.

A Way to Life. By ERNEST FREMONT TITTLE. New York: Henry Holt and Company. \$1.75.

If you have heard Tittle or read his sermons, you have a picture of the man, a fearless, prophetic spellbinder, swept by inner tides of terrific passion. What does a man like that do when he is confronted with the task of writing a series of lectures for the Ayer Foundation at Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, for the Russell Foundation at Auburn Theological Seminary? These lectures must be delivered from manuscript before sophisticated groups of hypercritical theologians in maturity or embryo. It is a stiff test for the "fine careless rapture" of a prophet. But if your prophet is Tittle, you may now feel assured. *A Way to Life* shows his mind, staking out a significant section of religious thought, and with careful documentation, clarity of expression, and confident step-by-step logic, proceeding to conclusions which will remain always, foundation stones well laid in the minds of the students and teachers who heard him.

Not that Tittle's stormy moods have been refined away for his more select company. In every chapter, somewhere, the rumbling of his great obsession is

heard like thunder on the left, and the air crackles with storm. The mention of war, in any connection, makes the sky of his mind black with clouds and livid with sudden flashes of fierce fury. Tittle, the preacher, emerges every ten pages or so—his trumpeting for peace indicating always the deep influence of Gregg's great book on nonviolence.

But between these outbursts of terrible compassion, you can watch the mind work. With what cool precision Tittle outlines long-range historical trends. You see the pendulum swing from religion "which belittled man in order to glorify God" far out to the opposite extreme of humanism "belittling the idea of God and affirming the greatness and self-sufficiency of man." You watch that pendulum start forward again past Barth toward a new theism which "sees in man a marvellous mixture of dust and divinity." In another chapter, you watch the "brutal solidarity of primitive man" yield to the impact of "rugged individualism, or perhaps it would be more accurate and honest to say an irresponsible egoism"—and this chapter mounts to its unforgettable climax in a great plea for a "Christian Society which would never trample upon the rights of the individual and in which no Christian individual would ever imperil, by his own self-seeking, the welfare of society."

The originality of his outline of thought is re-enforced by the sentences of quotation which he cites in connection with his argument. Keynes, Max Otto, Eustace Haydon, Whitehead, Wieman, Hindus, Katherine Mansfield, Floyd Dell, Millikan and Compton—great names of people who on this point or that agree or disagree with him, stud his pages like jewels, and as you read you are conscious of the fact that Tittle's conclusions were reached not in the vacuum of solitary meditation but in the midst of

the swirling currents of contemporary thought.

The experience of reading this book, *A Way to Life*, is a heartening one. We can trust this prophet. Even his dream of a Christian Internationale wistfully presented in his last chapter may prove possible of realization if the "remnant" of Christians, whom he seeks to challenge, will learn to feel as deeply as he feels, read as widely as he reads, suffer as terribly as he suffers, and then think as clearly as he thinks.

BERNARD C. CLAUSEN.

First Baptist Church,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

The Epistle of Paul to the Galatians.

By GEORGE S. DUNCAN. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$3.50.

PROFESSOR DUNCAN's volume is the tenth of the Moffatt New Testament commentaries to appear. Like the others in the series, it is designed for the Greekless, and, though based upon careful historical and textual criticism, it is intended to bring out the religious message of the document in terms intelligible to the average Christian reader. To write such a commentary on Galatians is one of the most difficult tasks which can be assigned to a Christian theologian in our un-Pauline times. Professor Duncan is evidently well equipped for the task by his insight into the perennial truth of the gospel of redemption, and he has produced an admirable interpretation of the "Magna Charta of Evangelical Christianity." The introductory essays on the theological background and the dominant religious ideas of the epistle are concise and incisive statements of the Pauline problem and the Pauline solution. The interpretation never gets lost in side issues, but hews to the line and succeeds in keep-

ing the argument as a whole before the reader's mind. The historical situation is never lost sight of, yet Paul appears as a preacher of redemption and the life of the spirit not only to first-century south Galatians who are being taken into bondage by Judaizers, but also to twentieth-century Christians who succumb to modern, idealistic or moralistic varieties of the Judaistic heresy.

One might desire more of the contemporary note than the author gives us. But to express the Pauline message for our time with the vividness and the reality which the epistle to the Galatians had for its readers requires a different approach than a historical commentary allows. The present volume will stimulate the preaching of the Pauline gospel in such contemporary terms, will provide a sound basis for this preaching and will greatly aid in the recovery of Pauline insights and convictions.

H. RICHARD NIEBUHR.

Yale Divinity School.

The Hebrew Heritage. By CHARLES W. HARRIS. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.50.

THIS book, as the subtitle states, is "a study of Israel's cultural and spiritual origins." It is divided into five parts. The first deals with the genesis and development of early cultures, especially the American and Egyptian. The second is devoted to the rise and growth of the Hebrew nation. The third expounds the religious and moral values in Hebrew prophecy. The fourth takes up religious thought in two neighboring non-Semitic races, the Persians and the Greeks. And the fifth gives an account of postexilic Judaism and its dominant ideas as represented especially by Psalms, Job and Ecclesiastes.

From this outline of its contents it is

evident that the book covers a very broad field. It surveys almost the whole of ancient history in its relation to the Old Testament. In dealing with such a broad subject two things are manifestly requisite: thorough acquaintance with the available material and the problems involved in its interpretation, and the ability to single out the most significant facts and theories and to relate them in a vital way to the understanding of Israel's message to the world. These qualifications the author has in an eminent degree. I do not know where one could turn for a better brief introduction to the cultural environment of ancient Israel. Here we have the framework in which Old Testament religion was set and a sufficient exposition of its history and leading ideas to enable the reader to see the whole in its true perspective.

The book is apparently intended for use as a college textbook, and is admirably adapted to that purpose. The material is well arranged, and there is a sufficient number of references to other books to start the student on a more thorough study of the various topics dealt with. The value of the book, however, is by no means limited to college students. It is written in such a clear and untechnical style that the general reader will have no difficulty with it.

The necessary limitation of such a volume is that it does not enable the author to go into detail as much as some would like nor does it give him opportunity to penetrate as deeply nor expound as fully as he might the great distinctive ideas of Old Testament religion. But within the limits set him he has in these two respects done as well as could be expected. A good sense of proportion is maintained throughout the book. Especially to be commended is the attention given to the development of Greek thought. The author rides no hobbies.

He presents a view of Old Testament religion and its sources that would generally be accepted by present-day scholarship, and he does so in a reverent spirit that will commend itself to the religiously minded. While he is primarily concerned with bringing out the religious customs and ideas that the Hebrews inherited or borrowed from other peoples, he everywhere recognizes that this is only preliminary to what is far more important, a better understanding of the unique heritage that we have received from Israel.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON.

Boston University
School of Theology.

Realist Pacifism. By LEYTON RICHARDS. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company. \$2.00.

LEYTON RICHARDS, minister of Carrs Lane Church, Birmingham, since 1924, is a pacifist prophet crying with a Christian voice in a confused world; and when Europe becomes either a burying ground or a more peaceful neighborhood the wonder will be why earlier heed was not paid to so real and penetrating a Christian statesman. The author has proved that he is willing to pay the price of a thoroughgoing pacifist's position, having served as secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation in England during the war when he was fined £100 under the Defense of the Realm Act for refusing to mix Christianity and war.

One gathers the impression from England that the influence of this author along with many others in a strong pacifist group prevented the British Government from forcing France to assist with her navy and from using, under the name of the League, naval and military sanctions in the Mediterranean against Italy. All of which may have meant the forestalling of another European war.

This book sets forth two reasons why the existing sanctions of the League Covenant cannot be invoked without issuing in a first-class war: national armaments and the presence of major powers outside the League. Thus the first steps toward world order become the creation of public opinion in favor of disarmament to a degree commensurate with civil defense and the clothing of an international authority with executive powers. Weapons of war would become the property of a League of Nations. An International Police Force could then proceed as against a rebellious province with redemption instead of extermination as its method.

With thorough consistency the author urges support for national policies that need no defense. He would have England internationalize not only her crown colonies to a mandatory system, but also her strategic chain of fortifications, Gibraltar, Malta, Port Said, Suez, et cetera, by transferring them to the sovereignty of the League of Nations. Greater faith hath no internationalist.

The appeal to the sub-Christian mind for conviction that the best defense of one's country today is to refuse to fight is based upon the application of chemistry and aeronautics to warfare. Both the urgency of common sense and the logic of history are invoked. The author speculates upon the achievements of force and those of martyrdom as historical bases for national greatness. He makes telling use of the history of the United States Supreme Court and the security of our several states under federation. He draws the conclusion that the co-operation of nations willing to qualify their sovereignty does not have to await any form of economic change.

The thrust of conviction is primarily directed at the Christian conscience and is based squarely upon the facts of

Christ's redemptive method and purpose. The Christian objection to war is shown to be against its method and spirit, though not necessarily its purpose. The spirit of war is found in readiness to violate, to kill, to demoralize; the method of war is the abdication of reason and the decencies, the propagating of lies, and the infliction of chemical and incendiary bombardment upon defenseless civil populations. Such means are not a remedy but an aggravation of evil and will destroy morale and civilization. In the face of the colossal foolishness of the illusions of military security, the church according to the author should "excommunicate" war and all its works from her borders. She could paralyze the hand of war and the world's statesmanship would speedily discover other ways of dealing with international disputes.

Some of the controversial speculations of this book seem over-simplified and dogmatic, as in the author's contention concerning the inefficacy of our Civil War in freeing the Negro; but perhaps for that very reason it is eloquent with the intensity of a great spirit.

F. MARION SMITH.
Minister Trinity Methodist Episcopal
Church, Springfield, Mass.

Songs From the Slums. By TOYOHICO KAGAWA. Nashville: The Cokesbury Press. \$1.00.

HAVING read *Songs From the Slums*, I was unwilling to attempt at once a review of the book. The spell these poems wove about me was too complete to admit of dispassionate judgment. The tensity of their feeling evoked emotions difficult to restrain; the earnestness of their moral purpose played upon all the presuppositions of the preacher as the organist plays upon the keys of his console.

Time now has passed, other interests have been allowed in; my mind has had a breathing spell. I can now appraise them more calmly. As to poetic form, the verses are irregular almost to the point of being without it. The tight, compact, sonnet-like fashion of most Oriental verse is wholly lacking. What they were in Japanese, in which they were written, of course we do not know; as we have them they are almost formless, or rather they are poured into any form the idea seems best to fit.

To say they are without form is not at all to say they are without beauty. Beauty is here in abundance; mostly a sad and haunting beauty that stirs pity awake and shame; pride, too, that though the soul may be beaten down by circumstance, yet it never lacks some champion ready to challenge and protest.

These verses make crystal clear the price evil exacts from him who sets himself to reform it. Here is no debonair and witless knight, intent to get himself some fame as champion of the unfortunate, without appreciable cost to himself. There's heart's blood in these verses, sacrifice to the point of suffering, renunciation to the grimness of the cross. The higher celibacy becomes articulate in "Love Me Not"—

"Love, linger not to whisper your temptation;
Seek not to bind me with your heavy chain;
I would be free to seek the world's salvation;
I would be free to rescue men from pain.
• • • • •
Fervent with vow I swore to fight, nor falter;
Fight with a faith not flickering, nor dim;
God is my Father; in my heart an altar Glows with the sacrifice I offer him.

Leave me alone, Love,
Leave my heart alone!"

The temptation to quote more is very strong. In "Spring Night," with its poignant closing lines, one sees what a recent writer has called Japan's Geisha Girl Problem, as Jesus would have seen it—

"Then I went away
And hid my face,
And wept—
Wept for the woe
Those little singing girls
Must know!"

Poets can be locked in prisons, more than once Kagawa has been, but no fetters can chain the soul. In "The Ballad of Reading Gaol," Oscar Wilde has shown what a prison can do to the spirit of man; in "If Only There Are Stars," Kagawa has shown what the spirit of man can do to a prison—

"Fearless, I fly and fly,
On through the heavenly sky;
Breaking all prison bars,
My soul sleeps with the stars!"

Make no mistake, this volume is poetry, poetry worth knowing.

WALLACE H. FINCH.
Baldwin, N. Y.

The Church of Christ and the Problems of the Day. By KARL HEIM. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.75.

THIS volume contains the series of lectures delivered on the James Sprunt Foundation at Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Va., in 1935, whose threefold object, as stated in the preface, is to depict the new world situation resulting from the failure of Rationalism to estimate Germany's attempt to replace lost faith in a transcendent world by a

new faith in the divine value of the nation, and to show how modern disillusionment leads to a new understanding of Lutheranism.

In spite of the fact that its "longings for an ordered world . . . are a divine urge within us which shall ultimately become a reality," Rationalism has failed because men cannot be merely educated into moral living. Nationalism, in order to avoid deciding between the Christian God and no-god, "substitutes unbounded faith in the spiritual ability of the nation." While Nationalism satisfies both intellectually and emotionally it must be pronounced inadequate as a religion because it has no redemptive power over that sin which the conscience persists in allowing.

That there is even a remote probability that Nationalism will submit to such modifications as the acceptance of Christianity would demand, the author nowhere asserts, he contents himself with repeatedly holding up the alternative of acceptance or rejection of the Lutheran faith, which he briefly but adequately presents, together with the consequences which may be expected to proceed from either choice. And yet as the reader lays down the book it is with the impression that Professor Heim cherishes the hope that Nationalism may none the less serve as the "new cart" upon which may ultimately rest the ark enshrining the old faith of Luther, a hope in which every Christian reader must share however dubious may seem the ground on which it rests.

This acceptance of Christianity by Nationalism may proceed according to Professor Heim from two causes. One, disillusionment through shaken confidence in capacity for self-redemption. Nationalism is a fair weather religion unfortified against adversity. It therefore needs to be re-enforced by faith in a

god outside itself who can take away sin. It is here that Nationalism is weakest, since it denies individual guilt (p. 76) and holds that evil is automatically expurgated by the spiritual ego within. But now, "If we have become aware of the reality of our guilt over which we have no control then the door is opened by which we may enter into the Holy of Holies of the Christian faith" (p. 84). True, but this acceptance of Luther's doctrines of "justification by faith" and a "vicarious atonement" would mean a surrender by Nationalism of its basic tenets. Teutonic Paganism did once thus surrender to Boniface but then it ceased to be paganism and dying bequeathed to Christianity only a Yule log and a Christmas tree. Since the present German faith is not ignorance of Christianity but a lapse from it, the problem is different and more difficult. The only comment possible is that "with God all things are possible."

The second fact from which proceeds hope in the reconciliation of Nationalism and Christianity lies in a certain analogy between the Christ of the Gospels and "The Leader." To the Bible student this analogy is not convincing. "The Leader," Professor Heim tells us (p. 110) "has stepped into the vacuum caused by the collapse at the end of the war of that whole world of ideas represented by the Age of Rationalism, German Idealism, etc. . . . At the moment in which ideas begin to fade, an entirely new necessity . . . comes to the front. The demand for the Hero breaks out with elemental force" (pp. 99-103). So "the essence of Christianity is not a philosophy but a person." Professor Heim proceeds: "The leader at whose command I risk my life has absolutely no need to possess a concrete program or a formulated ethic" (p. 106); similarly "Jesus did not give a

finished program for all time" (p. 114). "Jesus lets it be understood . . . that everything depends not on the acceptance of the truth of particular propositions or the appropriation of a definite view of life but on an attitude to his Person" (*ibid.*). Thus Christianity would appear to be only adoration of the virtues inherent in Jesus of Nazareth and there need be no expectation that the further very natural question: "Lord, what wouldst thou have me to do?" will be answered by any "concrete program or formulated ethic."

Also it would hardly seem as though the mission of the church were adequately stated when it is assigned the twofold task of serving as Public Conscience, arbitrating between right and wrong, for example, between employer and employee, and playing the Good Samaritan (pp. 122, 123).

If Nationalism admits the idea of a transcendent God it will feel the necessity of prayer whose value is attested by Christian experience and will finally come to faith in immortality through personal contact with the Risen Christ.

Whether the reader wholly agrees with Professor Heim or not, he will find the book both interesting and stimulating. The preacher, in his annual frantic search for an Easter sermon, will find some valuable suggestions in the last chapter entitled, "I Am the Resurrection and the Life."

J. FREDERIC BERG.

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The Church Against the World. By

H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, WILHELM
PAUCK and FRANCIS MILLER.
Chicago: Willett, Clark and Com-
pany. \$2.00.

THREE men of the "younger genera-

tion of theologians" have collaborated in providing us with a symptomatic and analytical book concerning the modern crisis facing the Church, not only from without but from within. The book is not exactly a unit, but represents rather a collection of pamphlets or papers that have been put into one volume and cemented together by an introduction and a common spirit of revolt and concern regarding the Christian situation.

These men are trying to help the Church by telling it frankly what is wrong. They write with a sense of holy suffering. Their thinking is not critical but creative. The gist of the book deals with the slavery, or unfreedom, of the Church in the modern world, due largely to the existence of too much "world" in the Church.

Protestantism, especially, by its unconscious or eager alliance with the cultural forces of the world, has been shorn of its power that comes of independency of life. Even in America, the land from which we might expect a Christian Church that could lead the world out into a universality of Christian appeal, the Church is becoming a national, or American cultural institution. The Church, and its very theology and life, have become anthropocentric, and thus the Church takes on the characteristics of a divisive human institution, whereas it must set up a universal frame of culture. Professor Pauck deals with the theological, or essentially religious, problem involved in the Church's crisis. Step by step he traces the growth of a pernicious element at the very heart of the Church's theology. He also appraises some of the modern movements within the Church, which are products of the crisis. With sympathy toward Barth's position, he does not think that Barth has followed through sufficiently to become the leader in the Church's struggle for independ-

ence. But Barth has pointed the way.

Great questions are proposed in this little volume, such as those suggested by Francis Miller, who asks, Can the Protestant Churches survive as reliable witnesses to Christian faith? and Is American religion Christian?

Professor H. Richard Niebuhr writes with his accustomed blend of scholarly analysis and positive synthesis on the way to the recovery of the Church's independence from a dependence upon anthropocentric civilization. The Church must return to theology, to God-centric faith.

Much could be written about this little book of tracts for the times, both in praise and criticism. But its main task is to serve as a huge question mark, a corrective "pinch of spice" upon our theological diet. It is a book that should be faced. And the hidden truth would not only disturb, but in disturbing would lead the sincere inquirer on to greater light. American churchmen will need many more such books as this.

If I might add a few observations of my own, I would add that this book will be paralyzing to the average reader. He will feel helpless in the face of the problem of the Church. It will bring about a negative reaction. Here and there it may arouse creative thinking. The realist will call its implicit call to independence too illusory. The active churchman will call it pessimistic. Others will call it too academic and analytical and critical.

It is a problem whether the solution to the crisis of the American churches will be along this line. The academic approach has been necessary in the past, but it hardly was capable of generating the fire needed to give life radiant and meaningful living. The common man must be reached, and it is problematical whether the private in the ranks, or even

the corporals (the ministers), will be reached by this book. And what he needs is hand grenades, not cannons or tanks!

There is room for another book with positive punch. Barth has pointed the way, and it may be that his way is more than a pointer. He is calling the Church back to a busyness with the Word of God in Christ, the Reality of the living God in human flesh. This book is good ground work, but we will need a clearer word of command to attack the enemy first of all within our gates. Here theology and analysis must follow the heroic knight who goes out under the urge of a great Commander and commission!

E. G. HOMRIGHAUSEN.

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In the Steps of the Master. By H. C.

V. MORTON. New York: Dodd,
Mead and Company. \$3.00.

MR. MORTON brings all his rich knowledge of history, travel and experience to the writing of *In the Steps of the Master*. It took the author of *In Search of England*, etc., to tell us that the Tenth Roman Legion that destroyed Jerusalem under Titus in 70 A. D. was trained under Vespasian during the siege of Britain in 43 A. D. And in the strange irony of history the race then conquered rules Palestine today under a Mandate from the League of Nations.

The author attempted to visit every place where it is recorded that our Lord went. He went steeped in the best of the writings of modern biblical scholars, both in the Old and New Testaments. He then wrote as he went, furnishing such vivid details that one easily imagines himself present with the writer at the time. Especially those who have themselves visited the scene will follow the

trip to the Red Rose City of Petra, in the heart of the Mountains of Edom, and see again the moon rise over the Arabian desert and light up the Cave City, built and long inhabited by defending armies. And yet those not having seen Machaerus, in the heart of the Moab Mountains overlooking the Dead Sea, will be able to imagine the rich life of the Court of Herod and the dastardly crime of the king in submitting to the revengeful request for the head of John the Baptist.

Beginning at Beersheba, he follows the army of Lord Allenby across to Gaza, and on by Ludd (Lydda), and up to Nebi Samuel from which many a conqueror has gotten his first view of the Beloved City. He tells how the Arabs are understanding the meaning of the peaceful conquest of Great Britain and are assisting in civilizing the yet unlettered *fel-lahin*. Then he gives us glimpses of the times of the Crusaders who built their forts at Acco and Athlit on the Mediterranean, from whence they made skirmishes inland and for 100 years held the Holy Land in the name of Christ, until Saladin retook it for Islam and thus began the Turkish rule.

Of more significance is his close attention to the Jewish feasts and customs, throwing light on the things our Lord did, and helping us to understand their meaning for our time. And greatest of all, we seem to be walking with Christ over the hills and valleys, into the homes and Temples, hearing him speak and understanding what he did as if we were there with him.

What hidden secrets there are in this tiny country where every stone holds the mystery of some tale that bears on the life of prophets and of him who showed himself the Friend of man!

G. B. THOMPSON.

Ajmer, Rajputana, India.

Man, the Unknown. By ALEXIS CARREL. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$3.50.

THIS book is a sign of the times. Written by a specialist, one of the most eminent in his own field, it is a plea for seeing things in the large and as a whole. Its subject is *Man, the Unknown*, and it is the attempt to sum up, in language which the layman can understand, what the special sciences which deal with aspects of man's nature can contribute to our understanding of man as a whole.

Doctor Carrel would be the first to disclaim the idea that he has given us a complete and final picture. His title, *Man, the Unknown*, registers his conviction that much as we know about man, our knowledge is but the shore which bounds the great ocean of our ignorance. But the book expresses the author's faith that this ocean, though vast, is not unconquerable and that in science we have a compass which, honestly and persistently used, will guide us to our goal.

If one were to raise a single query about the book, which is as fascinating as it is rewarding, it would be whether the author does not claim too much for science as the key to the discovery of man's true nature. What it has already done for us, Doctor Carrel has explained in language whose clarity is only surpassed by its picturesqueness. But not the least of the revelations which science has brought are just these areas of ignorance on which we lack adequate guidance. Unlike many devotees of the physical sciences, Doctor Carrel makes large place in his picture for the spiritual side of man's nature. He recognizes the contribution of the mystical experience to man's enlightenment and welfare. "Man," he writes, "integrates himself by meditation, just as by action. But he should not be content with contemplating

the beauty of the ocean, of the mountains, and of the clouds, the masterpieces of the artists and the poets, the majestic constructions of philosophical thought, the mathematical formulas which express natural laws. He must also be the soul which strives to attain a moral ideal, searches for light in the darkness of this world, marches forward along the mystic way, and renounces itself in order to apprehend the invisible substratum of the universe." (P. 146.)

Unlike most of his colleagues, Doctor Carrel accepts clairvoyance and telepathy as demonstrated facts, and gives a large place to the contribution made by prayer to physical healing. "Prayer, which is followed by organic effects," he tells us, "is of a special nature. First, it is entirely disinterested. Man offers himself to God. He stands before him like the canvas before the painter or the marble before the sculptor. At the same time, he asks for His grace, exposes his needs and those of his brothers in suffering. Generally, the patient who is cured is not praying for himself. But for another. Such a type of prayer demands complete renunciation—that is, a higher form of asceticism. The modest, the ignorant, and the poor are more capable of this self-denial than the rich and the intellectual. When it possesses such characteristics, prayer may set in motion a strange phenomenon, the miracle." (Pp. 147, 148.)

While all the book is interesting and informing, laymen will be apt to find the chapters which deal with the physical aspects of man's nature most instructive, particularly the chapters on "Body and Physiological Activities," on "Inward Time," and on "Adaptive Functions." Here Doctor Carrel speaks as biologist and physician, and does for the layman

what no other writer of our day has been able to do. He gives a picture of the mechanism of the human body which, in spite of its extraordinary complexity, makes it seem intelligible and even simple. Compared with these, the chapter on "Mental Activities," while interesting, is less convincing. Doctor Carrel himself recognizes that in this field our knowledge is much less accurate than in connection with the physical sciences, and the place of unverified conjecture is greater.

Least convincing is the last chapter. For here one feels that Doctor Carrel leaves the firm ground of science and indulges in speculation which, while interesting, is less firmly based. Many of his remarks are full of suggestion, such as the passages in which he speaks of the danger of leisure and of the weakening of man's power of resistance due to the loss of the element of discipline in modern life. But one feels that these statements would come with more convincing force if they were founded upon a more adequate study of man's social relationships than Doctor Carrel has had time to give us in this volume.

But these are minor defects in a book of singular excellence. Those who wish a statement of the teleological argument as it meets us in the light of the latest results of modern science will find it here in a form which is all the more effective because it is implicit rather than definitely stated. When one contemplates the intricacy of the mechanism which has made man what he is, one is lost in wonder at the greatness of the being from whom the universe proceeds and on whom it depends.

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN.
Union Theological Seminary.

Bookish Brevities

J. PARTON MILUM has written notable articles for *The Contemporary Review*.

Before coming to Harvard, Kirsopp Lake was Professor of New Testament Interpretation in the University of Leyden. Mrs. Lake, formerly Silva New, was a Guggenheim Fellow and a member of the executive committee of the expedition which excavated in Samaria for three years.

For many years Arthur Liebert was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin and Secretary of the Kant-Gesellschaft, an internationally famous organization. On account of the Aryan legislation of the Nazis he was forced to leave Germany in 1933.

A modest man is newly defined as the one who, knowing a short word where a longer might fit, uses the shorter.

H. V. Morton's *In the Steps of the Master* is meeting with a wide distribution in Canada. Thirty thousand copies have been imported from Great Britain. In a history of one hundred years it is the best seller of the Publishing House of the United Church.

The accomplished occupant of the Chair of Old Testament in a famous American Theological Seminary, who had all his training on another continent, recently recommended to his students seventy-nine books, only six of

which were written in America. From such advice more than one induction is to be drawn, but one sure inference is that more American scholars should write able books.

E. Stanley Jones is spending three months in a mental and spiritual retreat among the Himalayas. He occupies his morning in writing and his afternoons and evenings in reading. He plans to spend May and June with his Ashram and then proceed to America for the National Preaching Mission which he is to lead through the autumn.

It is announced that in the New York Public Library 200,000 books need immediate replacement. The appropriation for the purchase of books in 1935 was \$60,000. \$257,500 is sought for this year, which was the appropriation in 1932 and which amounts to only six cents per capita. Brooklyn Borough, which had \$60,000 last year, requests \$157,000 for 1936, and Queens Borough, which had \$25,000 in 1935, asks for \$250,000.

We can be overly complacent about the vast production of books as an indication of the intellectual development of the United States. It is computed that ten million novels are printed annually, relatively few of which exercise any elevating cultural influence. Hundreds of thousands of mystery stories are put out, whose greatest mystery, Ring Lardner holds, is how they ever came to be written.

The United Church of Canada devoted a recent Sunday to Reading and Life. The call to its observance urged that there is little chance for a rich and full life unless through books we are taught to use the thought and experience of the past and present to build up the best within us. Choice books contribute the wealth of a worthy introduction to life and an equipment for living unparalleled in value.

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A young and pioneer America does not readily recognize ecclesiastical niceties and doctrinal conciliations as approaches to Church unity. It is much more congenial to the American temperament to come to fellowship and understanding through co-operation in useful activities. Signs are not wanting, however, that even here the relations of church and state will come to have some of the acuteness now obtaining in other parts of the world; therefore, the timely significance of books like A. E. Garvie's *The Fatherly Rule of God*, William Adams Brown's *The Church, Catholic and Protestant* and Ernest F. Johnson's *The Church and Society*.

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Dean Virginia C. Gildersleeve of Barnard College challenges consideration by her assertion that due to the rapidly diminishing amount of reading done by young people, the present generation of students is rather more illiterate than were the students of the past. "Instead of taking things in through the eye and becoming familiar with the aspect of words they take them in through the ear by the radio and moving pictures, and the effect upon their spelling and some other aspects of their writing is lamentable."

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The title of a volume of 519 pages, *Living with Books*, has more promise than provender for readers of religious books. It is primarily addressed to librarians whom it will better assist in the selection of books in other fields than in religion. "In times when religion inclines to find individual rather than congregational expression," it holds, "that people who seek counsel, incentive or encouragement are apt nowadays to turn instinctively to books. In many personal situations the public library is the modern substitute for the religious help sought in an earlier age." Instead many ministers witness that while people may not be as ready to assemble for worship, never did so many approach them individually.

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Dr. Toyohiko Kagawa is giving himself for six months to the United States. He excels in fusing the fervor of an evangelist with the skill of a social worker. He bears upon his frail but un-resting body the marks of devotion to the poor and oppressed. His life is a protest against the militarism of his native Japan and against racial exclusiveness in the United States. When upon his last visit, the major social problems were outlined to him, Kagawa listened earnestly and then remarked that the solution lay in our people being more Christian. In Japan his *Grain of Wheat* has run through 150 editions and has been filmed and dramatized.

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The old debate is renewed as to whether literature reflects the society of its period or creates the standards and personalities of a new social milieu. The manifest answer is that both influences operate, with the additional observation that in revolt against contemporary customs the opposite may be emphasized.

Some writers on religion claim that theological ideas reflect the social conditions of their day while others trace the development of Christian truth through a series of towering and originating leaders. The transitions offer a fascinating and often baffling study, especially in our own America where it has been said a pendulum is not a pendulum but a piston. We are a long way from realizing the far-reaching change implied in the present lift of the primacy in theology and religion from the man-made to the God-given.

In social situations we have tired of the clever cynics who revelled in ridiculing the traditional. They have been useful as deflators and entertaining in the blowing off of the steam of their

partialities and prejudices. Now the earnest, constructive, responsible scholar wins our attention. Nor is this due to the compromise and weariness which Sinclair Lewis suggests we may expect when we reach the age of forty-five. Rather in an age when recklessness endangers the continuance of the best that man has achieved, we are more realistic and in our confusion we seek not only release from prevalent acknowledged iniquities but an assurance that in the turmoil of revolution conditions of living at least as free, as near sufficient and secure will ensue. Will Durant wisely writes—economic and political advance seem to demand a higher degree of equality among men than nature has provided.

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